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The Changing American Mosaic:
An Introduction
WILMA PEEBLES-WILKINS

Boston University
School of Social Work

This article, in addition to introducing the special journal issue on the
changing American mosaic, provides a synthesis of issues associatedwith
changing demographic trends as the number of people of color increase
between 2000-2050. Welfare reform, structuralinequality,and the convergence of race, class and gender issues are discussed in a civil rights context.
A brief summary of the otherjournalarticles by Glen Loury; Stanley Eitzen
and Maxine Baca Zinn; Ruth Sidel; Mary Krist, Douglas Gurak, Likwang
Chen; Doris Wilkinson and MargaretGibelman is also provided.
"While they're standing in the welfare lines
Crying at the doorsteps of those armies of salvation
Wasting time in the unemployment lines
Sitting around waiting for a promotion.
"Poor people gonna rise up
And get their share
Poor people gonna rise up
And take what's theirs"
-Talkin'

Bout A Revolution
Tracy Chapman

At the beginning of the decade of the nineties, the phrase "the
changing American mosaic" was frequently used to characterize
the anticipated demographic changes in large urban centers between the years 2000-2050. Population projections for the new
millennium have shown dramatic shifts in the number of people
of color such that people of color will out number the white
majority in some communities. Much of this shift is associated
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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with immigrants who are people of color and adds new dimensions to early civil rights efforts to increase opportunities for
African Americans and curtail job and other forms of institutional
and individual discrimination against them. Such demographic
shifts not only increase ethnic and racial diversity, but the labor
force changes, concerns arise about the political economy and
access to opportunities for all people of color and tensions arise
over the preservation of the identity of American society. (See
Reimers, Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and The Turn
Against Immigration.) More conservative attitudes about governmental responsibility and the use of public funds for low income
families and the poor accompany these shifts. Large urban communities have the highest welfare population and have had the
highest number of immigrants on welfare. Public assistance and
essential services for immigrants add still another dimension to
governmental responsibility and public assistance myths. Many
of the myths about the use of public benefits have historically been
negative stereotypes about poor, welfare dependent black female
heads of households. (See Sidel, Keeping Women and Children Last,
1998). However, In addition to targeting black mothers with
children born out of wedlock, welfare reform actually resulted
in anti-immigrant provisions as well. Dill, Baca Zinn and Patton
(1999) have described the conservative narrative manifested in
anti-immigrant campaigns which included, for example, negative
stereotypes of Latino families as welfare dependent with dysfunctional family lives. (pp. 265-66). The same authors describe these
political narratives as "racialized", and blaming "poor single and
immigrant mothers for social ills like drug addiction, poverty,
crime, and gang violence." (p. 264). Such political factors perpetuate social inequality in our society and changes in the American
mosaic raise critical concerns about social justice and the quality
of life for the growing number of people of color, many of whom
are poor. These projected population changes are not accompanied by changes in structural inequality in American society.
ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL
INEQUALITY AND FAMILY WELL-BEING
The Hamiltons (1997) in The Dual Agenda remind us that the
civil rights movement which began more than three decades ago
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was not only concerned about racial justice, but the economic
needs of poor families as well. Socioeconomic concerns of the civil
rights movement became obscured by the necessary thrust and
emphasis on racial discrimination. In their discussion on welfare
reform and full employment in the 1970's, the Hamiltons note
that "a full employment policy continued to represent an ideal
welfare reform plan for civil rights organizations because it would
be universal and provide jobs with no public assistance stigma
attached to them." (p. 175). By the same token, the Hamiltons
note that civil rights organizations were adamantly opposed to
mandatory welfare-to-work legislative reform, the implications
of such legislation being that welfare recipients did not want to
work. The distinction here is made between a full employment
policy and welfare reform, jobs in the "regular work force" versus
mandatory workfare programs. The 1963 March on Washington
was a march for both jobs and freedom-a march for federal
legislation to promote economic expansion, federal programs to
provide jobs for all the unemployed, federal fair employment
and labor standards to curtail job discrimination and the establishment of a national minimum wage. (p. 126). Economic
opportunity and civil rights were not viewed dichotomously.
The civil rights movement has always been concerned about the
adequate provision of social programs, access to health care, job
opportunities and benefits.
The so-called New Federalism has created uneven patterns in
the economic well-being of low income families needing public
benefits. Under current welfare reform measures, there has been a
decrease in federal responsibility for social programs, devolution
to the states, and an emphasis on welfare-to-work. While southern
states and states in the West, in general, tend to have greater
poverty, the population shifts noted earlier have primarily created
an increase in the immigrant population in large northeastern
cities. Many of these immigrants are people of color, are poor,
and in need of social programs, jobs, and other opportunities. It
should be noted that the success of welfare-to-work programs also
vary from state to state. And while reports released by state and
federal governments document a reduction in the welfare rolls
and a growing number of employed former welfare recipients,
the employment of welfare recipients is still of grave concern.
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The United Way of America, for example, has documented that
lack of transportation and other pragmatic problems associated
with employment have caused difficulties for welfare recipients
trying to comply with mandatory work requirements. However,
initiatives which encourage welfare-ro-work partnerships with
the private sector have reported some success. Such private initiatives, while not universally available, do improve economic
well-being of the low income individuals who participate and
those programs are worthy of note.
Even prior to the 1996 welfare reform act, companies that
developed business agenda around social needs, had successful
welfare-to-work partnerships which included training programs
for welfare recipients with employment commitments attached.
The Marriot and United Airlines are examples of businesses that
developed partnerships with welfare-to-work programs. Bank
Boston's inner-city development initiatives and the public education initiatives of Bell Atlantic and IBM are others. In her article,
From Spare Change to Real Change: The Social Sector as Beta Site
for Business Innovation, Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1999) described
various corporate social innovations such as the Pathways to
Independence program developed by Marriot in 1991. "The program, which currently runs in 13 U.S. cities, hones the job skills,
life skills, and work habits of welfare recipients, and Marriot guarantees participants a job offer when they complete the program."
(p. 125). Kanter further notes that the Pathways program has also
"created new jobs in poor communities." (p. 126).
While these pre-welfare reform business social innovations
described by Kanter have produced successful outcomes for participants, as noted earlier, these programs were limited in scope.
Similar attempts to transition welfare recipients into the workforce under welfare reform, have generated horror stories of
welfare recipients doing monotonous, demeaning state created
work assignments and still other welfare recipients who have
been unable to locate decent jobs, leaving ill-equipped extended
family members to pick up the pieces. Many of the work assignments available to welfare recipients under the new welfareto-work programs are not the civil rights movement advocated
"regular work force" described by the Hamiltons in the Dual
Agenda.

American Mosaic
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Economic well-being for welfare recipients is not the only
source of tension. Our society continues to struggle with unresolved tensions associated with equality of opportunity for
African Americans and other racial minorities, the redistribution
of wealth and power, and the increased emphasis on maintaining cultural identity and a host of other interpersonal responses
associated with presumed disadvantage and stereotypes. The demographic shifts noted earlier create even more complex issues in
relation to equality of opportunity, access to resources and crosscultural understanding. My colleague, Glen Loury (1997) made a
salient point about economic inequality which is germane to this
discussion and the content of this special issue. Loury states:
People are members of nuclear and extended families; they are part
of communities rooted in geographic localities. Because opportunity
is conveyed along the synapses of these social networks, inherited
social position is a major determinant of an individual's ultimate
economic success. (Loury, p. 27)
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Racial barriers still persist in American society which impede
full access to education, employment, and other opportunities for
the poor, women and people of color.. For example, the removal
of some federal benefits from immigrants caused, in many communities, a lack of access to health care, nutrition, and job training
as well as other resources which promote well-being. Similarly,
African Americans still face employment barriers and other forms
of institutional discrimination. While the 'colored' and 'white'
signs of de jure segregation have been dismantled in the south
for over 30 years, de facto segregation continues to persist in both
the south and the north. The racial and social division which was
once legislated is now more insidious, unwritten and informal, or
exists in the form of public policy which has a negative impact on
minorities. The need for reparation strategies for the historically
racially disadvantaged African American population and special
policies to provide access to opportunities for other people of
color, the poor, and women persists.
Those of us who grew up in the south in the late forties and
early fifties have the historic and anecdotal memory of segregation customs. In addition to the "colored" and "white" water
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fountains and other posted apartheid signs, certain jobs such as
those in janitorial services were considered black people's jobs
and other jobs such as white collar jobs were those for white
people. Shopping in more expensive clothing stores was off limits,
black Americans were seated and served last in public accommodations, if at all. In some instances, black customers were
served at the back door of eating establishments. Just as I was
about to graduate from college in North Carolina, civil rights
legislation prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations
was passed. A restaurant, now closed, across the street from the
university I attended, began to seat black customers. Under dejure
segregation customs, black customers ordering a hamburger from
this restaurant, for example, were given a hamburger wrapped in
waxed paper in a paper bag at the back door. Initially, the white
community was still adjusting to the new civil rights legislation
and while black customers no longer ordered from the back door,
white waitresses would still serve the seated black customers a
hamburger on a piece of waxed paper instead of a plate. This
example is but one of the many ways black Americans were
publicly humiliated. Black Americans have often been expected to
"do more for less" or to work harder and be more overloaded than
others to achieve similar outcomes. Often watched and overly
criticized, the aspirations of many black Americans were stifled.
The current conservative political narrative described by Dill,
Baca Zinn, and Patton is reminiscent of the stereotypes and negative projections from the old days when stereotypes that Black
people were unclean, smelled bad and had over-active sex drives
were used to thwart desegregation attempts.
Socially defined rules as well as negative and debilitating
stereotypes not only dominate the conservative political narrative
about welfare recipients, but persist at many other levels in our
society and negatively impact employment, educational opportunities and other means of improving the quality of one's life.
Feagin (1998) in describing the "codefinition" of racism and class
subordination indicates that "characteristics of the racial sphere
are also determined by the economic sphere." That is, racism, and
sexism as well, are influenced by economically defined roles in
the larger society. In keeping with black historical memory, Feagin
states that "higher paying jobs have for more than three centuries
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been assumed to be the prerogative of white people and lower
paying jobs the position of blacks." (p. 327). Job competition and
stereotypes, working in tandem, influence employment outcomes
and success on the job.
People of color, women, and welfare recipients are not infrequently the object of negative projections in the general society
and in the workforce. For example, an article by Kilborn (1995)
related to glass ceiling phenomenon in labor force participation
described the stereotypes white business men held about minorities and women which created presumptive attitudes causing these groups to be excluded from higher paying corporate
positions. Perceptions about women involved "not being tough
enough" and tied down to one location. Black men were viewed
as "undisciplined and always late"; and Hispanic men seen as
"heavy drinkers and drug users who don't want to work". As
might be expected, Asians were perceived as "more equipped for
technical than people-oriented work". Describing the negative
influence of stereotypes on creating a diverse work force, Kilborn
states: "Some white men are frightened and angry that people
unlike them are vying for their jobs. But for many other men,
higher level executives, simple inertia sustains the stereotypes
and keeps top management white and male". (p. 329). As our
society becomes more diverse grappling with others "seeing the
wrong thing" becomes tantamount. Similar stereotypes and presumptions can cause hypercritical attitudes and behaviors as well
as cultural and gender insensitive remarks and interactions which
may impede the success of minorities and women in the work
force at all job levels.
Addressing lack of cultural awareness and understanding in
the workforce, a recent article in the Health Care Review (Southern
New England). "Over the Rainbow: The Many Hues of Today's
Corporate Culture" notes that:
Stereotypical perceptions of culturally different individuals often
push minority employees into less visible and secondary positions
within organizations, ultimately limiting the inclusionary process
and the potential of those employees.... People will not contribute
if they are not recognized and respected for who they are. (Louis
and Maloof, 1999, p. 10).
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Negative perceptions and projections can potentially have serious
consequences for families who are trying to comply with welfare
reform regulations and become integrated into the regular workforce. For example, very similar to Louis and Maloof's (1999) comments about integrating culturally different employees into the
corporate culture workforce, working styles, attitudes and values
among the TANF job trainees who are high school drop-outs are
very different from the traditional job trainee in programs such
as those of the Urban League designed for high school graduates.
Presumptions about others based on stereotypes also influence outcomes for the poor, women and people of color who
try to advance themselves through the educational system. This
is particularly true for African Americans and exists within the
middle class.. In a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly, Claude
Steele (1999) described the impact of stereotypes on the success of black students and calls our attention to the fact that
the disadvantages of race are not overcome by higher socioeconomic status. Steele and his colleagues used the term "stereotyped threatened" or stereotyped vulnerability" to describe the
threat of being perceived based on a negative stereotype or the
fear of behaving in such a way as to confirm that stereotype.
Those who are stereotyped threatened also have a low degree
of racial trust associated with social attitudes and stereotypes
about race. Subtle cues can cause performance difficulties in test
situations, taxing the mental abilities of black students who have
the ability to perform better. Steele also suggests that this situation
requires special policy and practices by educational institutions.
As we are reminded in the article, similar analogies apply to
women in advanced math and the poor in certain academic situations. These issues are intrinsically woven with the current
affirmative action debate and educational admissions policies.
The need for social remedies for the historically disadvantaged
groups persists.
While the major thrust in this issue of the journal is on social
justice for lower socioeconomic groups, we need to acknowledge
that other social injustices which involve racial disadvantage
are quite prevalent in our society. For example, Feagin (1998)
describes in his research on antiblack discrimination in public
places, both contested and uncontested forms of discrimination
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against black college professors, black physicians and other middle class black adults and their children. These transgressions
were documented in public facilities as well as in educational
and work place sites. (pp. 267-294). Often, such transgressions,
in addition to involving racial prejudice and intolerance, are
based on societal stereotypes about all black people. Presumed
disadvantage because of race or about affirmative action benefits
feed into these stereotypes. Cultural insensitivity and lack of
understanding in the changing American mosaic is exacerbated
by this persistent and continued discrimination against African
Americans so long after the civil rights movement of the sixties.
Stereotypes and myths persist at all levels of our society, but to
paraphrase Sidel (1999), "the convergence of American stereotypes about race, class, and gender" causes the poor, especially
the welfare recipient, to be denied access to American wealth.
(p. 15).
CLASS, GENDER, AND RACE/ETHNICITY INTERSECTING.
Tracy Chapman's Talkin' Bout A Revolution characterizes the
welfare recipient's lack of "regular work force "opportunities and
lack of access to the American wealth. A disproportionate percentage of welfare recipients are people of color, both native born
and immigrant. Most people of color would like to be gainfully
employed. However, with limited education and discrimination,
access to decent employment has been limited. Danziger, et. al. in
their research on welfare reform and mental health call attention
to the many barriers which influence the employability of welfare
recipients. They state:
Many single mothers have problems with physical health, depression, substance dependence, domestic violence , and child care responsibilities that make steady work difficult. When these problems
are combined with lack of education, work experience, and job skills,
the cumulative effect can be overwhelming. Women, especially minority women, also often face discrimination and harassment in the
workplace. (Danziger, et. al., p. 4).
Jobs available to welfare recipients are often menial forms of
employment and menial employment tends to pay less than
public assistance. These low wages are further complicated by
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inadequate child care and lack of access to health care. (It is helpful
here to acknowledge that a large number of working poor are also
without insurance coverage and adequate child care.).
Current mandatory welfare-to-work programs are political
strategies designed to reduce the welfare roles and not address
full employment policies for the underclass. Devolution of the
welfare state with the passage of the Personal Responsibility Act
of 1996 focuses on employment for welfare recipients, but not
necessarily employment in the regular work force. While the
civil rights movement endorsed greater job opportunities for the
poor or underclass, many scholars and public policy analyst view
current welfare-to-work programs as punitive, a form of racial
politics and primarily designed to attack black female headed
households. Based on stereotyped assumptions about welfare
recipients not wanting to work, welfare reform limits the time
a recipient can remain on welfare and removes the safety net for
those who are unable to comply with new regulations. Persistent
poverty remains a concern and while some welfare recipients
have obtained employment, researchers have stated that the poorest families have been driven deeper into poverty and the others
are only slightly better off. (See Boston Globe article reporting on
reactions from the Liberal-Leaning Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities, August 22, 1999).
As expected, 1997 poverty statistics from the U.S. Census
Bureau indicates that the percentage of poverty is still greatest
among those families of Hispanic origin and among black families. Among female headed households with no husband present,
black women and women of Hispanic origin have the highest
percentage of poverty. The poverty rate among Asian and Pacific
Islander families, while lower than other minority groups, is still
higher that the rate for white families. While these numbers were
down in 1997 compared to 1996 and 1989, the percentage of families in poverty remains high, 39.8% for black female householder
families and 47.6% for female householder families of Hispanic
origin. It should also be noted that poverty rates among foreign
born and non-citizens is disproportionately higher than the native
population living in poverty. While there has been improvement
relative to persistent poverty among black Americans, in 1993
black individuals remained in poverty significantly longer than
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other racial groups. In 1998, the number of African Americans
living in poverty declined, and the Census Bureau reported an
overall increase in income. However, both the African American
and Latino poverty rates are still disproportionately high. (Census
Bureau, 1999)
The safety net for immigrants varies from state to state and
differential state policies create concerns about immigrant economic well-being since immigrants tend to be concentrated in
certain geographic locations. Under welfare reform immigrants
initially lost entitlement to case assistance, food stamps, health
benefits and other public programs. While some of these benefits
have been restored, food stamps are only available to children, the
elderly and the disabled and new immigrants have to wait five
years to qualify for federal assistance.. (Zimmerman and Tumlin,
1999). Advocacy groups continue to work for policy changes
which have negatively impacted immigrants. Zimmerman and
Tumlin note that the response to immigrants under the new
federalism raises a number of policy questions. They state:
...since the federal government determines how many and which
immigrants are admitted to the United States, does the federal
government have a special obligation to provide for them? What
are the implications of this new devolution given that most of
the immigrant population is concentrated in only a handful of
states? Is the federal goal of promoting self-sufficiency achieved
by devolving eligibility decisions to the states (Zimmerman and
Tumlin, 1999, p. 3)?
The new federalism has created a decline in the welfare rolls
among immigrants as well as citizens. Much of this decline in
large urban centers is associated with the immigrant population
and it is difficult to fully understand the significance of this
decline on family economic and emotional well-being for immigrants as well as citizens. For example, Fix and Passel (1999) of
the Urban Research Institute document dramatic declines in approved applications in some California counties when eligibility
has remained unchanged. In this regard, Fix states, "It appears
that these chilling effects originate in confusion and fear among
immigrants and lack of understanding on the part of providers
over who is eligible for benefits." (p. 1). This study further noted
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that low-income immigrant households were less likely to receive
welfare benefits than low-income citizen or native households.
These research findings have serious implications for low-income
as well as other immigrant households where individuals are being cared for in extended family arrangements. (See Krist, Gurak,
Chen, This Journal). In such arrangements, family networks may
be stretched and overburdened.
In May, 1999, the Boston Globe reported on data released by
the federal General Accounting Office. This media data paints
a very healthy public picture of the social outcomes of welfare
reform with 67 to 87 percent of former recipients having been
employed at some point after leaving welfare. However, again,
issues are raised not only about whether these former welfare
recipients are or were in the "regular work force", but issues are
raised about the safety net and social consequences for families.
The periodic reports in the New York Times on family household well-being are good cases in point. In February, 1999 the
New York Times described the burdened placed on families as
the welfare rolls shrink. (p. 20). Examples of life for those who
left welfare included grandmothers with meager resources in
"skip-generation" households raising their grandchildren in unsupported kinship care arrangements, young welfare recipients
unable to retain or locate private jobs and unable to qualify for
welfare, others caring for substance abusing relatives and exposure to highly conflictual household arrangements. These were
just a few examples of troubled households as families, most
of them female headed households, struggle for economic and
social well-being. These struggles for economic and social wellbeing exist while the media gives reports of many unspent welfare
dollars. (New York Times, 1999, p. 1)
This special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social
Welfare is intended to help us understand the current nature of
structural inequality, and the relationship between socioeconomic
conditions citizenship, class, gender and race. The social construction of minority status and its relationship to public policy
formulation is also addressed. We have emphasized economic
well-being and social justice for people of color.
The first article by noted economist, Glen Loury, a comparative
analysis of census and other statistical data, provides insight into
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the social and economic well-being of the black and white populations. Trends in the changing nature of the historic disadvantage
of African Americans are presented over time. While the number
of single parent households is disheartening, Loury's analysis
points out the increase in income and educational attainment
among African Americans during the past 25 years.
Stanley Eitzen and Maxine Baca Zinn give an overview of the
current welfare reform legislation and its consequences. Their
essay includes a historical synthesis of welfare provisions from
1935-1996 and describes the gradual dismantling of the welfare
system since the Reagan administration. Conservative assumptions undergirding welfare reform, consequences of the legislative provisions for individuals and families, inadequacies of
welfare reform and a more progressive solution to welfare are
discussed.
Ruth Sidel, author of Keeping Women and Children Last (1998),
has developed a polemic on the impact of welfare reform on
women and children. She calls our attention to the role of political
conservatism on poor, single mothers and describes how race,
class and gender stereotypes converge to exclude poor women
from access to American resources..
The article by Mary Kritz, Douglas Gurak,and Likwang Chen is a
quantitative analysis of the household composition of elderly immigrants using two samples of the 1990 U.S. Census. Comparative
data is provided on living arrangements as well as demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics. The cross cultural implications
of their findings show that living arrangements of elderly immigrants from developing countries are significantly influenced by
economic resources and family social support is prevalent. Policy
implications for elderly immigrants living in extended family
households are discussed as well as English language fluency,
and other implications associated with labor force participation
and immigrant status.
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diversity in American society. She challenges social scientists and
practitioners to rethink the conceptualization, use and relevance
of the term minority which is "nonscientific and devoid of conceptual clarity and empirical validity." (p. 115, This Journal).
In his social ethics essay, "Who Cares About Racial Inequality", ProfessorGlen Loury develops a moral argument in support of
using race as one of a number of other criteria of excellence to take
into account in admissions and hiring procedures. He suggests a
form of "developmental" affirmative action to maintain diversity
in educational settings and the workplace.
Margaret Gibelman's article is a synthesis of longstanding issues associated with affirmative action. A social justice perspective is presented and emphasizes is placed on the mission and
values of the social welfare community. She proposes reframed
affirmative action strategies which focus more on the economically disadvantaged.
These authors provide thought provoking perspectives on
social inequality, and insight into the social construction of gender, race, and poverty in America as well. Social scientists and
practioners alike are challenged to rethink the social construction
of minority status.
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Twenty-Five Years of Black America:
Two Steps Forward and One Step Back?
GLENN C. LOURY
Boston University
Institute on Race and Social Division

The nature of social and economic inequality as it exists now between
Blacks and Whites in the United States is explored in this paper. Summary
statisticson education, earnings,employment, family structure, incarceration and life expectancy are presented by age, sex and race. It is suggested
that, while progress has been made in narrowing the racial gap in social
standing, there remains a significant disparity that warrants continuing

concern.

I. INTRODUCTION
The data concerning the state of America, black and white,
over the past 25 years is both disheartening and encouraging.
Disheartening are many measures of the opportunities and difficulties faced by black children and, to a lesser extent, white
children. Infant mortality has declined, but black children are less
and less likely to be raised by both of their parents.
Many objective measures of achievement-exam scores (national proficiency exams as well as SAT exams), levels of education, and income-are more encouraging. Even as scores on
several exams have remained roughly constant for white children and young adults, scores for blacks have increased. More
remarkable is the fact that these increases seem to have occurred
while the black exam-taking population has increased.
Based on a report of the former Center for New Black Leadership compiled by
Russell D. Murphy, Jr. under the supervision of Professor Glenn C. Loury, and with
the assistance of Kasirnir Nwuke, at the Institute on Race and Social Division, Boston
University.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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So, looking at black America over the past quarter century,
there is much for both optimists and pessimists.
II. CHILDREN
Birth is much safer today than it was 25 years ago (Figure 1),
but arriving in this world is still more hazardous for black children
than for white ones. The infant mortality rate' for black children
was 17.0 in 1990, while for white children it was only 7.3. This difference has persisted over time even though substantial progress
has been made. In 1970, rates for both were considerably higher:
32.6 for black children and 17.8 for white ones.
A. Family structure
The families into which these children are born are fairly
different than the ones of their counterparts of 25 years ago.
Among black women, unmarried mothers accounted for 68% of
all births in 1992 (Figure 2), while in 1960 they accounted for
only 22%. For white mothers, the increase has been even more
Figure 1
Infant Mortality
01--Black
35
30

1::

~White

25
Z
"-J 20

~15
10
,.

5

,.
II

II

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996, Table 2-2;
race of the child.

21

Black America

Figure 2
Births to UnmarriedMothers
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dramatic, although from a smaller base: from 2% in 1960 to 23%
in 1992.
Not surprisingly, as fewer children are born to married mothers, fewer live with both of their parents. The decline has been
steady for both black and white children, but black children face
a much larger problem: less than 40% of black children lived
with both of their parents in 1994. Children of educated parents
are more likely to live with two parents (Table 1). There remain
significant differences between whites and blacks at all education
levels, but the most dramatic differences are for those children
whose parents have a high school education or less.
B. Poverty

Poverty rates for both black and white children have increased
slightly, but most of the increase has been among white children.
Although poverty rates for black children have not changed much
over the past 20 years, the rates are strikingly high: 42% in 1995
(Figure 4). Rates for white children have increased: from 10.5% in
1970 to 15.5% in 1995.
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Figure 3
Children Living with Both Parents
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Table 1
Children under 18 living with both parents (% in 1995)
Parent's Education
Less than 12
Grades 9-12 (no diploma)
High school graduate
College: Associates degree or none
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional degree

Black

White

35.0
18.1
38.8
40.0
62.8
66.9

73.8
62.1
74.1
77.6
90.3
92.6

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996, Table No. 82.

For children, a major factor associated with living in poverty
is living in a family headed by a woman. The poverty rate for these
families is quite high: roughly 60% for families headed by black
women and roughly 40% for families headed by white women
(Figure 5a, 5b). Although the risk has improved somewhat for
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Figure 4
Poverty Rate: children under 18
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black families over the past 20 years, it is still larger than the comparable risk for families headed by white women. For married
couple families, the risk is much lower. Black families still face
higher risks than white ones, but the gap has narrowed.
C. School enrollment
Preschool enrollment rates for 3 to 4 year old black children
increased from 18.7% in 1973 to 29.8% in 1993. For white children,
enrollment rates increased more: from 17.8% to 38.0% (Figure 6a,
6b). By the early 1990s, enrollment of 5 year olds in kindergarten
had increased slightly while enrollment in first grade decreased
slightly (Figure 7). Both kindergarten and first grade enrollment
rates are similar for black and white 5 year olds.
D. School progress
National assessment tests of proficiency in reading and mathematics have shown fairly steady improvements since 1970 (1973
for mathematics). Increases in average scores for black students
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Figure 5a
Poverty Rate: female headedfamilies (with children under 18)
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Figure 5b
Poverty Rate: married couple familes (with children under 18)
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aged 9, 13, and 17 have been fairly impressive, particularly relative to increases in average scores for white students (Table 2). In
1973, the average mathematics score for black students aged 17
was 270 (out of 500); by 1994 it had increased to 286.
Average reading scores for both white and black students fell
in the 1980s. For black students, the decrease came later (between
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Figure 6a
Enrollment, 3-4 year olds: Pre-school
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Figure 6b

Enrollment, 3-4 year olds: Kindergarten
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Figure 7
Enrollment of 5 year olds
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1988 and 1990 instead of between 1980 and 1984) and was larger.
The scores of black 13 year olds reached a peak of 243 in 1988 and
fell to 234 by 1994; the scores of white 13 year olds fell from 264
in 1980 to 261 in 1988.
The distribution of scores suggests that improvements were
widespread: the scores of black students at the 5th, 50th, and 95th
percentile all climbed (relative to those of white students) from
1978 to 1994 (Table 3). Unfortunately, the gaps between black
and white students seem to have been smallest in the 1986 to
1990 period (for the older students) and appear to have increased
again after that.
E. Conclusion

The story of American childhoods is a mixed one. In some
respects, black children face large and growing deficits compared
to white children:
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" the likelihood of being born to an unmarried mother
" the likelihood of not living with both parents
" the likelihood of living in poverty
However, not all is bleak:

" the poverty rate for black children in married couple households
has fallen (even while that for their white counterparts has
increased)
" school enrollment rates for young children have increased
" national measures of mathematics and reading proficiency
show both absolute and relative progress for black children at
all ages
" the proficiency gains are widespread: they are not limited to
only high or only low achieving students
III. TEENS
A. Educationalchoices
Up through the age of 17, the school enrollment rates of black
and white teens are roughly equivalent (Table 4). Rates are also
similar for those over the age of 25, with black enrollment rates
often slightly higher than white ones. For the late teens and early
twenties, however, black enrollment rates have tended to be lower
than white ones. Over the 20 years since 1975, the gaps between
black and white young adults aged 18-19 and 20-21 have grown.
In 1975, black and white 18-19 year olds had almost identical
school enrollment rates (46.8% and 46.9%). By 1994, however, the
rate for white 18-19 year olds had risen to 62.6% while the rate
for black 18-19 year olds had risen to only 53.4%. Similarly, while
black 20-21 year olds were only 5.4 points less likely to be enrolled
than their white counterparts in 1975, by 1994, the gap had grown
to 14.8 points.
High school dropout rates have varied from year to year for
both black and white teens (Figure 8). While the single year event
dropout rate (proportion of those in grades 10-12 dropping out
within a given year) has fallen slightly for white students (from
5.7% in 1973 to 4.1% in 1993) it has fallen sharply for black students
(from 10.1% in 1973 to 5.4% in 1993). Status dropout rates (all
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Table 4

Enrollment rates (% of population group)

B
W
B
W
B
W
B
W
B
W

1975
1980
1985
1990
1994

16-17

18-19

20-21

22-24

25-29

30-34

86.8
89.5
90.7
89.2
91.8
92.5
91.7
93.5
95.3
95.1

46.9
46.8
45.8
47
43.5
53.7
55
59.1
53.4
62.6

26.7
32.1
23.3
33
27.7
37.2
28.3
43.1
35.3
50.1

13.9
16.4
13.6
16.8
13.8
17.5
19.7
21.9
22.8
24.9

9.4
10.1
8.8
9.4
7.4
9.6
6.1
10.4
10.5
10.8

7.1
6.6
6.9
6.4
5.2
6.2
4.5
6.2
7.3
6.7

Stubbs, 1996, Table DTAB007.
Figure 8
Dropout rates: event and status

100
80
---

60

Black - event
Black - status
White - event
White - status

40
20
1973I

1973 1978

I

1983

I

1988 1993

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States.

of those aged 18-24 who are neither in high school nor have
completed high school) have also fallen significantly for black
students while rates for white students have remained roughly
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constant. The rate for young black adults is now (1991) only
slightly higher than that for young whites, while in 1973 it was
more than 85% higher.
B. Labor force

The employment rates for teens have fluctuated up and down
without much apparent trend. However, the rate for black teens
has generally been about 20 points lower than that for white teens
(Figure 9).
C. Dropouts and the labor force
Dropping out of high school seems to be an increasingly bad
signal about one's future prospects. Between 1973 and 1993, employment rates (and labor force participation rates-both relative
to population) for recent high school dropouts 2 (as proportions of
the 16-24 year old population) dropped (Figure 10a). For young
black adults, the declines have been relatively large: the participation rate fell from 59.4% to 43.6% while the employment rate
fell from 43.9% to 26.9%. For young white adults, the declines
Figure 9
Employment to Population Ratio: 16-19 year olds
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were much smaller: from 71.0% to 68.0% in participation and from
55.1% to 52.8% in employment. As the labor market prospects
of dropouts has worsened, the likelihood of their calling upon
government transfer programs has increased (Figure 10b). For
young (25-34 year old) black adults with 9-11 years of education,
the use of AFDC or public assistance has increased by almost 50%:
from 23.2% to 35.6%. For similarly situated whites, use has almost
doubled: from 6.0% to 11.3%.
D. High School graduates and the laborforce
The overall labor market experiences of recent high school
graduates who do not enter college have remained fairly constant
over the past 20 years. The labor force participation rate for recent
(within the year) black and white graduates has remained roughly
constant, perhaps declining a little for black graduates. Employment rates for recent graduates have declined somewhat for both
black and white graduates (Figure 11a). Both participation and
employment rates for black graduates remain significantly lower
than for their white counterparts. Use of government transfer
programs among both black and white high school graduates
Figure 10a
Recent High School Dropouts: employment
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Figure 10b
AFDC or Public Assistance: 25-34 year olds with 9-11 years of education
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(individuals aged 25-34 with exactly 12 years of schooling) has
been relatively low and constant, although the rate for white
graduates has been increasing slowly (Figure lb).
E. College

SAT scores suggest a pattern similar to that of high school
dropout rates: both the dropout rates of white high school students and the SAT scores of white college-bound seniors have
remained roughly constant over the 1976-1994 period (before
re-norming). However, the dropout rates of black high school
students have dropped and the SAT scores of black college-bound
seniors have steadily increased (Figure 12). Mean scores of black
seniors remain below those of white seniors, however. The total
score3 for black college-bound seniors was 78.9% of the total score
for white college-bound seniors in 1994, up from 72.7% in 1976.
Over this period, the proportion of all SAT test-takers who were
classified as members of a minority group increased from 15.0%
in 1976 to 31.0% in 1994. The overall mean score has declined as
the share of minority students in the test-taking population has
increased. However, black students taking the SAT have done
better over time-even as the pool of black test-takers expanded.
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Figure 11a
Recent High School Graduates:employment
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Figure 11b
AFDC or Public Assistance: 25-34 year olds with 12 years of education

100.0
-m-

80.0

Black

A, White

60.0
40.0
20.0

1972

1977

1982

1987

1992

Source: Stubbs, 1996, Tables C0281303 and C032D02.

Higher education has expanded dramatically over the past
35 years and the expansion has been most dramatic for black
Americans. White enrollment (full-time) in 1993 was 6.7 million,
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Figure 12

Mean Total SAT (Verbal+Math) Scores
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an increase of 64% over its 1965 level. For blacks, enrollment in
1993 was 0.9 million, an increase of 319% over its 1965 level. While
black students represented only 4.9% of total enrollment in 1965
and 7.4% in 1970, by the mid-1970s, they reached 11.4%.
F. Teen pregnancy

Teen age (15-19 years old) black women are more than twice
as likely to give birth than are white teens (Figure 13). Both in
relative and in absolute terms, this is an improvement over the
early 1970s. In 1970, black teens had a birth rate almost 2.5 times
as large as white teens (140.7 per 1000 versus 57.4). By 1992, the
rate for black teens had dropped to 112.2 while the rate for white
teens had only fallen to 51.8. For both black and white teens, rates
dropped by the mid-1980s to even lower rates (94.1 for blacks and
42.9 for whites in 1984). By 1988 the rates were rising again. Part
of the difference between black and white teen birth rates arises
from the increased likelihood of more than one birth for black
teens. The first birth rates of black and white teens are closer than
are the total birth rates: 74.3 per 1000 for black teens in 1992 versus
40.5 for white teens.
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Figure 13
Teen births (women 15-19)
140
120

--.-

E

Black- first births

-m- Black - all births
10O0

White - first births

-

C)

80 -

Q

60
40

White - all births

O 20
0-

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1995, Tables
1-9, 1-10.

IV. ADULTS
A. Educationalattainment
Both the white and black populations are increasingly well
educated (Figure 14). The proportions of those with at least 4
years of high school or at least 4 years of college have increased
dramatically for whites as well as for blacks, but the increases for
blacks have been larger-both in absolute and in relative terms.
B. Employment
Employment rates for women have risen considerably over
the past 25 years for both blacks and whites (Figure 15). For men,
rates have fallen slightly. Employment rates for black men were
only slightly lower than rates for white men in 1972, but the gap
widened in through the mid-1980s. After 1985, the gap tended to
narrow, with a small retreat in the early 1990s. Black and white
women have almost identical employment rates.
Black men and women tend to work in different occupations
than do white men and women (Table 5). Black men are more
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Figure 15
Employment to PopulationRatio: 20+ years old
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Table 5

Employed Men and Women 16+ (%)
Women

Men
Occupation
Managerial and professional specialty
Technical, sales, and administrative support
Service
Farming, forestry, and fishing
Precision production, craft, and repair
Operators, fabricators, and laborers
Total

Black

White

Black

White

14.7
17.6
20.0
2.0
15.0
30.7

27.5
20.6
9.8
4.3
18.5
19.3

20.1
39.4
26.9
0.2
2.5
10.8

29.9
43.2
16.8
1.2
2.1
6.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Current Population Reports, 1995, Table 2.

heavily represented in the Service and Operators,fabricators, and
laborers categories than are white men (51% vs. 29%). White men
are more represented particularly in the Managerialand professional
specialty but also the Technical, sales, and administrative support
and Precision production, craft, and repair occupations than are
black men. Black women are also more heavily represented in
the Service and Operators,fabricators, and laborers categories than
are white women.
Employment status has a significant effect on the likelihood
an individual will face poverty. Among individuals employed
year-round, poverty rates are generally less than 10%, although
not for teens (Table 6). The poverty rate for blacks employed full
time is slightly higher (roughly 2 points) than for whites. Among
those who did not work, not only are poverty rates much higher
(37% for white 25-34 year olds), but the rates for blacks relative
to whites are also higher (59% vs. 37% for 25-34 year olds).
C. Economic well-being
Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient 4, has increased
over the past 25 years (Figure 16). Among black families, inequality has been generally higher than among white households and this has persisted over time. At the same time, official
measurements of poverty status show some year to year variation.
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Table 6

Below Poverty Level (%)
Black

White

Worked
Worked Did Not Worked
Worked Did Not
Full time Part time
Work Full time Part time
Work
16-17 years
18-24
25-34
35-54
55-64
65 and over

NA
6.7
6.7
4.5
4.1
0.0

29.3
24.7
34.5
18.6
18.6
12.8

40.8
48.2
59.0
44.8
44.8
30.5

18.7
4.4
2.8
1.7
1.7
1.5

7.3
15.0
16.6
8.1
8.1
2.6

19.3
36.2
36.7
18.0
18.0
11.6

Current Population Reports, 1996, Table 10.
Figure 16

Inequality--Gini Coefficient: Families
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The poverty rates for blacks is roughly where it was 25 years
ago while the rate for whites is somewhat higher than it was
(Figure 17).
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Figure 17
Poverty Status of Persons
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Non-family households have lower incomes, in general, than
do family households. Over the past 15 years, however, the median income in non-family households has increased by more
(proportionally) than has the median income in family households (Figures 18a, 18b).
Among year-round, full time workers, the gap between
whites and blacks is narrower, particularly for workers with
similar levels of education (Table 7). Median earnings for black
men with at least a bachelor's degree were 76% of median earnings for their white counterparts. For black men with less than a
high school education, the ratio was higher: 85%. The increase in
earnings associated with moving from the less than high school
group to the high school group is significantly lower for black men
than for any other group (11% vs. 26% for black women). Moving
from a high school education to some college is associated with
large gains for black men and women; for white men and women,
the gains are a third to a half smaller. All groups have large gains
associated with moving from some college to at least a bachelor's
degree, although the gain for black men is smaller.
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Figure 18a
Median Income-Non-family Households
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Figure 18b

Median Income-Family Households
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Table 7

Median earnings-1993;Year-round full time workers
Less than
High School

High
School

Some
College

Bachelor's
or more

Total

Thousands of $
Men
-Black
-White
Women -Black
-White

18.6
22.0
13.1
14.7

20.6
28.4
16.5
19.8

26.6
32.4
21.1
23.4

35.9
47.2
31.2
32.9

24.1
33.8
20.3
23.5

Black/White ratio:
Men
Women

0.9
0.9

0.7
0.8

0.8
0.9

0.8
1.0

0.7
0.9

29.0
14.0
28.0
18.0

35.0
46.0
48.0
41.0

%Increase over next lower educational level:
Men
Women

-Black
-White
-Black
-White

-

11.0
29.0
26.0
35.0

Current Population Reports, 1995, Table 12.

For educated workers in the same age group, the difference

between blacks and whites is narrower still. Among college educated workers who are employed one year after graduation (year-

round, full time), the ratio of black to white salaries was 0.96 in
1990, up from 0.92 in 1977. As a comparison, the similar ratio of
women's salaries to men's was 0.87 in 1990 (up from 0.77 in 1977).
Black households tend to have fewer assets than do white
ones. Even by income quintile (quintiles defined for all households), households headed by blacks tend to be poorer (Table 9).
Furthermore, black households are more heavily represented at
the lower income quintiles.
D. Household and family formation
Marriage is declining in the United States (Figure 19). Among
black women over age 15, less than 30% were married in 1994; in
1970, more than 40% were5 . Among white women, the decline has
been just as steady, although not quite as fast. The corresponding
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Table 8
Median salaries: college graduates employed full-time, 1 year after
graudation (1992 $)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Black
23,018

White
24,975

Men
28,108

Women
21,649

21,515

23,105

26,334

20,318

20,995

23,556

25,974

21,387

22,653

25,021

27,153

23,054

22,676

23,637

25,825

22,343

figures for black and white men are similar to those for black and
white women, although the proportions of men married tend to
be several points higher than for women (roughly 7 points higher
for black men and 5 points higher for white men).
Interracial marriage has increased significantly over the past
few decades. Although still only a tiny fraction of all marriage
(0.41% of all married couples in 1990), black-white interracial
marriages were still more than 3 times as likely in 1990 as in
1960(0.41% vs. 0.13% (U.S. Bureau of the Census (1996), Statistical
Abstract of the United States)).
Fertility has also declined over the past 25 years among American women; births per 1,000 women aged 15-44 declined sharply
in the early 1970s (Figure 20). Since 1975, fertility has fluctuated a
little, but has been largely constant. Black and white women have
become more similar in their overall child bearing: in 1994 the
rate for black women was roughly 12 births higher than for white
women, while in 1970, the rate for black women was roughly 31
births higher.
Abortion rates remain fairly high for both black and white
6
women; roughly one quarter of the pregnancies of white women
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end in abortion and roughly 40% of the pregnancies of black
women do as well7 (Figure 21). Crude estimates based on these
frequencies and other Centers for Disease Control data suggest
that, over time, significant fractions of both black and white
women may have abortions. Among white women, perhaps more
than a third will have at least one abortion by the age of 44; for
black women the fraction may be considerably larger-well over
one half.
E. Health

Maternal mortality, the rate at which mothers die in childbirth,
has improved dramatically during the 20th century. In the early
years of this century, more than 700 women died for each 100,000
live births. By 1940, the overall rate had dropped to 376 per
100,000 births, but the rate for the mothers of black children was
782 (for mothers of white children it was 320 (National Center
for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996)). Considering
those levels, the current figures -less than 20 per 100,000 for both
blacks and whites-are almost miraculous, although the rate for
black mothers is still more than twice that for white mothers
(Figure 22).
F. Victimization

Men are more likely than women and blacks more likely
Figure 21
Abortion Rate-Women 15-44
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Figure 22
Maternal Mortality
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than whites to be homicide victims. Black men in particular face
homicide rates well in excess of those faced by other demographic
groups (Figures 23a, 23b). In the first half of the 1980s, homicide
rates for black men dropped sharply; the rate for white men fell
simultaneously, but from a smaller base. Unfortunately, the rates
climbed again after 1985. The rate of less serious violent crime
(rapes, robberies, or assaults) has been relatively steady, with a
slight decline through 1990 for both blacks and whites During
the 1990s, however, the rate faced by black men and women
rose sharply.
Victimization rates for violent crimes other than murder (Table 10) suggest that black men and women along with white men
are particularly likely to be victims at young ages (through age 25).
After 25, victimization for women, black and white, falls rapidly,
from 127 per 1,000 black women age 20-24 to 44.5 per 1,000 age
25-34. For white men, the victimization rates fall quickly among
the older groups as well. For black men, victimization rates do
not fall as far and more importantly, the rates remain high even
among older age groups (75 per 1,000 for black men age 35-49).
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Figure 23a
Homicide Rate
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Figure 23b
Crime Rate: rapes, robberies,assaults
100

.0
-5

Black
80

-

0

o

60

C)

40
CL)

nE

20

z

0
1973

1978

1983

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994.

1988

White

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

48

Table 10
Violent crime (not murder): victimization rate per 1,000 population
(1993)
Women

Men

Victim's
Age

Black

White

Black

White

12-15
16-19
20-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65+

146.0
91.9
99.2
74.5
75.4
33.1
14.3

148.4
144.5
104.3
69.6
43.0
21.1
5.4

112.3
145.6
127.0
44.5
43.4
3.8
12.2

93.2
90.4
79.0
49.0
39.1
13.8
4.5

Table 11
Adults per 100,000 populationheld in local jails,state orfederal prisons
(1993)
Men

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Women

Black

White

Black

White

3,544
3,850
3,943
4,441
5,066
5,365
5,717
6,014
6,259
6,753

528
570
594
629
685
718
740
774
805
860

183
189
216
257
321
338
356
365
403
435

27
29
35
41
47
48
51
53
56
60

G. Incarceration
Adults, men and women, are increasingly facing the criminal
justice system as adversaries (Table 11). Relative to population
sizes, black men and women have been more likely to be imprisoned. In 1994, the rate of imprisonment for white men was 1.6
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Figure 19
Women: Married, Husband Present
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Figure 20
Fertility: Women 15-44
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times the 1985 value; for black men the 1994 rate was 1.9 times
its 1985 value. For black women, the 1994 imprisonment rate was
2.4 times the 1985 rate, while for white women the 1994 rate was
2.2 times the 1985 rate.
H. Health and life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth has increased fairly dramatically over
the past few decades. Since 1940, the expected life for a black man
has increased8 by almost 14 years and for a black woman, it has
increased by almost 20 years. For whites, the increases have been
slightly less dramatic, but still impressive: roughly 11 years for
white men and 13 for white women. The increases have continued
over the past 25 years (Figure 24), although for black men, life
expectancy seems to have plateaued shortly after 1980 at roughly
65 years. Life expectancy at different ages shows generally the
same patterns, although the differences between black men and
white men and between black women and white women are less
pronounced at age 65 than at younger ages.
This analysis has used census and other statistical data to
describe the nature of social and economic inequality as it exists
Figure 24
Life Expectancy at Birth
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Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996, Table 6-5.
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Table 12

Life Expectancy
Men

Women

Black

White

Black

White

1969-71
1979-81
1991

60.0
64.1
64.6

67.9
70.8
72.9

68.3
73.9
73.8

75.5
78.2
79.6

1969-71
1979-81
1991

61.2
64.6
64.9

68.3
70.7
72.5

69.4
73.3
73.9

75.7
78.0
79.1

At age 20:
1969-71
1979-81
1991

43.5
46.5
46.9

50.2
52.5
54.1

51.2
54.9
55.4

57.2
59.4
60.4

At age 65:
1969-71
1979-81
1991

12.5
13.3
13.4

13.0
14.3
15.4

15.7
17.1
17.2

16.9
18.6
19.2

At birth:

At age 1:

National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996, Section 6,
Table A.

between Blacks and Whites in the United States. Attention has
been given to trends over time to illustrate how the nature of the
historic disadvantage suffered by blacks has changed in the last
generation. As noted earlier, while some measures of difficulties,
such as the number of black children being raised by single
parents, are disheartening; the increases in levels of education
and income among black Americans over the past 25 years are
encouraging.
NOTES
1. Infants are less than one year of age; rates are per 1000 live births and are
based on the race of the child. See National Center for Health Statistics, Public
Health Service (1996).
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2. Those who were neither enrolled nor high school graduates, but were enrolled 12 months earlier.
3. Mean verbal plus mean math.
4. A measure of concentration of income that varies between 0 and 1; larger
values indicate more concentration. The measure sums up--over each level
of the income distribution-the difference between the group's population
fraction and its income fraction. If income is perfectly evenly distributed-i.e.
x% of the population has x% of the income, then the differences will be 0 and
the Gini coefficient will be 0 as well.
5. From 1970 to 1979, the figures are for people over age 14; from 1980, the
figures are for those over age 15. (Saluter, 1994 and earlier issues).
6. Measured pregnancies-live births and abortions-but not miscarriages.
7. 1991 estimates: 303 abortions per 1,000 live births for white women; 661 per
1,000 live births for black women.
8. For 1940, the figure is for All other races; for 1970 and later, figures are for Black
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This is an overview essay on the 1996 welfare legislation and its con-

sequences. The paper is divided into five parts: (1) The basic elements
of the legislation; (2) The conservative assumptions undergirding this
legislation and the progressive responses to them; (3) The consequences
of the legislationfor individualsand families; (4) The missing elements in
the new welfare legislation;and (5) The progressivesolution to welfare.

From 1935 to 1996 the United States had a minimal welfare
program for those in need. Since the Reagan administration this
welfare program has gradually been dismantled. This dismemberment accelerated in 1996 when the federal government made
welfare assistance to families temporary and withdrew $55 billion
of federal aid to poor people. Thus, the federal safety net under
the poor has been shredded especially for poor families with
children (Schorr, 1997:163). This is an overview essay, drawing together the current information on the general and family-specific
consequences resulting from the recent welfare legislation. It is
divided into five parts: (1) the basic elements of the 1996 welfare
legislation; (2) the conservative assumptions guiding that legislation and the progressive response; (3) the consequences of the
legislation for individuals and families; (4) the missing elements
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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in the new welfare legislation; and (5) the progressive solution to
welfare.
THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
WORK OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1996
The welfare system prior to 1996 needed an overhaul. Its provisions encouraged dependency since recipients leaving welfare
lost medicaid. It provided disincentives to work because money
earned was subtracted from welfare payments. By leaving the
distribution of benefits for many programs to the states, there
were wide disparities in benefits by geographical location. And,
the benefits provided were never enough to lift people out of
poverty. The welfare system, however, did help many on the
economic margins to get above the poverty line. A study by the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that
without such assistance, 57.6 million people would have been poor
in 1995. "But when government benefits are counted, including
food stamps, housing assistance, school lunch support and benefits
provided through the earned-income tax credit, the number of poor
people drops to 30.3 million" (emphasis added). (Reported in Herbert,
1996: 68A)
While this difference is certainly meaningful, the government
could do much better. For example, France and the United States
both would have child poverty rates of about 25 percent if it were
not for government assistance. With the generous government
assistance provided in France, the child poverty rate is reduced
to just 6.5 percent. The minimal U. S. welfare program, on the
other hand, reduces the child poverty rate to about 21 percent
(Raspberry, 1997).
In 1996 the Republican-dominated Congress and a middleof-the-road Democratic president passed a sweeping welfare law
that ended the 61-year old safety net for poor people, completing the
Reagan Revolution (Watts, 1997: 409; Sciacchitano, 1999). The major provisions of this law (as later amended) include the following (much of the description of the new welfare law and
its consequences are from the Children's Defense Fund, 1997:
Edelman, 1997; Schorr, 1997; Watts, 1997; and Eitzen, 1996): First,
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the law eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), setting up a temporary program in its place. Second,
states, through federal block grants, were given a fixed sum of
money and considerable flexibility in how to spend it. Third, the
law insisted on work. States were required to demand that parents
work within two years of receiving cash assistance, although
states had the right to shorten the period before recipients must
work. Fourth, the law mandated a five-year lifetime limit on the
receipt of assistance, which states can reduce if they wish. Fifth,
the law required that unmarried teen parents must live with
an adult and attend school to receive assistance. Sixth, various
federal assistance programs targeted for the poor were cut by
$54.5 billion over six years. Included in these budget cuts were
$27 billion from the food stamp program, $7 billion from the
children's portion of the Supplemental Security Income program,
and $3 billion over six years for child nutrition, and federal
funding for social services was cut by a six-year total of $2.5
billion. Cuts were also made by tightening the qualifying criteria
for being defined as a disabled child. Ironically, the narrowed
eligibility requirements "result in the loss of coverage for some
children who if they were adults would be considered disabled"
(Edelman, 1997: 48). Seventh, the welfare law denied a broad
range of public benefits to legal immigrants. Concerning this last
point, although there is some variation from state to state (since
the states administer the programs), all legal immigrants were
cut off from food stamps and those who entered the country after
the welfare bill was signed were ineligible for federal programs
such as Supplemental Security Income and state run programs
such as temporary welfare and Medicaid. And, eighth, the federal
money given to the states was capped at $16.4 billion annually.
This is significant because it means that there is no adjustment for
inflation or population growth. In effect, by 2002 states will have
considerably less federal money to spend on welfare than they
did under the old welfare provisions.
In sum, this new welfare legislation ended the entitlement
which guaranteed that states must give help to all needy families
with children (Quadagno, 1999). Now assistance for poor families
was temporary with parents required to work. Lamenting the
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passage of the 1996 Welfare Act, The Nation editorialized: "There
is now a bipartisan agreement that the United States bears no
responsibility for its poorest families" (The Nation, 1995: 371).
THE CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS GUIDING CURRENT
WELFARE POLICY AND THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE
Assumptions from conservative ideology provide the bedrock of the 1996 Welfare Law (Sciacchitano, 1999). First, there
is the conservative assumption that welfare programs establish
perverse incentives that keep the beneficiaries from working and
to have babies outside of marriage. That is, welfare is so generous
that it makes sense to stay on welfare, rather than go to work.
Moreover, since the benefits increase with each child, women
on welfare make the rational decision to have more children.
Progressives argue that this reasoning is fallacious because it
ignores five facts: (1) The average monthly AFDC payment, accounting for inflation, has withered by almost 50 percent since
1970, yet the birth rate for unmarried mothers has soared during
this period; (2) The average monthly AFDC payment plus food
stamps provides benefits that are much below the poverty line;
(3) States with low welfare benefits have higher illegitimacy rates
than states with higher welfare benefits; (4) New Jersey's 1993
law that ended the practice of increasing a welfare check when a
recipient had another baby did not drive down birth rates among
women on welfare (Healy, 1997); and (5) The much more generous
welfare states of Canada, western Europe, and Scandinavia have
much lower out-of-wedlock birth rates than found in the United
States.
A second assumption of the lawmakers is that when poor
people are confronted with a "sink or swim" world they will
develop the determination and the skill to stay afloat (Murray,
1984). By shoving welfare recipients off of the dole, their only
recourse will be to work, resulting in productive rather than
parasitic people. Progressives, however, note that under current
societal conditions many of the poor will "sink" even if they
wanted to "swim." There are not enough jobs and many of the
jobs that are available do not lift poor people out of poverty.
And, many who are being pushed "into the pool" cannot"swim"
because they lack the skills and experience required.
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Third, there is a moral condemnation of those on welfare
because their poverty is assumed by conservatives the result of
their attitude, their way of life, and their choice to reject the work
ethic. Progressives argue, to the contrary, that the problem for
most welfare recipients is not the lack of a work ethic but a lack
of jobs that pay enough to enable them to become independent
(Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997:12; for empirical invalidation of the
culture of poverty argument of the conservatives see, for example,
Edin and Lein, 1997). Moreover, they see a tendency on the part
of the conservatives to reserve this moral condemnation of poor
people "for those who are not only poor but different-in terms
of race, ethnicity, country of origin, or religion-or who violate
patriarchal norms" (Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997: 9).
Progressives argue that the willingness to work on the part
of poor people is not the problem. Research from a number of
studies shows that most welfare recipients do work, bringing in
extra money from various activities such as house cleaning, doing
laundry, repairing clothing, child care, and selling items that they
have made. For example, sociologist Kathleen Harris, summarizing her findings from a nationally representative sample of single
mothers who received welfare, says:
I found exclusive dependence on welfare to be rare. More than half
of the single mothers whom I studied worked while they were
on welfare, and two-thirds left the welfare rolls when they could
support themselves with jobs. However, more than half (57 percent)
of the women who worked their way off public assistance later
returned because their jobs ended or they still could not make ends
meet. (Harris, 1996: B7)
This outside work to supplement welfare is necessary because
welfare payments are insufficient to make ends meet. In 1991, for
example, the average AFDC payment and food stamps averaged
$565 a month, while the average monthly expenses were $876a deficit of $311 (Koretz, 1996). In Mississippi, for example, the
benefits for years have been only 17 percent of the poverty live and
with food stamps added, only 40 percent of the poverty line (Edelman, 1999). This difference is made up through various strategies
including income-producing work and help from family, friends,
neighbors, boyfriends, and absent fathers.
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A question arising from the requirement that all welfare recipients work is whether a single mother is "able" to work (McLarin,
1995). Traditionally, she was not considered so. AFDC was created in 1935 with the goal of keeping women at home with
their children. The new legislation has changed that, forcing
poor women with children to work, often without the training,
sometimes without the jobs, and usually without the child care.
Through twisted logic, many of the same politicians who want
poor mothers to work, want middle-class mothers to give up their
jobs because a stay-at-home mother is positive for children.
Another issue regarding work has to do with its availability.
During the Great Depression the federal government provided
jobs for poor people. These jobs included the construction of
roads, bridges, and buildings, clearing forests, planting trees to
stop wind erosion, and the like. The jobs provided society with
important projects and needy individuals and families with income and skill development. The situation is different now. The
new legislation mandates that poor people will work but without
providing the jobs.
This punitive overhaul [of the welfare system] sends [welfare recipients] off on their own to secure work in a world of downsizing,
layoffs and capital flight. Where are the welfare recipients going to
find stable jobs? How can they pay for health insurance and child
care when they earn the minimum wage? What will happen to their
children? (The Nation, 1995: 372)
Fourth, welfare dependency is assumed by conservatives to
be the source of illegitimacy, laziness, crime, and other social
pathologies. Progressives, however, point to the nations with a
much more generous welfare system than in the United States,
noting that cities in those countries are much safer, and that
violent crime is very much lower than in the United States, as
is the rate of teenage pregnancy. Also, from 1970 to the mid1990s AFDC benefits declined sharply (from $792 per month in
inflation-adjusted 1994 dollars in 1970 for a family of four to
$435 per month in 1994. If welfare benefits affect marriage and
fertility, then one would expect that the drop in welfare benefits
would have made marriage more attractive and childbearing
outside of marriage less attractive. "Yet divorce, cohabitation,
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and the percentage of births that occurred outside of marriage
all increased during this period" (Cherlin, 1998: 124).
Most important, progressives argue that when welfare is seen
as the cause of societal ills, the remedy is to get rid of welfare rather
than confronting the structural sources of poverty. The causes
of poverty are complex, involving the structural inequalities of
class, race, and gender, the changing economy, the lack of good
jobs, the maldistribution of resources for schools, and inadequate
pay and benefits for low-end jobs. All of these conditions occur
within the ideology and practice of capitalism, which celebrates
competition, selfishness, domination, and exploitation. Thus, a
cure for poverty involves much more than greater individual
effort and getting rid of the welfare system. It requires structural
changes in society.
Finally, there is a racial subtext in the welfare legislation. Underlying the debate on welfare, were the dominant but erroneous
notions about certain groups, their families, and the women who
seek public funds and services to support and maintain families.
The conservative ideology posits that these groups have no claim
to these resources because they do not conform to traditional
family values. Fueling this assumption is the false belief that
African American women dominate the welfare rolls. Similarly,
"negative images of Latinos and other immigrants fueled debates
in the states and paved the way for denying benefits to legal
immigrants nationwide" (Dill, Baca Zinn, and Patton, 1998: 21).
The conservative response, in short, is that the welfare state is
bad and should be eliminated. But just what is it that the policymakers are in the process of killing off? What will its death mean
for society? The U. S. welfare state, which is the most modest of the
industrialized nations, emerged in the 1930s as a reaction to the
instability of the Great Depression and capitalism run amuck
(the following is from Moberg, 1995). Motivated by a fear of
radical unrest by the economically disadvantaged and disaffected
and the need to save capitalism from its own self-destructive
tendencies (economic instability, rape of the environment, worker
exploitation, lack of worker and consumer safety), the creators
of the New Deal under Roosevelt and the Great Society under
Johnson instituted Social Security, the minimum wage, federal aid
to education, health and nutrition programs, subsidized housing,
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and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. These welfare
programs go too far, say the conservatives. Progressives, on the
other hand, argue that they do not go far enough.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1996 WELFARE
LEGISLATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES
Although the time is relatively short since the 1996 welfare
legislation, we can examine some preliminary results and anticipate its longer term effects. As of September 1998, the welfare
rolls had declined from 12.2 million to about 8 million since the
enactment of the welfare legislation. This dramatic reduction has
led supporters of the new welfare law to declare that the new law
was working as intended. This interpretation is erroneous for at
least four reasons. To begin, those who left the welfare rolls first
were likely the easiest to place in jobs, that is, they have some
secondary education and job experience. But, while the bulk of
these former welfare recipients found work, their work, typically,
offered little room for advancement and a high risk of being laid
off (Burtless, 1998). Most important, the wages were usually too
meager to lift them out of poverty (Albelda, 1999). The Children's
Defense Fund and the National Coalition for the Homeless found
that for those who recently left welfare only 29 percent had wages
above the poverty line and 51 percent had wages that did not
even reach 75 percent of the poverty level (reported in Jackson,
1999). The much more difficult task will be to find jobs for those
who have multiple obstacles to success (relatively uneducated,
inadequate work experience or job skills, or who are functionally disabled). Second, the welfare legislation was passed at a
propitious historical moment-during an economic expansion
when jobs were being created and unemployment was low. Two
years later the unemployment rate had dropped to 4.3 percent, the
lowest rate in 27 years. Because of a growing economy the number
of AFDC recipients declined by 2.2 million in the 30 months before
the 1996 legislation(DeParle, 1997a; Wolf, 1998b).
But even with the booming economy and many still receiving
welfare because their time limits had not been reached, there are
reports of rising rates of hunger and homelessness (Population
Today, 1999). The U. S. Conference of Mayors collected data from
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30 major cities from November 1, 1997 to October 31, 1998 and
found that 78 percent of the cities had an increase in the number of
requests for emergency food assistance and 84 percent reported
an increase in the number of families with children who requested
emergency food assistance (United States Conference of Mayors,
1998). These requests were 16 percent higher than in the previous
year (the largest increase since 1992)(reported in Loven, 1998).
Another survey by Second Harvest, the nation's largest network
of food banks, found that more than 21 million people used
emergency food programs in 1997,40 percent of whom came from
working households (reported in Wolf, 1998a). Low-cost housing
has also become more scarce because of gentrification, soaring
housing prices, and the reduction in subsidized apartments. As
a result the Department of Housing and Urban Development
revealed that a record 5.3 million families with low incomes face a
crisis of unaffordable rent-defined as rents exceeding 30 percent
of one's income (Associated Press, 1998). The U. S. Conference on
Mayors reported that in 1998 there was an 11 percent increase in
emergency shelter demands over the previous year in the 30 cities
surveyed (reported in Ratnesar, 1999).
These realities raise serious questions about job availability,
hunger, and homelessness, when the unemployment rate goes
up to seven or eight percent, or worse, when there is an economic
recession. In either situation there will be layoffs, which means
that the last to be hired (the workers only recently off welfare) will
be the first to be fired. If these former employees had used up their
time limits for welfare, they will be on their own without a safety
net with nowhere to turn for rent, utilities, food, and health care.
Third, the availability of low end jobs is distributed unevenly.
Some social categories have more difficulty getting low-wage
employment than others. "Not surprisingly, in the fierce competition for jobs in that sector, individuals who are young, black and
non-college educated fare the worst" (Herbert, 1997: 70A). When
the unemployment rate was 5.2 percent in 1996, unemployment
among young African American women (ages 15 to 25 with a
high school diploma was 19.7 percent (Economic Policy Report,
cited in Herbert, 1997).
Work by itself is not the solution. Latino women and men
participate in the labor force at nearly the same rate as Whites

62

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

(66.5 percent compared to 67.2 percent (U. S. Department of
Labor, 1997), yet the poverty rate in 1996 for Latinos was 29.4
percent, compared to 11.2 percent for Whites (Dill et al., 1998).
Moreover, 10 percent of poor people worked year-round, fulltime in 1996. Underscoring one of the above points: working for
the minimum wage, which most former welfare recipients do,
gives a full-time worker an annual income that is more than $2000
below the poverty line for a family of three. Obviously, then, it
takes adequately compensated work to climb out of poverty, a
provision missing from the welfare legislation.
The 1996 legislation was especially harsh to immigrant families (Cherlin, 1998; Eisinger, 1998), who are mostly people of
color. New legal immigrants, except for those of refugee status,
are now ineligible for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(the mechanism that replaced AFDC), food stamps, and most
other federally funded benefits until they become citizens, which
takes a minimum of five years. Under these conditions, it seems
more than reasonable to assume that hundreds of thousands of
immigrant families will be pushed into poverty by the provisions
of the 1996 welfare legislation.
Regarding marriage Stephanie Aaronson and Heidi Hartmann conclude that the "preponderance of research suggests
that welfare has no impact on women's marital and childbearing
behavior. .."(Aaronson and Hartmann, 1996: 586). Poverty, on the
other hand, does. After reviewing the literature, family historian
Stephanie Coontz summarizes what previous research predicts:
Poor couples are twice as likely to divorce as more affluent ones.
Jobless individuals are three to four times less likely to marry. And
teens who live in areas of high unemployment and inferior school
systems are six to seven times more likely to become unwed parents
than more fortunate teens. Dozens of research studies show that the
most effective deterrent to early childbearing is access to, among
other things, good schools and steady jobs (Coontz, 1994: 19).
The recent welfare legislation is going to put more children
at risk as they and their mothers no longer receive AFDC, food
stamps, and other welfare benefits. Many of their mothers will
now work at minimum wage jobs with new expenses (transportation, child care, and clothing), and likely no health insurance.
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And, we know that many who work will not escape poverty.
Columbia University's National Center for Children in Poverty,
reported, for example, that in 1996 some 5.5 million children
lived in poverty and 63 percent of them lived in families with at
least one working parent (reported in Healy, 1998). Many of their
mothers are difficult to employ because they suffer disproportionately from mental health problems and they often lack quality
education and work experience. Thus, many former mothers on
welfare will likely be unemployed and without the safety net after
two years. Clearly, without raising the minimum wage, providing training programs, guaranteeing work, and subsidizing child
care, more children will be raised in poverty under the new welfare rules. Daniel Lichter's review of children in poverty shows
that before the 1996 welfare legislation went into effect, the rate of
child poverty was at a 30-year high, and the income gap between
rich and poor children greater than at any time in recent memory
(Lichter, 1997: 141). It is obvious that the new welfare legislation
will increase the child poverty rate and the income inequality
gap. The Urban Institute estimates that an additional 1.1 million
children would become poor as a result of the 1996 legislation
(The Urban Institute, 1996; see also Albelda and Tilly, 1997: 127).
Moreover, more than eight million families with children would
lose an average of $1,300 per family (cited in Edelman, 1997: 46)
Thus, more children than ever will be further impoverished,
which will have serious debilitating consequences for them (for
documentation of the later life outcomes of childhood poverty
see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997).
We ask: Is it appropriate to take $28 billion over six years in
food assistance from poor women and their children? As Marian
Wright Edelman has stated: "The elimination of the national
guarantee to protect children is a moral outrage ... a massive

betrayal that places the lives of many of our youngest and most
vulnerable citizens in grave danger" (Edelman, 1996: 1).
WHAT IS MISSING IN THE NEW WELFARE LEGISLATION
Foremost, the legislation ignored the conclusions of social
science research (Astone, 1997). This research documents, for
example, that 70 percent of ADFC recipients leave welfare within
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two years. We also know that nearly three-fourths of those who
leave end up back on welfare because of inadequate pay, the lack
of medical benefits, or their lack of job skills. Only 15 percent of
recipients stay on welfare continuously for five years or more.
Social science research also informs us of the detrimental effects
of poverty on marriage relationships, the increased probability of
spouse and child abuse, and the dismal future for many children
of the poor.
Second, while focusing on the replacement of work for welfare, there is no provision for jobs and if one finds work there is no
assistance for transportation (two-thirds of all new jobs are in the
suburbs, while three-quarters of welfare recipients live in central
cities or rural areas; just one in 20 welfare recipients owns a car,
Bailey, 1997); and there is no child care subsidy or provision of
high level day care for the children of working parents. Moreover,
this law contains no provisions requiring the states to provide
educational or job-training programs for those displaced from
welfare. Especially hard hit are women. Without education:
women's wages will not grow, and without growth in their wages,
welfare mothers will never be able to afford child care or health
care.... Eliminating welfare without improving the pay and benefits of the jobs they can get-or improving their ability to get
better jobs-can have only one result: an increase in poverty among
women and children. (Harris, 1996: B7)
The 1996 welfare legislation assumes that jobs are uniformly
available. But the availability of low-wage, entry-level jobs depends on time and place. Some regions (e.g., the coal mining
region in Appalachia), states such as California and cities such as
New York City have to overcome a mismatch-huge numbers on
welfare and relatively few jobs. In New York City, for example,
the ratio of welfare recipients to jobs is four times the national
average. From 1992 to 1996 in that city there was a net gain of
only 88,000 jobs. "At that slow rate of growth, if every job gained
by the local economy were given to a New Yorker now on welfare
it would take 21 years for all 470,000 adults to be absorbed into
the economy" (Finder, 1996: 17). Similarly, by mid-1999 when
most welfare recipients will be forced to find some type of work,
Detroit expects a shortfall of 75,303 jobs and Philadelphia will
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fall 53,400 jobs short (Associated Press, 1997). There are many
pockets of rural poverty where jobs are few and poverty high.
In East Carroll Parish, Louisiana, for example, 55 percent of the
residents live below the poverty line, the unemployment rate
is three times the national average, and the median household
income is less than one-third the median for the country. There is
no industry other than farming (Kelly, 1996). Nearby in the eleven
delta counties of Mississippi, the poverty rate is 41 percent and
unemployment more than double the national rate. Frank Howell
of Mississippi State University has estimated that for every 254
families leaving welfare in those counties only one new job will be
created (cited in DeParle, 1997). Or consider the case of California,
where the state's economy is generating 300,000 jobs a year (many
of which are high tech jobs not suitable for the underschooled
and undertrained), which is insufficient for the 1 million current
welfare recipients who have to be moved into a job market and
where 2 million people not on welfare are currently looking for
jobs and another half-million part-timers want more work (USA
Today, 1997).
A major concern with the welfare legislation is that by pushing
the poor into an already crowded workforce, wages for low-end
jobs will be driven down. This hurts those leaving welfare as
well as the working poor. There are 38 million working poor
who receive $7.50 or less an hour for work and usually have no
health insurance. What will happen to their wages and jobs when
4 million people (50 percent of all adults on welfare assistance)
are added to the workforce by 2000, as mandated by the law?
Employers are prohibited from firing existing workers to hire
welfare recipients whose compensation is subsidized by the state.
But employers can reduce working hours, wages, and benefits for
existing workers, a likely occurrence. The plight of the working
poor, always marginal, thus, becomes worse because of welfare
reform. Researchers at the Economic Policy Institute estimate
that with the addition of one million new low-wage workers the
income of the bottom 30 percent of earners will be reduced on
average by 11.9 percent. This drop in wages will be even more
severe in those states and localities with large numbers of people
on welfare (McCrate, 1997; Street, 1998). This has at least three
additional negative consequences. First, it weakens those labor
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unions that organize low-pay workers such as janitors, municipal
workers, and food handlers. This weakness reinforces low wages
and minimal benefits for the economically marginal. Second, the
anger of the working poor, most likely, will be directed at the
former welfare recipients, not the economic system that limits
their opportunities and exploits them. Third, and related to the
second, the anger of the working poor will likely be overtly racist
as the working poor perceive their economic situation reduced
by racial minorities and immigrants who they believe are the
majority of welfare recipients (a belief that is false, by the way,
as 56 percent of first-time female-headed welfare recipients from
1990 to 1992 were White; Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law,
1996: 28).
The third missing ingredient in the new welfare legislation
is an understanding of the structural sources of poverty and
meeting the challenges of a rapidly changing economy.
Fourth, the legislation offers no safety net for the people who
are unable to find jobs or who are not able to get their children
into day care. When the economy slows down, as it inevitably
will, many of the working poor and former welfare recipients
will lose their jobs. What will happen to them when they cannot
pay their rents or house payments, or their utility bills, or medical
bills? Under the previous welfare system, many families were just
a lost job, divorce, medical disaster, or rent hike away from losing
their housing. The fastest growing category of homeless during
the late 1980s and early 1990s were families (Timmer, Eitzen, and
Talley, 1994). Under the new welfare law, and especially when
society experiences an economic downturn, increasing numbers
of families will have to move into substandard housing or even
into homeless shelters. According to Peter Edelman:
There will be suffering. Some of the damage will be obvious-more
homelessness, for example, with more demand on already strapped
shelters and soup kitchens. The ensuing problems will also appear
as increases in the incidence of other problems, directly but perhaps
not provably owing to the impact of the welfare bill. There will
be more malnutrition and more crime, increased infant mortality,
and increased drug and alcohol abuse. There will be increased
family violence and abuse against children and women, and a
consequent significant spillover of the problem into the already
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overloaded child-welfare system and battered-women's shelters.
(Edelman, 1997: 53)
To illustrate addressing just the issue of welfare's effect on crime
rates, Hannon and Defronzo (1998) found that higher levels of
welfare assistance reduce the strength of the positive relationship
between the size of the disadvantaged population and crime rates
(for the theoretical understanding of this effect see Messner and
Rosenfeld, 1997).
Fifth, a major concern with the 1996 welfare legislation is
the abdication of federal responsibility for welfare. By turning
over welfare to the states, there are fifty welfare programs. This
devolution has the effect of making benefits very uneven as some
states will be relatively generous and others will be much less so.
Tufts University's Center on Hunger and Poverty surveyed the
fifty states to study the implementation of federal welfare reform.
The study found that only fourteen states had revamped their
systems in such a way as to likely improve the financial condition
of the poor. Two-thirds of the states actually made changes that
threaten even greater poverty (reported in The Nation, 1998).
States' rights have not always worked in the past. "States failed in
the past to take the lead in trying to end racial discrimination or
to alleviate unemployment and poverty. That's why the country
need the New Deal, civil rights legislation, and social welfare
programs.. ." (Hettleman, 1997: 24; see also Schlesinger, quoted
in Shanker, 1995: E7).
Moreover, the federal block grants do not reflect economic
reality, since they do not adjust for inflation, for economic change,
or for demographics (Primus, 1997: 20). This oversight ensures
that the spending on poor people will not only vary by state but
that the amount will be increasingly inadequate.
Sixth, the welfare legislation does not protect children of
poor parents. How are they to escape poverty without adequate
supports for their health and education?
Seventh, the welfare legislation did not address the real issue
-ending poverty.
Many of us had assumed that welfare reform was fueled by a
desire to eliminate poverty. This is not the case. Under the new
law, welfare is seen as an issue in and of itself, divorced from issues
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of poverty. Ending welfare had nothing to do with addressing poverty.

(Watts, 1997: 412)
THE SOLUTION
Is the answer to these poverty-related problems a more feeble welfare system or a more robust one? In our view the only
way to help poor people is to spend more money, not less as
the government has done since the Reagan administration (Wellstone and Dauster, 1999). This money would be spent on helping
people with child care, increasing the minimum wage, providing job training and education programs, universal health care
(at present we provide some health care for the poor through
Medicaid, but do not help the working poor-clearly, a perverse
incentive system), guaranteeing jobs, and reducing the tax burden
on the poor who are trying to work their way out of poverty. In
Wisconsin, for example, the welfare rolls have been cut by 65
percent over ten years. This effort to get people working rather
than on welfare has cost the state more, not less for health care,
child care, transportation, and training. In 1987, for instance,
Wisconsin spent $12 million a year on child care. By 1998, it was
spending $180 million annually (Dionne, 1997).
Is there a way to restructure the welfare system to apportion money and services more fairly to the needy? Is there a
way to move people away from welfare dependency and toward
autonomy, responsibility, and self-sufficiency? Is there a way to
strengthen families on the economic margins? Is there a way to
protect the children of the impoverished? Is there a way to meet
the needs of the working poor as well poor people? Is there a way
to structure such a federal program so that it attacks the causes of
poverty, not the symptoms? An editorial in In These Times provides
the progressive solution to these important questions:
Welfare as we know it should surely be ended. But it should be
ended in a way that provides every person capable of working with
an equal right to employment, and everyone who is employed with
a living wage. In the long run, that would also require equal educational opportunity for all at all levels of instruction, universal health
care and quality child care for working mothers. Such a program
should be federally mandated and funded, but administered by the
states or by elected community councils. And it should be available
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to all citizens and legal residents up to a comfortable income level,
and paid for by graduated income taxes on those above that level.
(In These Times, 1996: 2; see also Edelman, 1997)
The current political climate (from both political parties and
much of the public) runs counter to these proposals. Instead of a
society that emphasizes community, cooperation, equality of opportunity, and fundamental human rights, the politico-economic
system of the United States celebrates individualism, competition, and domination. The vast majority of political leaders and
their constituents oppose increasing the minimum wage to a
living wage, universal health care, and an adequate safety net
for poor people. Thus, to eliminate poverty its roots in the market
economy must be eliminated.
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The Enemy Within:
The Demonization of Poor Women
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The denigrationand demonization of poor women was central to the effort
to repeal Aid to Families with Dependent Children by the passage of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996. The utilization of negative stereotypes involving race, class and
gender effectively marginalizedimpoverished women and their children,
who were blamed for virtually all of the social problems of the United

States during the 1990s. Despite the massive concentrationof wealth and
income in the hands of the wealthiest Americans and the ever-widening
gap between rich and poor, the United States continues to ignore the need
for fundamental economic and social reform.

They are despised, denigrated, ostracized from mainstream
society. In earlier times, they were known as the "dangerous
classes;" today they are labeled the "underclass." They are pictured as virtually irredeemable, lazy, dependent, living off the
hard-earned money of others. They are poor single mothers. They
are welfare recipients. They are the enemy within.
The demonizing of poor, single mothers has been an integral
part of the recent onslaught on the safety net, meager and inadequate as it is. Poor mothers have been deemed unworthy, the
"undeserving poor;" millions of welfare recipients were painted
with one brush, were relegated to that area in society that is
beyond the Pale. Systematic stereotyping and stigmatizing of
"welfare mothers" was necessary in order to dehumanize them
in the eyes of other Americans before the harsh and tenuous
lifeline of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
the other bare-bones social programs could be shredded. The
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number I
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implicit and often explicit message is: if welfare recipients are
so unworthy, perhaps such harsh treatment, such punishment is
warranted, even necessary, in order to modify their social and
reproductive behavior. Perhaps, it has been said, removing cash
and other benefits, forcing mothers to work even at dead-end jobs
for poverty wages, and denying aid to children of teenagers and
to additional babies born while the mother is receiving AFDC
is the only way to deal with this "deviant" and "irresponsible"
group. Many politicians claim, moreover, that they promote these
Draconian measures against the poor as a form of "tough love,"
"for their own good." These cuts in assistance and services may
be painful at first, this reasoning goes, and some suggest that
this current generation of poor parents may have to be written
off, but in the long run these harsh measures will enable the
next generation to "stand on their own two feet." Congress, the
tough but responsible parent, will force the poor, as though they
were rebellious adolescents, to shape up, to reform their delinquent ways.
Just over a decade ago, social scientist Charles Murray, author
of Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980, articulated
the values, priorities, and underlying agenda of America's war
against the poor: "Some people are better than others. They deserve more of society's rewards, of which money is only one small
part. A principal function of social policy is to make sure they have
the opportunity to reap those rewards. Government cannot identify the worthy, but it can protect a society in which the worthy
can identify themselves," (Murray, 1984, p. 234). Thus Murray
was calling for government to legitimize the existing social and
economic hierarchy by safeguarding the affluence and lifestyles
of those whom he has deemed "better" and more "worthy."
The rhetoric that accompanied and paved the way for the
continuing assault on programs for poor women and children
was fueled by a pledge made by candidate Bill Clinton during the
1992 presidential campaign to "put an end to welfare as we know
it," (DeParle, July, 1994). As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Democrat from New York, stated, "The Republicans took him at
his word" and went much further. But the only real way to end
welfare as we know it, Moynihan continues, is "just to dump the
children on the streets," (Pear, 1995).
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Prior to the repeal of Aids to Families with Dependent Children by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the litany of criticism against poor, single women was relentless. Mother-only families were blamed
for virtually all of the ills afflicting American society Out-ofwedlock births were blamed for the "breakdown of the family,"
for the crime rate, drug and alcohol addiction, poverty, illiteracy,
homelessness, poor school performance and the rending of the
social fabric. The labeling of some citizens as "dependent"-that
is, dependent on social welfare programs rather than on spouses,
parents or other family members, or other, more acceptable Federal programs-has been used indiscriminately to discredit an
entire group of women and children without regard to their
character or their specific work and/or family history.
As the political tide turned rapidly against the poor, particularly poor women, rhetoric escalated to previously unimagined
levels of hyperbole and vitriol. At a 1994 news conference called
by the Mainstream Forum, a group of centrist and conservative House Democrats affiliated with the Democratic Leadership Council, the political organization President Clinton helped
found and headed when he was Governor of Arkansas, Representative Nathan Deal, a Georgia Democrat, declared that welfare
was dead. He went on to state, "The stench from its decaying carcass has filled the nostrils of every American," (DeParle,
May, 1994).
The very words that are being used tell us what to think
and how to feel. Poor women are characterized by their "dependence," an absolute negative, a polar opposite from that valued
American characteristic, "independence." This label presumes
that they are "dependent," that they passively rely on the government for their day-to-day needs while we, the rest of us, are "independent," "pull ourselves up by our bootstraps," are out there "on
our own." These designations leave no room for the considerable
variation and complexity that characterize most people's lives, for
the fact that virtually all of us are in varying degrees dependent on
others and on societal supports during our adult lives-that many
of us have been recipients of financial or other kinds of help from
family members, that many have been helped by inheritance,
by assistance in finding (and sometimes keeping) a job, by tax
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deductions for mortgage payments, or the Federal subsidy of
farm prices or highways, or by programs such as Medicare or
Unemployment Compensation or disability assistance.
Dividing people into "us" and "them" is facilitated by the
resurrection of terms such as "illegitimacy" that encourage the
shaming and denigration of mothers and their out-of-wedlock
children, for it is far easier to refuse aid to "them," to people
who engage in disgraceful, stigmatized behavior than to people
who seem like "us." David Boaz, executive vice-president of the
Cato Institute, a libertarian organization, even hoped to resurrect
the term "bastard:" "We've made it possible for a teen-age girl to
survive with no husband and no job. That used to be very difficult.
If we had more stigma and lower benefits, might we end up with
100,000 bastards every year rather than a million children born to
alternative families?" (Wines, April, 1995).
Poor, single mothers, particularly AFDC recipients, have
been portrayed as the ultimate outsiders-marginalized as nonworkers in a society that claims belief in the work ethic, marginalized as single parents in a society that holds the two-parent,
heterosexual family as the desired norm, marginalized as poor
people in a society that worships success and material rewards
and marginalized as people of color when in reality millions of
whites live in poverty. One of the key myths in the demonizing
of poor women is that most of the impoverished, single, childbearing women are black. This image of the poor, inexorably
intertwined with the long-standing baggage of racist ideology,
facilitates their being perceived as deviants, as the ultimate outsiders. As anthropologist Leith Mullings has stated, "Women of
color, and particularly African-American women, are the focus
of well-elaborated, strongly held ... ideologies concerning race,
class, and gender." She goes on to state that "the images, representation, and symbols that form ideologies often have complex meanings and associations that are not easily or readily
articulated, making them difficult to challenge," (Mullings, 1994,
pp. 265-89).
Historically, African-American women have been described
on the one hand by the image of "'Mammy,' the religious, loyal,
motherly slave.. ." and, on the other hand, by the image of
"'Jezebel,' the sexually aggressive, provocative woman governed
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entirely by libido." As Mullings states, this Mammy/Jezebel
stereotype is a variation of the widespread madonna/whore
dualism but the issue of race adds an even more pernicious
element to the classic stereotype. The view of African Americans
as a different species, what Mullings and others have termed
the "otherness of race," has "justified the attribution of excessive
sexuality." That "sexuality continues to be a major theme in the
discourse about race" assures that it is also a major theme in
the discourse about poor women. Moreover, the Mammy image,
so prevalent through the first half of the twentieth century and
memorialized in popular culture by the film Gone With the Wind,
has been replaced, according to Mullings, by the image of the
"emasculating matriarch," (Mullings, 1994, pp. 265-89).
Therefore, whether through overt sexuality or through control within
the family that supposedly robs black men of their authority and
power, black women are portrayed as deviant and as the primary
cause of the problems within the black family and within the black
community.
Patricia Hill Collins, author of Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, analyzes the
ways in which these deeply rooted images of black women underlie and buttress the harsh treatment of poor women over the
past two decades and particularly during the 1990s:
Portraying African-American women as matriarch allows the dominant group to blame Black women for the success or failure of
Black children. Assuming that Black poverty is passed on intergenerationally, via value transmission in families, an elite white male
standpoint suggests that Black children lack the attention and care
allegedly lavished on white, middle-class children and that diverts
attention from the political and economic inequality affecting Black
mothers and children and suggests that anyone can rise from poverty if he or she only received good values at home. Those AfricanAmericans who remain poor are blamed for their own victimization
(Collins, 1990, p. 74).
Since the 1994 election, attacks on other groups in the United
States-particularly on criminals and potential criminals and on
immigrants-have also escalated sharply. This process has included verbal denigration as well as cruel and unusual treatment
of those who are traditionally perceived as outsiders. There has
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been harsh rhetoric against documented and undocumented immigrants, as well as attempts to deprive them of essential human
services. Prisoners who are mentally ill, functionally illiterate,
and otherwise usually exempt from such inhumane punishment
are being executed. Chain gangs and forced labor have returned
to the Alabama penal system. It is surely no accident that all of
these groups are made up largely of low-income people of color.
But the harshest rhetoric and most sweeping policy changes have
been reserved for the poor, particularly poor women. It is the
convergence of class, gender, and race that makes this sweeping
attack on one segment of society possible.
This denigration of poor welfare recipients is based in large
part on dichotomous thinking and on the repetition and reiteration of commonly held myths about poor women and their children. The dichotomous thinking underlying much of the so-called
welfare debate divides people, primarily women, into "good"
and "bad;" "workers" and "idlers;" those who abide by the traditional "family values" and those who do not; good caring mothers and those who have been characterized by Charles Murray
as "rotten mothers." Even children are being characterized by
this either/or language: "legitimate" versus "illegitimate" (or
"bastards"); young people who become productive citizens as
opposed to those who are truant, drop out of school, or engage
in early childbearing and other forms of "anti-social" behavior.
As Elaine Pagels points out in her book, The Origin of Satan,
many cultures throughout the world and over the span of recorded human history have divided people into "we" and "they,"
"human" and "nonhuman." The "we" is often correlated with the
"human" while the "they" are envisaged as "nonhuman." Pagels
claims this kind of dichotomous thinking is deeply embedded in
the Judeo-Christian tradition (Pagels, 1995, xviii).
The scathing stereotyping of poor mothers has severe consequences for them, for their children, and for the society as a whole.
As sociologist Erving Goffman (1963) has pointed out:
By definition, of course we believe the person with a stigma is not
quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce
his life chances. We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain
his inferiority and account for the danger he represents ...(p. 5).
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Perhaps the most dehumanizing and degrading references
recipients occurred on the floor of the House of Repwelfare
to
resentatives on March 24, 1995 during the debate on a bill that
would cut $69 billion in spending on social welfare programs
over the next five years. Welfare recipients were compared to animals by two Republican members of the House. Representative
John L. Mica of Florida held up a sign that said, "Don't Feed
the Alligators." He explained, "We post these warnings because
unnatural feeding and artificial care create dependency. When
dependency sets in, these otherwise able alligators can no longer
survive on their own." Mica then noted that while "people are
not alligators ... we've upset the natural order. We've created a

system of dependency," (Pear, March, 1995).
Representative Barbara Cubin of Wyoming carried the analogy still further:
The Federal Government introduced wolves into the State of Wyoming, and they put them in the pens, and they brought back elk
and venison to them every day. This is what I call the wolf welfare
program. The Federal Government provided everything that the
wolves need for their existence. But guess what? They opened the
gates and let the wolves out, and now the wolves won't go. Just like
any animal in the species, any mammal, when you take away their
freedom and their dignity and their ability, they can't provide for
themselves ... (Pear, March, 1995).

Toni Morrison (1974) in her book The Bluest Eye, a novel that
deals explicitly with the denigration of black women in white
America, describes the impact of demonizing an entire sector of
society:
Outdoors, we knew, was the real terror of life...
There is a difference between being put out and being put
outdoors. If you are put out, you go somewhere else; if you are
outdoors, there is no place to go. The distinction was subtle but final.
Outdoors was the end of something, an irrevocable, physical fact,
defining and complementing our metaphysical condition (p. 18).
The persistence of myths about welfare recipients and the
resistance of policy-makers to the true facts despite repeated
reiteration of them by experts in the field of social welfare are noteworthy. It appears that the United States needs to have someone
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to blame, people to hate, a group to rally against. For nearly a
half century Americans had a clear-cut enemy-Communism.
Throughout the Cold War, there was an ideology we could despise, countries to fear, foreign leaders to demonize. We had external villains whom we could blame for many of the world's ills
and whom we could identify as evil in order to define ourselves
as good. With the virtual world-wide breakdown of so-called
Communist countries (with the exception of Cuba and North
Korea), who would be the enemy now? Whom could we distrust
and despise? Who would be the devil that in comparison would
make us feel righteous and worthy? Who would be the "them"
to help us to feel more truly "us?"
Moreover, over the past two decades we have seen a dramatic economic shift within the U.S.-a massive concentration of
wealth and income in the hands of the richest among us. In 1977,
the highest fifth of all households received 44 percent of total
national income, the middle three-fifths received 51.8 percent
while the lowest fifth received 4.2 percent. By 1993 the income
of the highest fifth rose to 48.2 percent, the highest percentage of
income on record for that group; the income of the middle threefifths dropped to 48.2 percent, the lowest share on record; and the
bottom fifth only received 3.6 percent, also the lowest share ever
recorded. Over the same decade and a half, the income of the top 5
percent rose from 16.8 percent to 20 percent (Center of Budget and
Policy Priorities, 1994). Furthermore, according to Kevin Phillips
(1994), author of Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the
Frustrationof American Politics, "the 100,000 American Families in
the top tenth of one percent enjoy by far and away the greatest
wealth and income gains in the 1980s" but despite their enormous
affluence "the Clinton tax increases of 1993 did not concentrate on
the high-income, high-political-influence, investment dollar rich,
the people making $4 million or $17 million a year," (pp. 206-07).
There is consequently a greater gap in income today between rich
and poor than at any time since such data have been collected and,
as Phillips points out, those profiting the most are the top tenth
of one percent.
If we examine differences in wealth among the U.S. population, we see an even more dramatic differential. In 1989, the top
one half of one percent (the "super-rich") owned 31.4 percent of
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total household wealth, an increase of five percentage points since
1983. Moreover, the top 20 percent of the population owned 84.6
percent of total wealth. Since one-fifth of Americans owned 84.6
percent of total wealth, the remaining four-fifths of Americans
owned only 15.4 percent. More specifically, the top one-half of
one percent owned nearly twice as much wealth (31.4%) as the
bottom 80 percent of all Americans (15.4%). Moreover, preliminary estimates indicate that between 1989 and 1992, 68 percent
of the increase in total household wealth went to the richest one
percent-an even greater gain than during the 1980s (Wolff, 1994,
pp. 143-174).
Despite the economic boom and low unemployment rates of
the 1990s, millions of families have seen their neighborhoods deteriorate, the quality of schools, public transportation, health care
and other services decline, their feelings of physical insecurity
rise, and their overall quality of life plummet. Whom can they
blame? During the past twenty years when the working class and
the middle class were losing ground, a period during which the
rich and "truly rich" were increasing their income and share of the
nation's wealth to what many consider obscene levels, we have
seen a strategy on the part of many politicians, policy makers,
and conservative strategists to encourage the middle and working
classes to blame the poor and the powerless, particularly women
and people of color, rather than the rich and powerful for their
losses.
As Thomas and Mary Edsall, authors of ChainReaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (1991), point out:
Racial polarization, in effect, helped create a political climate
receptive to an economic agenda based on the conservative principle
that sharply increasing incentives and rewards for those people
and interests at the top of the economic pyramid and decreasing
government support for those at the bottom would combine to spur
economic expansion and growth...
Insofar as those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution
can be identified as disproportionately black and Hispanic-making
possible the isolation of the poor as conceptually separable from
the white majority-racial polarization facilitates the enactment of
regressive redistributional policies. And insofar as the government
programs serving those in the bottom of the income distribution
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simultaneously divide the poor from the working class and black
from white, whose programs are highly vulnerable to conservative
assault (p. 13).

Blaming the poor and powerless for America's social and
economic problems is far more comforting and acceptable than
blaming the rich and powerful. Blaming the poor upholds a
fundamental tenet of the American Dream: that individuals can
dramatically alter the course of their own lives, that they can rise
in the class hierarchy on their own initiative. To maintain our
own dreams of success we must blame the poor for their failure;
if their failure is due to flaws in the structure of society, these
same societal limitations could thwart our dreams of success. The
notion that the failure of the poor is due to their characterological
weaknesses enable others to blame the impoverished for their
own poverty while simultaneously preserving the faith of the
non-poor in the possibility of success.
The times are therefore ripe for scapegoating. Scapegoats
have been used throughout history to solve societal problems.
In ancient Greece human scapegoats (pharmakos) were used to
ward off plagues and other calamities. In early Roman law an
innocent person was allowed to take on the penalty of another
who had confessed his/her own guilt. In the Old Testament ritual
of Yom Kippur, a goat was symbolically burdened with the sins
of the Jewish people and then sent into the wilderness to rid the
nation of its iniquities. Scapegoating has become national policy
in the United States. We are indeed heaping the sins of a violent
and unjust society on the poor and sending them out into the
wilderness.
The problems the United States must address as we move
into the next century are widespread poverty amidst incredible
affluence, massive hopelessness and alienation among those who
feel outside of the boundaries of the society, and a deeply-felt
despair among the poor and the working class that is increasingly
expressed through violence. There is no question that the welfare
system in particular and the society in general has not addressed
these issues and, in fact, has exacerbated them-not through
generosity, not through making poor people dependent on a
panoply of services but rather by not providing the essential
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education, job training, child care, health care, and perhaps most
important, jobs by which families can support themselves at a
decent standard of living. The central problem American society
must deal with is not the character of poor women and the
structure of the welfare system; the central problem is poverty
and the multiplicity of ways that it is embedded in the structure
of American society. We must recognize that people are not poor
due to characterological defects but rather that the poverty that
plagues so many Americans has been socially constructed and
therefore must be dealt with by fundamental economic and social
change.
Over three decades ago, Michael Harrington ended his powerful expose of poverty in America, The Other America, with the
following words: "The means are at hand to fulfill the age-old
dream: poverty can now be abolished.... How long shall we look
the other way while our fellow human beings suffer? How long?"
(Harrington, 1963, p. 170).
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This paper describes how the composition of elderly immigrants is changing and how elderly immigrants differ from natives in terms of living
arrangementand demographicand socioeconomic characteristics.The determinants of living alone are investigatedfor 11 ethnic origin categories
and natives. The analysis utilizes data from two samples of the 1990
U.S. Census: the PUMS-A 5% sample and an independent 3% sample of
households containingat leastone member 60 ormore years of age. Between
1970 and 1990 immigrantsfrom Asia and Latin America moved from
forming a minor component of the elderly to being a significantand rapidly
growing part of the elderly population which is also expanding rapidly.
Elderly immigrants from developing countries have distinctly different
living arrangementprofilesfrom natives andfrom other immigrant elderly.
They are significantlymore likely to be living with children as well as with
others, and distinctly less likely to be living alone or with spouse only.
However, there is no single pattern for all immigrants and even within
the broad categories of developing and developed origin groups there is
considerable heterogeneity of living arrangements. The most important
source of differences in the odds of elderly living alone is the degree of integration, indexed by English languagefluency, durationof U.S. residence,
and citizenship status. Economic resources also significantly influence the
odds that elderly from developing countries live alone. Demographicand
physical limitationfactors, while important in influencing type of living
arrangement in general, do not contribute significantly to immigrant
group differentials in living arrangements.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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The aging of the U.S. population has captured increased scholarly and policy attention in recent years and will undoubtedly
capture more in the years ahead as the elderly population grows
from one in eight Americans in 1995 to one in five by the year
2030 (Treas 1995; Treas and Torrecilha 1995; U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1996). The ethnic composition of the U.S. elderly population is also changing rapidly and this shift and the implications
of that change have attracted some research attention (Jackson
et al. 1993; Kramer, Stanford, and Torres-Gil 1994; Stanford and
Yee 1991). Very little research attention, however, has been given
to elderly immigrants, except for an article by Wilmoth, DeJong
and Himes (1997), or to the role of immigration as a contributor
to the shifting ethnic composition of the elderly population. We
seek to address that omission in this paper by looking at how the
composition of elderly immigrants is changing. We also examine
how elderly immigrants differ from native non-Hispanic whites
in their social demographic characteristics, economic resources,
health status, and living arrangements. In addition to examining
these dimensions for elderly immigrants as a whole, we look at
patterns for the ten largest immigrant groups. Finally, we assess
the extent to which differences between natives and elderly immigrants in living arrangements stem from the national origins
of immigrants, from differences between elderly immigrants and
natives in demographic characteristics, economic resources and
health status, and/or from the extent of integration of elderly
immigrants into U.S. society.
SHIFTING COMPOSITION OF U.S. ELDERLY POPULATION
According to the U.S. Administration on Aging (1996), the
two most rapidly growing segments of the elderly population are
Hispanics and Asians/Pacific Islanders. In the 1995 to 2010 period, for instance, Asians and other races1 are expected to grow by
55.4 percent, Hispanics by 52.7 percent, Blacks by 21 percent, and
whites by 9.9 percent (U.S. Administration on Aging 1996). The
fact that these differential growth rates will be heavily influenced
by immigration becomes clear from projections of the growth of
the native and foreign-born components of the U.S. population
prepared by Pitkin and Simmons (1996); their projections show
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that from 1995 to 2010, the elderly of foreign-born origin will
increase by 68.5 percent, compared to a 16.7 percent increase for
the native-born population. Given these differential growth rates
of native-born and foreign-born elderly, it is hardly surprising
that the ethnic composition of the elderly population will change
rapidly in the years ahead. For instance, Hispanics are expected
to increase their share of the elderly population from 4.5 percent
in 1995 to 17.5 percent by 2050; Asians, Pacific Islanders and other
races will increase from 2.3 percent in 1995 to 10.9 percent in 2050;
Black Americans will increase slightly, from 8.1 percent in 1995
to 10.9 percent in 2050; and non-Hispanic whites will decrease
proportionately (U.S. Administration on Aging 1996).
An examination of changes in the national origins of foreignborn elderly from 1970 to 1990, drawing on census data, illustrates
further the shifting composition of elderly immigrants. Table 1
identifies the top ten countries of origin for foreign-born elderly
aged 60 and over in 1970 and 1990 and gives the percentage
change in size of those populations in that period. Foreign-born
elderly who come from a country other than a top ten one are aggregated into an "Other Foreign Born" category (last row of Table
1). Table 1 shows that while 69.6 percent of elderly immigrants
originated in a top ten country in 1970, that percentage dropped
to 61.9 percent in 1990. This drop is consistent with increasing
diversification in the origins of U.S. immigrants, a trend that has
been well documented (Bouvier 1992; Reimers 1985).
In addition, the countries in the top ten listing changed during
the period. Whereas Mexico was the only developing country
on the list in 1970, by 1990 it was the second largest source of
elderly immigrants and three other developing countries-Cuba,
China and the Philippines-were also among the top ten senders.
In contrast, European countries in the top ten dropped from
eight in 1970 to five in 1990. More importantly, the percentage
change in the population size of elderly immigrants from different
countries in the 1970-90 period, shown in the last column of
Table 1, indicates that elderly immigrants from the five European
countries, i.e. Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland and USSR,
experienced an absolute decline in size from 1970 to 1990 while
those from the four developing countries greatly increased in
size-Chinese, Filipino, Cuban, and Mexican elderly increased
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by 441.1 percent, 435.5 percent, 342.9 percent, and 90.7 percent,
respectively, from 1970 to 1990. In contrast, Canadians were the
only group of predominantly non-Hispanic white origins that
experienced an increase in size, albeit only a modest one (11.5%).
Dynamics from two immigration waves are shaping the shifting ethnic composition of elderly immigrants. The first wave
occurred during the first two decades of this century when the
United States was receiving annual inflows of about 700,000 immigrants, largely from European countries. The second immigration wave started in the late 1960s, reached annual levels of 800900,000 by the early 1990s, and continues today. In contrast to
the European origins of most first wave immigrants, the bulk of
today's immigrants come from Asia or Latin America. Indeed,
in 1990, only 14.6 percent of new immigrants were of European
origin (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1991). Given
these trends and the fact that most Europeans from the first wave
have already reached their elderly years, it is clear that the numbers of elderly immigrants of European origin will continue to
decline rapidly in the years ahead while those from Asia and Latin
America will increase (Pitkin and Simmons 1996).2 In addition,
growth of the foreign-born elderly population is being sped up
by the fact that growing numbers of new immigrants admitted to
the United States are already elderly or at older ages. Greenwood,
Hussain and McDowell (1997) calculated, for instance, that only
8.1 percent of newly admitted immigrants in 1972 were aged 50
and older but that 15.5 percent were of that age in 1991.
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS ARE IMPORTANT
Mindel (1979) and others (Wolf 1990; Wolf and Soldo 1988)
show that independent living arrangements are increasing among
the elderly and co-residence with kin decreasing. This trend
toward independent living, defined as living alone or with spouse
only, is usually interpreted as reflecting individual preferences
(Soldo, Wolf, and Agree 1990). A number of factors are known
to be important correlates of independent living, including age,
sex, ethnicity, and economic resources. In addition, functional
limitations and availability of kin (Burr and Mutchler 1992 and
1993; Waite and Hughes 1997; Zsembik 1993) shape living arrangements. It is often claimed that elderly who live alone are
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in a more vulnerable situation than those who live with a spouse
and/or own children (Himes 1992; Waite 1997). Mui and Burnette
(1994) found that while elderly who live alone have better physical and functional health than elderly living with others, they also
experienced more depression, loneliness, and social isolation than
the latter.
Given the increasing numbers of elderly immigrants, a key
question is whether they will follow the trend of native-born
elderly toward increased independent living. Although several
studies of living arrangements among minority elderly show that
Black Americans, Hispanics, and Asians are significantly more
likely than non-Hispanic whites to live in extended households
(Burr and Mutchler 1992, 1993; Choi 1991; Kamo and Zhou 1994;
Lubben and Becerra 1987; Mutchler and Frisbie 1987; Zsembik
1993), most of these studies do not differentiate between the
native-born and foreign-born components of the minority groups
studied. Thus, although immigrants are a large and growing
component of elderly Asian and Hispanic populations, we do not
know the extent to which their living arrangements differ from
those of minority native-born or from native-born non-Hispanic
whites. A study by Kamo and Zhou (1994) suggests, however, that
immigration status is an important factor that accounts for differences between native whites and Asians in living arrangements.
Wilmoth, Dejong and Himes (1997) did examine the living
arrangements of elderly immigrants of European, Latin American and Asian origin and compared how they differed from
those of their native-born counterparts of same ancestry (i.e. nonHispanic whites, Hispanics, and Asians). For all three minority
groups, they found that elderly immigrants are significantly more
likely than their native-born counterparts to live in extended
families. Wilmoth et al.'s study (1997) also suggests that elderly
immigrants' degree of integration influences outcomes since they
found that those who spoke English poorly or were 60 years of
age or older when they migrated to the United States were significantly more likely to reside in extended families than other elderly
immigrants.3 They did not, however, examine other integration
indicators or assess how the living arrangements of minority
immigrants compare to those of non-Hispanic whites. A study by
Boyd (1991) of elderly immigrant women in Canada also shows
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that immigrants are more likely than natives to live in extended
families in that context.
In this study, we extend these earlier analyses by examining
first how elderly immigrants differ from native non-Hispanic
whites in their characteristics and living arrangements. We then
focus on the patterns for the ten largest immigrant groups, in
addition to all other foreign born who are treated as an 11 th group.
Previous studies of elderly minorities have focused on Hispanic
and/or Asian minorities. In this study, however, we look at discrete national origin groups because we assume that there is considerable heterogeneity within the elderly immigrant population
and that groups defined as of similar ethnicity based on language
(Hispanics) or region of origin (Asians) may differ considerably
from each other in socioeconomic characteristics and living arrangements. Just as earlier studies allowed us to appreciate differences in integration processes between Europeans of British,
German, Irish, Italian, Polish and other heritages (Abramson 1973;
Jiobu 1990; Lieberson 1963), we expect that comparative studies
of contemporary immigrants will reveal important differences between Mexicans, Cubans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Colombians
and other groups usually aggregated together as Hispanics or
among others (Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, etc.) who
are aggregated as Asians. At the very least, it is important to determine the extent to which there are significant differences across
recent immigrant groups before treating them as homogeneous
populations.4
CHARACTERISTICS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF THE ELDERLY POPULATION
Since we are interested in analyzing how the living arrangements of immigrants in specific origin groups differ from each
other and from natives, we need a database that has a large
number of cases. The only databases that satisfy this condition
are the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 1990 U.S.
Census. In this study, we merge data from two 1990 Public Use
Microdata Samples-PUMS-5% and PUMS-O. The PUMS-5% is
a 5 percent sample of the total population counted in 1990 and
the PUMS-O is an independent 3% sample of households in 1990
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that had at least one member aged 60 or over. Since the PUMS-5%
and PUMS-O files are independent samples and have comparable
data on individuals, households, and geographic areas, they can
be merged to form an 8% sample of elderly persons in the 1990
U.S. population.5 To assure a sufficient number of elderly immigrants from different origins in the database, our analysis sample
includes all foreign-born persons aged 60 and over (N=278,174) in
the merged PUMS-8% file. In addition, we drew a 0.0075 sample of
natives from the PUMS-8% (N=24,229) and use weights for population estimates. 6 We assume that foreign-born persons identified
in the census are permanent residents of the United States and
use the terms foreign born and immigrants interchangeably in
7
the paper.
Individuals are our unit of analysis. We focus on specific nativity groups in our descriptive analysis and use dummy variables
in our multivariate analysis to classify immigrants by country of
birth. Table 2 provides demographic, socioeconomic, immigration and integration statistics for all native-born and foreign-born
elderly in 1990 and for the ten largest origin groups and an 1 1 th category composed of all other foreign born. For summary purposes,
we classify the top ten source countries according to conventional
categories of "developed" and "developing."8 While a perusal of
Rows 1 and 2, Table 2, suggests that foreign-born and nativeborn elderly are relatively similar in their age, sex, and education
characteristics, it becomes clear when we examine statistics for
the different national origin groups that there is considerable
diversity among elderly immigrants.
On average, elderly immigrants from China, Cuba, Mexico,
and the Philippines tend to be younger than elderly immigrants
from the six "developed" countries. Although over 50 percent
of elderly immigrants in all origin groups are female, elderly
immigrants from China and the Philippines are least likely to
be female, 53.3 and 53.9 percent, respectively. In contrast, over
66 percent of German and British elderly are female. The socioeconomic profiles of elderly immigrant groups also differ considerably. While Mexican elderly have only 4.7 years of schooling,
on average, British, Canadian and German elderly have over 9
years. Moreover, the "developed/developing" origins of elderly
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immigrants are not closely associated with the educational levels
of the different groups. Table 1 shows, for instance, that elderly
immigrants from Italy, a developed country, have the second
lowest level of education (6.4 years), while those from Mexico
have the lowest level of education (4.7 years). In contrast, elderly
immigrants from the Philippines, a developing country sender,
are relatively well educated. The national origins of elderly immigrants are related to average income levels since Table 2 shows
that elderly immigrants from the "developing" country groups
have lower average income and are less likely to receive Social
Security than those from "developed" countries. Indeed, Social
Security, a principal income source for the elderly, is not received
at all by 55 percent of elderly immigrants from China, Cuba,
Mexico and the Philippines compared to 27.2 percent of those
from "developed" countries. Filipino elderly are least likely to
receive Social Security (67.0%).
The percentage of elderly immigrants who have a functional
limitation, defined as either a physical mobility limitation or a
personal care limitation, tends to be higher for elderly immigrants, on average, than it is for native-born elderly-24.7 versus
19.5 percent, respectively. More than 27 percent of Italian, Polish
and Russian elderly had a functional limitation in 1990 but other
groups, namely Chinese, Canadian, and British elderly, were less
likely than native-born to have a functional limitation. The last
three columns of Table 2 show the percentages of elderly immigrants in each group who migrated to the United States before
1950, who are citizens, and who speak English only or very well.
As expected, the four groups from developing regions have relatively low percentages who migrated to the United States before
1950, are less likely to be citizens, and have lower percentages
who speak English only or very well. But there are important
differences across the groups. While 40 percent of Mexican elderly
arrived before 1950, only 6.1 percent of Cubans were in the United
States by that year. Among the groups from "developed" areas,
on the other hand, more than 57 percent immigrated before 1950,
over 74 percent are citizens, and over 78 percent speak English
very well.
The living arrangements of the same eleven groups of elderly immigrants can be compared to those of natives in Table 3.
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Table 3
Living arrangementsof elderly non-Hispanic white native-born and
foreign-borngroups from largest origin countries, 1990a
Alone

Spouse
only

Native born

25.7

45.1

16.7

8.2

4.2

Foreign born

21.8

33.7

30.3

9.9

4.3

"Developing"
origin groups
China
Cuba
Mexico
Philippines

12.8
11.2
16.5
14.2
5.5

23.8
26.0
31.4
20.4
16.6

46.7
51.6
32.3
49.1
60.1

15.0
9.4
18.3
14.4
16.8

1.6
1.7
1.5
1.9
1.0

"Developing"
origin groups
Canada
England
Germany
Italy
Poland
USSR

27.9
28.5
27.6
29.1
24.5
26.8
31.3

42.9
47.2
47.0
46.4
35.7
43.7
37.9

18.4
14.0
15.5
14.5
28.9
18.8
17.6

6.3
6.1
5.9
5.6
6.8
6.5
7.3

4.5
4.3
4.1
4.4
4.0
4.2
6.0

Other foreign born

21.0

30.1

32.6

10.4

5.8

Childrenb Othersc Institutionalized

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990 PUMS, combined sample from 5% and
PUMS-O 3%).
a All numbers are percentages and rows sum to 100 (some rows may not sum
to 100 due to rounding errors).
b Elderly who live with at least one child are included in this category; 57.8% of
these families also include a spouse or an unmarried partner.
c Elderly who live with other related or unrelated persons are included in this
category; 28.9% of these households also include a spouse or an unmarried
partner.

We classified the total elderly population by five types of living
arrangements-the percentages living alone, living with spouse
only, living with children, living with others, and living in group
quarters or institutions. Categories one and two, i.e. living alone
or with spouse only, are self explanatory, since no person, other
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than those noted, is included in those families. Elderly living with
children, however, may have a spouse present and others may
also be present. We assume that elderly living with children have a
potential care-giver present and, therefore, allow that condition to
override the importance of a spouse also being present. A similar
situation holds for elderly living with "Others." These "Others"
may be a relative or a non-relative of the elderly person and no
further condition is specified with regard to the age profile of
"Others" in our analysis. A spouse may also be included in these
families but we assume that the important condition from the
standpoint of care and support for the elderly person is the fact
that at least one other person is also present. We know that 57.8
percent of elderly living with children have a spouse present and
that 28.9 percent of elderly living with "Others" do.
Table 3 confirms that foreign-born elderly are less likely than
native-born elderly to live independently (i.e. alone or with
spouse only) and more likely to live in extended families (i.e. with
children or with others). Those patterns vary sharply, however,
for different origin groups. For instance, while only 5.5 percent
of elderly Filipinos live alone, 16.5 percent of elderly Cubans do,
and over 27 percent of elderly Canadians, British, Germans and
Russians live alone. Italians are the least likely of the "developed"
country groups to live alone (24.5%). The percentages who live
with only a spouse range from 16.6 percent of Filipino elderly
to over 40 percent of Polish, Canadian, British and German elderly. Relatively small percentages of Mexicans and Chinese,
on the other hand, live with spouse only (20.4 and 26 percent,
respectively).
Although foreign-born elderly as a whole are almost twice
as likely as native-born elderly to live with children, 30.3 and
16.7 percent, respectively, those rates also vary considerably by
national origin. Elderly immigrants from the Philippines are most
likely to live with children-60.1 percent do so-but only about
14 percent of the elderly from Canada and Germany live with a
child. All of the "developing" country groups are more likely than
"developed" ones to live with children but there is some diversity
within these groupings. For instance, Italians, a "developed"
group, are almost as likely to live with children as Cubans, a
"developing" country group, with rates of 28.9 and 32.3 percent,
respectively. While only 9.9 percent of all elderly immigrants
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live with "Other persons," that number rises to 18.3 percent for
Cubans and drops to less than eight percent for the "developed"
groups. Finally, the incidence of group or institutionalized living
among foreign-born elderly from "developing" areas is less than 2
percent but rises to 4 percent or more for the "developed" groups.
Elderly immigrants from the USSR are more likely than those
from other countries to be institutionalized (6.0%).
Age and gender are two key dimensions that are known to be
closely associated with living arrangements. For three age groups
(60-69, 70-79, and 80 and over), Figure 1 shows the percentage
in each type of living arrangement for native-born and foreignborn elderly. Although foreign-born elderly are less likely than
native-born elderly to live alone at each age level, it is clear that
both groups respond similarly to the aging process. For instance,
for both natives and immigrants, the percentages in their 80s who
live alone are more than double what they are for elderly in their
60s. In contrast, the percentages living with spouse only or with
children decline with age for both natives and immigrants and the
percentages living in institutions increase with age in both groups.
Figure 2 shows how living arrangements differ for men and
women by nativity status. Regardless of nativity, women are over
twice as likely as men to live alone and much less likely to live with
spouse only. Whether the elderly live with children, however,
depends largely upon their nativity status. Foreign-born men and
women have comparable percentages who live with children and
both are more likely to be in that living arrangement than nativeborn elderly However, women are more likely than men to live
in institutional or group quarters and those rates do not vary by
nativity status.
To explore whether period of immigration makes a difference
for elderly living arrangements, we prepared a line graph that
shows the percentage of elderly immigrants living alone by age,
sex, and immigration period (Figure 3). Immigrants are disaggregated by sex into three immigration cohorts-immigrants who
came to the United States before 1950, between 1950 and 1969,
and between 1970-1990. For comparative purposes, the living
arrangements of native-born elderly are also displayed (bold
lines). Figure 3 suggests that immigration period is very closely
associated with whether elderly immigrants live alone, especially
among women. We find, for instance, that elderly immigrant

98

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Figure 1
Living arrangementsof elderly by origin and age group

[] Inst/grp

M Others
[] Children
0 SpOnly
E Alone

Origin and age group

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990 PUMS, combined sample from 5% and

PUMS-O 3%).
Note: SpOnly means "living with spouse only;" Inst/Grp means "being
institutionalized or living in a group quarter."

women who arrived in the United States before 1950 are as likely
to live alone as native-born women at each age level. While the
percentages living alone increase for those two groups of women
in their 60s and 70s, after age 84, they decline. For immigrant men
who came to the USA before 1950 and native men, in contrast, the
rates of living alone steadily increase with age, even among men
in their 80s. Elderly immigrant men who arrived more recently,
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Figure 2

Living arrangementsof elderly by orgin and sex group
100% 90%
80%70%n

E Others
50%

LI

Children

0I

401c

SpOnly
Alone

30%
0% ]

10%Men
Women
Foreign born

Men
Women
Native born

Origin and sex group

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990 PUMS, combined sample from 5% and

PUMS-O 3%).
Note: SpOnly means 'living with spouse only;" Inst/Grp means "being
institutionalized or living in a group quarter."

however, tend to be less likely to live alone after age 85. Least
likely to live alone are immigrant men who arrived after 1950
and immigrant women who arrived in the 1970-90 period. In
general, Figure 3 supports the argument that integration is an
important factor influencing living arrangements since it shows
that the longer elderly immigrants reside in the United States, the
more their living arrangements correspond to those of natives.

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

100

Figure 3
Percentageof elderly living alone by age and immigration period

60 to 64

65 to 69

70 to 74

75 to 79

80 to 84

85 to 89

over90

Age

•.

• . men, immigrated in 70-90
women, immigrated in 70-90
. men, immigrated in 50-69
women, immigrated in 50-69

...
-

men, immigrated before 50
women, immigrated before 50
men, native born
women, native born

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990 PUMS, combined sample from 5% and
PUMS-O 3%).

SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ELDERLY
IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES IN INDEPENDENT LIVING
Thus far our analysis establishes that elderly immigrants from
different origins diverge considerably from natives in their demographic and socioeconomic profiles and in their living arrangements. We have also established that differentials between elderly
immigrants and natives in living arrangements are closely related
to their age, sex, and immigration period. We next address the
issue of whether differentials between elderly immigrants and
natives in independent living stem mainly from national origins,
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differences in individual characteristics (demographic, economic
resources, and health status) or the extent of integration into
U.S. society To evaluate the importance of these different dimensions, we use logistic regression since that technique permits
us to control for multiple factors. We focus on a single living
arrangement-living alone-since elderly in that arrangement
are considered to be in a more vulnerable situation than elderly
in other arrangements.
Measurement of Covariatesand Model Specification
The outcome variable is whether the elderly person aged 60
or over lived alone in 1990. Elderly who are married and have a
spouse present or who are living in institutions or group quarters
are excluded from the multivariate analysis in order to constrain
the sample to elderly who are making choices between living
alone versus living with children or others in extended arrangements.9 Since previous research indicates that elderly immigrants'
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, functional limitations, and degree of integration shape their living arrangements, we control for these factors in our analysis. We measure age as a categorical indicator since Figure 3 shows that it
has a non-linear relationship to living arrangements for women;
the categories used are ages 60-69=[referent], 70-79="1", and 80
and over="1". We include sex as a dummy variable (1=female;
O=male). A measure of functional limitation was constructed
based on responses to two questions: "Because of a health condition that has lasted 6 or more months, does this persons have any
difficulty (1) going outside the home alone, for example, to shop or
visit a doctor's office or (2) taking care of his or her own personal
needs, such as bathing, dressing or getting around inside the
home?" If the response was yes to both of these questions, we gave
functional limitation a code of "3"; if the response was yes to one
question, we gave it a code of "2"; and if the response was no to
both questions, we coded it "1." Because mobility limitation and
care limitation are highly correlated, it is preferable to combine
them into a single measure.
Economic resources are measured by education and income.
Education indirectly assesses earning potential and is measured
by an ordinal variable specifying different years of completed
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schooling. Two income measures are utilized: a dummy variable
set equal to "1" if no Social Security income was received in 1989
and respondent's total 1989 income. Since Social Security is a
major source of income support for the elderly, we expect elderly
who do not receive that type of income to be more dependent
on spouses, children, or others and, therefore, less likely to live
alone. In contrast, we expect to find increased odds of living alone
as personal income increases. We use the square root of personal
income to capture negative values and correct for skewness, and
divide the resulting measure by ten to reduce scale differences.
Three measures are used to assess elderly immigrant's degree
of integration into U.S. society-English language fluency, length
of U.S. residence, and citizenship status. Although ideally we
would like to have measures of intentions to remain in the United
States and other behavioral aspects of integration, these are not
available with census data. We expect to find that as elderly immigrants become more integrated, they will be more likely to live
alone, i.e. to adopt the independent living arrangements favored
by native non-Hispanic whites. To measure English language
fluency, we use two dummy variables. The first is set equal to "1"
if the respondent speaks only English at home and the second is
set equal to "1" if the respondent speaks English well or very well.
The second integration measure-length of U.S. residency-is an
ordinal measure that ranges from 10 for persons who arrived
before 1950 or were born in the USA to "1" for persons who
entered in the 1987-90 period. Elderly immigrants who arrived
more recently should be more likely than those who arrived years
ago to live with relatives or with others, since they will have
fewer ties to and knowledge of U.S. society . Finally we use a
dummy variable for citizenship status that is coded "1" if the
elderly immigrant is a native or naturalized citizen. This measure
provides a crude assessment of commitment to the United States
and we expect to find that elderly immigrants who are citizens
will be more likely to live alone than non-citizens. 10
Relative Inportance of National Origin, Characteristics,and
Integrationfor Living Alone
Since our main interest is to assess whether differences in independent living that occur between natives and elderly immigrants
from different origins diminish after controlling for differences
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across these groups in individual characteristics, we focus upon
that relationship in our discussion of findings. To do this, we
specify four sets of models in Table 4 that allow us to observe how
the odds of living alone change for each national origin group
as we control for differentials between natives and immigrants
in characteristics and integration. We examine the same eleven
national origin groups as we did in Tables 1-3. All foreign-born
elderly are classified into one of the eleven groups. The findings
are presented as odds ratios or the exponentiated value of the
unstandardized regression coefficient (Exp[B]). Values in the ratio
that exceed unity express a positive effect of the covariate on the
occurrence of the event of living alone, relative to that which occurs for the referent population; a value less than unity expresses
a negative likelihood that the outcome event occurs.
Model 1, Table 4, gives the odds that immigrants live alone
relative to natives by their national origin status. These ratios were
estimated from a model that included only the 11 dummy variables for national origin and thus represent the actual population
odds that each origin group lives alone relative to natives. The
national origin groups are ranked by the magnitude and direction
of their difference with natives in odds of living alone. That model
shows that Filipinos are 93 percent less likely than native nonHispanic whites to live alone and Chinese, Mexicans, Cubans,
Other Foreign Born, Italians and Poles are also significantly less
likely than natives to live alone. Elderly immigrants from England, Canada, and Germany, on the other hand, are significantly
more likely to live alone than natives. Russians are the only group
that is not significantly different from natives.
Model 2 allows us to evaluate whether differences between
elderly immigrants and natives in socio-demographic characteristics (age and sex) and functional limitation account for the national origin differences observed in Model 1. Our earlier descriptive analysis indicated that there is considerable diversity across
the origin groups in these and other individual-level characteristics and, therefore, it is important to determine whether these
differences account for origin differences in living arrangements.
By comparing change in the unadjusted and adjusted odds ratios
(i.e. Models I and 2), we can evaluate whether elderly immigrants
would be more or less likely than natives to live alone, if they
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had the same characteristics. Model 2 indicates that controlling
for differences among elderly immigrants and natives in sociodemographic characteristics and functional limitations has almost no effect on their living arrangements. Only for Italians and
Canadians does the odds ratio change somewhat. For instance,
the odds that Canadian elderly live alone drop from 21 percent
more likely than natives in Model 1 to 14 percent more likely in
Model 2. Although socio-demographic characteristics and functional limitation are highly significant for living arrangements,
Model 2 indicates that the relationships between those factors
and living alone do not vary significantly by origin status. As
expected, the odds of living alone increase with age but are less
likely to occur among elderly with a functional limitation-the
latter are 26 percent less likely to live on their own than elderly
with no limitations. Women are slightly less likely to live alone
than men, net of other differences.
In Model 3 we control for economic resources, including education and income. A comparison of odds ratios in Models 2
and 3 shows that for all of the groups, a convergence pattern
occurs after controlling for differences in economic resources even
though large differences persist. For the foreign-born elderly,
limited economic resources are a major reason why they are
more likely than natives to live alone. The three measures of economic resources have the expected relationships to living alone.
Education and personal income significantly increase the odds
of living alone and lack of Social Security income significantly
decreases it.
In Model 4, we control for elderly immigrants' integration into
U.S. society by assessing the importance of their English language
ability, length of U.S. residency, and citizenship status for living
arrangements. A comparison of Models 3 and 4 shows substantial
change for several national origin groups. Indeed, after controlling for integration, in addition to characteristics controlled for
in Models 2-3, we find no significant difference between Chinese
and natives in independent living and a considerable reduction
in the difference with natives for Filipinos and Mexicans. Other
foreign born and Italians remain significantly less likely than
natives to live alone but the substantive differences are small. For

Elderly Immigrants

107

six other groups (Cubans, Russians, Poles, British, Canadians, and
Germans), Model 4 indicates that if these elderly immigrants had
the same integration characteristics as other elderly, they would
actually be more likely to live alone than natives. This finding
is somewhat surprising because it shows a pattern for national
origin groups that has not been picked up by research which
tends to study minorities as larger aggregates, such as Hispanics
or Asians. In other ways the finding is not surprising because research on the elderly indicates that availability of kin is necessary
for co-residence with kin to take place (Wolf and Soldo 1988).
All else equal, immigrants should have fewer kin available to
them than other elderly because the process of migration usually
separates migrants from kin.
All of the measures of other elderly characteristics remain
highly significant in Model 4, although the magnitude of some
of the relationships change from earlier models. For instance,
after controlling for integration, Model 4 indicates that elderly
aged 80 or over are actually slightly less likely to live alone than
those aged 70-79. This finding is consistent with the curvilinear
pattern observed in Figure 3 for older women with longer U.S.
residence and native-born women. Although the odds ratios for
education and personal income appear modest, it should be kept
in mind that they are derived from unstandardized coefficients
and summarize change per unit. Both measures of economic
resources are composed of several units.
In order to gain a better understanding of the nature of the
integration effect, we examined the effects of the characteristic
and integration covariates for each of the 11 immigrant groups
and natives by estimating separate logit models. These models
include all covariates in Model 4, Table 4, except the dummy
variables for group origin. The results (not shown) reveal a high
degree of consistency across origin groups in the impacts of
the integration variables on the odds of living alone. All of the
estimated integration coefficients are in the same direction as
described above for Model 4 or are statistically insignificant.
Period of U.S. residence and citizenship status have the most
consistent impact: in ten of eleven groups, elderly immigrants
are more likely to live on their own if they are a U.S. citizen and if
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they have resided in the United States longer. The exceptions (no
relationship) occur on the citizenship measure for Chinese and
on length of U.S. residency for Canadians. One could speculate
that the pattern for Canadians stems from the fact that this group
is probably more similar to native-born elderly than immigrants
from other origins and thus has limited internal differentiation
on the integration measure. English language fluency also has a
consistent impact for most origin groups. If elderly immigrants
speak only English, they are significantly more likely to live on
their own in eight of eleven groups and if they speak English
well or very well, they are likely to do so in six of eleven groups.
Since England and Canada are two of the origin groups that have
no relationship on that measure, this finding suggests that lack
of variation within the origin population itself is the principal
reason for the lack of a relationship.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis documents that the composition of U.S. elderly
immigrants changed dramatically between 1970 and 1990 and
will continue to change in the years ahead. In the past two
decades, the number of elderly immigrants from Mexico, Philippines, China, Cuba and other developing countries has been
growing rapidly and will continue to do so in the years ahead. On
the other hand, the number of elderly European immigrants will
decline. The shifting composition of elderly immigrants should
have implications for living arrangements. Our analysis of the
living arrangements of elderly immigrants from the ten largest
origin groups shows that two Asian groups (Filipinos and Chinese) and two Latin American groups (Cubans and Mexicans)
differ markedly from European elderly in their living arrangements. The Asian and Latin American immigrants are much more
likely than European elderly to live in families with children or
others and less likely to live independently. Elderly immigrants,
however, are a diverse population and our analysis demonstrates
the merits of looking at differences for discrete groups. Cubans,
while much less likely than European elderly to live alone, are
three times more likely than Filipino elderly to do so. Further
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analysis of additional origin groups is clearly needed to identify
the extent to which other rapidly growing Asian or Latin American groups differ significantly from the groups examined in our
analysis.
Although elderly immigrants from European countries and
Canada are most similar to natives in their living arrangements,
there is some diversity even among that group. Elderly immigrants from Italy and the former USSR, for instance, are less
likely than natives (and other European elderly) to be living with
spouses, and Italians are more likely, by over 10 percentage points,
to be living with children. Despite these differences, the major
divide suggested by our analysis is between more recent elderly
immigrants from Latin America and Asia and older elderly immigrants from Europe and Canada. These differences will be more
marked in the years ahead as the absolute and relative size of the
immigrant elderly from Asia, Latin America, and Africa increases
in the next millennium.
Our multivariate exploration of the sources of differences
in living arrangements between natives and elderly immigrants
from 11 origins sheds some light on the nature of these differences.
First, the analysis makes it clear that reduced socio-economic
resources and lack of integration significantly constrain independent living among elderly immigrants and are important factors
contributing to differences with natives. Socio-demographic characteristics and functional limitations, on the other hand, are not
a major source of differences between immigrants and natives in
living arrangements.
Nonetheless, we observe an interesting pattern, namely that
while the study covariates do, with a few exceptions, reduce
the differentials between immigrants and natives, the remaining
diversity is almost as marked as that which we observe without
statistically equalizing these characteristics. This finding again
suggests the importance of studying discrete immigrant groups
and identifying how they differ from natives in living arrangements and determinants. Our analysis clearly shows that integration is strongly associated with increased odds of living alone.
From a statistical standpoint, this means different things for different groups. For most of the European groups, equalization on
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integration tends to produce larger differentials with natives than
existed prior to the introduction of statistical controls. Being a
citizen, speaking only English or speaking English well, and being
a longer term resident of the United States are all associated with
increased odds of living alone. Since the effect of English is strong,
even after controlling for duration of residence and individual
characteristics, this suggests that language ability reflects degree
of integration and not just shifts in the selectivity of migrants over
time. Nevertheless, longitudinal data are needed to examine the
issue of selectivity in a more rigorous manner.
From the point of view of social policy these findings provide
an ambiguous message. The ambiguity revolves around how one
evaluates the status of living alone for the elderly. If it is a positive
choice, based on personal preferences and made because of resources, values and abilities, then social policy should encourage
it. One way to encourage it for elderly immigrants would be
to foster the social integration of the elderly through language
programs and efforts that increase English language activities.
The latter, however, should be encouraged from a public policy
standpoint for a multitude of reasons that have nothing to do with
elderly living arrangements. Labor force participation, income
generation, and civic participation on the part of immigrants
would all be advanced by increased English language fluency.
Nonetheless, to the extent that such integration occurs, our analysis suggests that the results will also be correlated with increased
odds of independent living among elderly immigrants.
Though elderly living with own children is not the behavioral
mode in the United States, our culture positively values familial
social support to the elderly. Only time will tell, however, whether
the tendency observed in our analysis for elderly immigrants
from the Philippines, China, Mexico and other Asian and Latin
American countries to be less likely to live on their own and more
likely to live with children will be enduring or transient. Certainly,
the living arrangements of more recent elderly immigrants are
much more likely than those of natives and the immigrant elderly from European origins to involve children. This mode of
providing support to the elderly may be more deeply rooted in
the cultures of these newer groups than was the case for most
European groups. Social policy efforts aimed at supporting the
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elderly within the context of households made up of children and
other relatives may provide the greatest level of real assistance.
Perhaps combining such efforts with others aimed at facilitating
integration could simultaneously enhance the overall social welfare of the elderly while opening up choices to them with regard

to living arrangements.
NOTES
1. The other races category includes Asian and Pacific Islanders, American
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts. Asians are the largest component of that
category.
2. From 1970 to 1990 the foreign-born elderly population decreased from
3,863,303 to 3,555,190. However, Pitkin and Simmons (1996) estimate that
the foreign-born elderly have increased in the 1990s and will reach 4,300,000
by 2000 and 6,000,000 by 2010.
3. Naturalized citizens may petition for their parents to join them as an immediate relative. Included in the immediate relative category are: spouses
of citizens, children under 21 years of age of citizens, parents of citizens 21
years of age or older, and orphans adopted by citizens. Immediate relatives
are exempt from numerical limitations imposed on U.S. immigration (U.S.
INS 1996, pp. 15-17 and A.3-5).
4. Although we are unaware of any study of elderly immigrants from different
national origins, there are some studies of diversity among "younger"
immigrants which show that national origin is an important variable that
determines how integration proceeds (Gurak and Kritz 1978; Kritz and
Nogle 1994; Tienda and Angel 1982; Zsembik 1993).
5. The ICPSR, University of Michigan, created an 8 percent merged sample
and we downloaded that file through the Internet and use it in our analysis.
6. The differential sampling fractions for natives and immigrants do not affect
our findings because we use the person weights provided by the Census
Bureau (pwgtl) to adjust for geographic differences in sampling and other
technical factors. For our descriptive analysis, different sampling fractions
for groups do not matter because statistics are calculated separately for each
population (i.e. native born means on characteristics are calculated for that
population only and Mexican means are calculated for that population). In
the case of population estimates (e.g. used in Table 1), we adjust for the difference in the sampling fractions of natives and immigrants by multiplying
the census weight for natives by the inverse of our sampling fraction (i.e.
133 X pwgtl) in order to inflate the native-born component to an 8% sample.
7. The U.S. Census does not ascertain legal immigration status. It does gather
data on country of birth, year of entry to the USA, and citizenship status.
Using these measures, it is possible to differentiate persons who are nativeborn citizens from those who were born abroad and immigrated to this
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country at some point in time. We also assume that the foreign born who
are elderly are less likely to be illegal or temporary residents than younger
foreign-born persons.
8. This usage conforms with the United Nations classification of countries.
9. The sample for the multivariate analysis contains 130,093 cases. Alternative
model specifications, such as including elderly with spouse present in the
sample and using marital status as a covariate, cannot be done because of
the fact that no one who has a spouse present can live alone.
10. Most of the covariates included in our regression analysis are not highly
correlated. The highest correlations occur between length of U.S. residence
and citizenship status (.61) and length of U.S. residence and receipt of Social
Security income (-.52). Nonetheless, all three covariates have the expected
relationships to the outcome measure and, therefore, we use all three in our
models. No other variables have a higher intercorrelation than 0.37.
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Rethinking the Concept of "Minority":
A Task for Social Scientists and Practitioners
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Although sociologists have articulated the components and scope of the
"minority" concept, many of the characteristicsare no longer germane.
Originally those placed in the category were viewed as subordinate and
as possessing cultural or physical qualities not approved or preferred
by the larger population. There has been no systematic questioning of
ingrained seductive words and value-basedconstructions like "minority".
This brief critique offers an evaluation of the "minority" conception that is
so pervasive in the social and behavioral sciences, the print and broadcast
media, politics, and the entire language system.

INTRODUCTION
In current academic discourse, feminist theory and critiques
of post-modern thinking have ushered in reappraisals of conventional language, especially about gender. However, this has not
led to objective interpretations of how men and women of nonwhite racial and ethnic groups translate their experiences. Nor
has there been any systematic questioning of ingrained seductive
words and value-based constructions like minority. In the United
states, at least, this latter notion represents a classic example of
an ambiguous concept that is accepted as theoretically sound and
scientifically measurable in the social sciences and given credibility in matters of policy. As an abstraction most often regarded as
virtually synonymous with race, "minority" is actually nonscientific and devoid of conceptual clarity and empirical validity.
American Sociology has played a major role in generating
a specialized vocabulary and in giving legitimacy to concepts
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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like "minority." The field evolved from European philosophical
roots as a social science permeated with values. Numerous biased
terms and expressions like "invasion" and "visibility" comprised
the original sociological frames of reference. The preoccupation
in the United States with racial differences institutionalized the
minority idea and resulted in the absence of historical explanations of causal social forces (e.g., slavery, discrimination). Consequently, existing sociological concepts and theoretically derived
assumptions linked to "minority" are without historical or scientific merit. Actually, they have suppressed realistic and unbiased
examinations of racial attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies.
Although sociologists have articulated the components and
scope of the "minority" concept, many of the characteristics are
no longer germane. Originally those placed in the category were
viewed as subordinate and possessing cultural or physical qualities not approved or preferred by the larger population. The
assertion was that minorities have a shared sense of group identity. Interestingly, this was overlooked as also being a feature of
majority groups. The initial definitions emphasized being selfconscious and viewing themselves as "objects of collective discrimination" (Wirth, 1945: 347). In establishing the boundaries
of the identity of the excluded, Wirth stated that they posses an
inherited status. Without presenting the influences of divergent
power relations, he and other sociologists thought of a minority
as a group singled out from others for "differential and unequal
treatment." This formulation included biology, culture, structural, and perceptual aspects. Several of the traits assigned to
"minorities" covered all racial and ethnic groups and economic
classes including the "power elite."
Basically, the label "minority" is engulfed in political connotations and refers to behaviors as well as biological traits. As
a multidimensional and generic notion, it encompasses behavior but negates ethnicity and cultural distinctiveness. Additionally, this linguistic tool does not denote the vast contrasts that
are characteristic of ethnic and racial group life. The variability embodied in ethnic traditions, lifestyles and group modes
of affirming collective identity are not reflected in the assorted
meanings of "minority" (Aguirre and Messineo, 1997; Snyder,
1990; Wright, 1997).
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Moreover, "minority' does not accurately incorporate the
histories and biographies of diverse ethnic and racial populations
such as American Indian, Mexican American, African American,
Puerto Rican, and Asian American (Feagin and Sikes, 1995; Garcia, 1997; Harjo, 1993; Mendoza, 1994; Snipp, 1989; Wilkinson,
1990). That is, the concept appears to have no relevance to ancestral linkages that provide a sense of family and community unity.
An underlying thesis of this discussion is that social science interpretations of identities must be group-centered as well as racially
specific. Ethnic affiliation and racial attachment, as opposed to
externally ascribed "minority" status, are essential parallels with
social placement and self-images (Plummer, 1995; Ramsey, 1991).
This brief critique offers an evaluation of the "minority" conception that is so pervasive in the social and behavioral sciences,
the print and broadcast media, politics, and the entire language
system. Given my long-term interest in the language that frames
sociological theory and research, an insightful review of the concept in Race, Gender & Class (Nibert, 1996) was well received.
While I have a different perspective on alternatives, the author
correctly described "minority' as a "sociological euphemism." In
the discussion, the evolution of the abstraction is interpreted with
respect to the reasons for the sustained reliance on this particular
term instead of "oppressed groups." The author states that "the
term [constitutes] a social scientific euphemism for the victims of
widespread exploitation, injustice and incalculable hardship and
suffering.. ." Highlighting trends involving possible substitutions, aspects of the thesis offer a starting point for this discussion
(Nibert, 1996: 131).
As this critical analysis will show, unlike other immigrant
populations designated as minorities, African Americans have
encountered a myriad of barriers since their forced arrival.
Throughout the twentieth century, obstacles to upward mobility
and equal life chances have confronted them. No other ethnic
group in the United States has been enslaved or has faced perpetual racial segregation and discrimination in all institutional
domains. Only the American Indian's history approximates this
legacy, to some degree. Against this background, the reasons
given for continuing the "minority" classification in the 21st
century are overshadowed by historical forces. The expression
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simply does not enable understanding of the immense cultural
and racial heterogeneity that typifies American society.
OBJECTIVES
Contextualized within the culture of the United States, two
central questions guide this argument. (1) What are some major
deficiencies associated with the minority concept? (2) How can the
minority idea be transformed and removed from the social science vocabulary?Another important question guiding this inquiry is what
are the scientific and policy issues associated with the word minority?
At the outset, the basic principle is reaffirmed that identifying
individuals by their race or ethnic background is no less important
than recognizing them by their gender or sexuality. All of these
indicators provide a sense of the essence of individuality and
communal solidarity. Self-knowledge and feelings of personal
worth are enhanced through articulating the components of one's
identity. Learning is similarly advanced by becoming cognizant
of the specific groups comprising the society.
An important related scientific and "sociology of knowledge"
issue is why the word "minority" has been retained in the sciences
and in the language system itself. While used in other countries
where it most often refers to language minorities, in the United
States the concept has always been ambiguous and value-laden.
Since its origins, the word has been framed in negative imagery
Juxtaposed with problems of definition, typically those so labeled
have been depicted as lacking in political and economic power.
In addition, they have been considered as occupying the status
of the culturally disadvantaged. Each of these descriptors carries
a stigma (See: D'Amico, 1997; Goffman, 1963; Riggs, 1997; Snyder, 1990).
POLITICAL LANGUAGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Science and the various professions have special modes of
constructing and using language. Among the principal requirements in scientific reasoning is that concepts should be reliable,
capable of measurement, and empirically verifiable. Correspondingly, clinical fields seek to rely on relatively precise diagnostic tools for behaviors and emotions. In spite of the particular
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paradigms in disciplines like sociology, innumerable words are
obscure and without a reality basis. "Minority" is one of the key
words that is imprecise.
The clarity and logic of concepts is a critical area in the social
and behavioral sciences. While "minority" is applied incessantly,
the category lacks concrete indicators and its miscellaneous attributes tend to be flawed and conflicting. Thus, given the wide
variability among the diverse groups to whom the label refers,
problems emerge with its application in social science paradigms.
The difficulties disclosed with its usage are multiple. In fact, the
contemporary qualities appear to confuse the initial definitions
offered by sociologists.
Frequently, "minority" indicates only races (African Americans) or ethnic populations (Hispanics, Asians). At times, it extends to occupationally subordinated groups (e.g., women) and
socially isolated populations. Multiracial (biracial persons) and
economically depressed persons (unemployed, poor) are subsumed under the minority label. Sexual orientation, physical
handicapped status and being white and male or female are similarly classified. It is also applied to processes and changes such
as access to college, aging, migrants, opportunities, businesses,
rights, issues in mental health, political perspectives ad infinitum.
Of special concern in this critical review is the use of the minority concept as representational and as an analytical medium.
This interest stems from the interpretations and consequences of
the word and its diversified nature as illustrated in the sciences
and in the national media. Because "minority" does not meet any
of the conventional standards for concept validity, it is an extremely problematic term in sociological inquiry. The numerous
referents for the idea are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the array
of meanings associated with it produce misleading conclusions.
Ultimately, the complications surrounding minority have serious
ramifications for social science generalizations as well as clinical
practice.
THE MINORITY CHALLENGE
A few selected examples illuminate the contradictions inherent in the use of minority. In an instructive essay by William
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Raspberry, a perceptive and influential African American journalist, the mistake is made of using the word "minorities" to
denote Blacks only, the group to whom he is referring. The author notes that "Black students at the College of Holy Cross
[had] won the right to exclude whites from membership in the
school-supported Black Student Union." The theme of the article is "In some instances, separation of the races helps minorities" (Raspberry, 1995: p. A9). However, the essay focuses solely
on race.
Similarly, an article appeared in BlackIssues in HigherEducation
on the challenges to private scholarships for minorities (Wright,
1997: 14-16). From the title, it was not clear whether the emphasis
was on African Americans, sexual orientation, or handicapped
status. Actually, the report focused on a student who felt that
a community college in Northern Virginia violated the law by
preventing Whites from applying for a particular scholarship. A
mathematics instructor was quoted as saying that there "appears
to be a major hysteria, or fear, of more minority students gaining access to colleges and universities" (Wright, 1997: 16). This
comment is obviously not about females and gender issues nor
sexual orientation. For, the single "minority" group presented is
the African American.
Numerous studies have been designed to examine racial and
ethnic bias in a variety of areas from housing and the occupational
sphere to advertising. With respect to the latter, a Federal Communications Commission report on this subject appeared in USA
Today (January 14, 1999). The findings revealed that "advertisers
regularly discriminate against minority-owned radio stations and
those that have large African American or Hispanic audiences"
(Alexander, 1999). Throughout the article, the word minority preceded the following: radio stations, listeners, consumers, media,
hiring, and magazines. But, as one examines the results from the
study by the Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, the
consumer groups, stations, and audiences discussed are African
American and Hispanic. In this context, minority was used as
equivalent with race since the focus was on just two racial populations. Questioning such research as well as the presumption
that minority is a useful classification provides a foundation for
this discussion.
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Finally, a USA Today report pertained to Denny's becoming
one of the first advertisers to launch a campaign about race. The
author stated that "with a high number of minority customers,
Denny's can't ignore them" (Horovitz, 1999: 1B). Again, the primary "minority" being referred to is the African American. In
most of the examples relating to African Americans, "minority"
is used as a politically correct term to conceal racial specificity.
As a matter of fact, the concept epitomizes one of the notable
forms of politically correct language permeating sociology and
the broader culture. The choice of this word marks the "sociological imagination" as well as the American national consciousness.
Nibert (1996: 133) noted that "sociologists have been reluctant to
call 'minority groups' oppressed because such a perspective is
outside the range of accepted political discourse." Regardless,
the term is not only deceptive in advertising but is inaccurate in
the social sciences and inappropriate for policy decisions.
In earlier writings, I have used "minority" as a result of indoctrination in sociological reasoning and forced compliance with
editorial stipulations (Wilkinson, 1980a, 1980b, 1987b). However,
when I incorporated the term in an examination of psychotherapy,
its coverage was clearly restricted.
"... white therapists [must] be trained to understand the multicultural history of the society and to cope with racial and ethnic
biases and race/sex role stereotypes, since these have an impact on
the therapeutic experiences of minority women." (Wilkinson, 1980b:
297).
Selected issues encountered in psychotherapy with women from
economically and educationally disadvantaged strata were explored. A significant void was observed in examinations of therapeutic processes and outcomes with "minority women (i.e.,
American Indian, Black or African American, Mexican American
and Puerto Rican)" (Wilkinson, 1980b: 285). I pointed out that
"most studies of racial and ethnic minorities had not been sexspecific." Nevertheless, my principal thesis at the time centered on
African American women. Dissonance was evident throughout
my usage of the term.
Again, in a demographic review of "Ethnicity" in the Handbook
of Marriageand the Family, my hesitancy in using "minority" was

122

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

obvious. In order to minimize misrepresentation, in the introduction I stated that:
"To date, most of the information on minority families had tended
to mirror biases intrinsic in the nation's dominant culture. To counteract these biases an attempt has been made to incorporate the...
conceptual frameworks... offered by contemporary minority
scholars" (Wilkinson, 1987:183).
"Minority families" were limited to those delineated by their
racial heritage and ethnic lineage.
"Minority families differ from those in the majority population on
the basis of race, ancestry, and other characteristics. They are part of a
socially, politically, and economically subordinated population. Differential treatment is a significant consequence of minority status.
The dominant minority groups (or populations) in the United States
are Blacks or Afro-Americans, Chicanos or Mexican-Americans,
Puerto Ricans, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos" (Wilkinson, 1987:
183).
As this discussion demonstrates, the word "minority" has
substantial variation and hence translations. This invites illogical
reasoning in its numerous applications. Groups so defined have
very few shared attributes with respect to race, ethnicity, social
class, gender, sexuality, and/or culture. In other words, minimal
social and behavioral traits are held in common. Most groups detailed as minorities have separate class positions, racial and ethnic
origins, family backgrounds, and life styles. Likewise, exposure
to the opportunity structure and with oppression vary. Only one
population assigned minority status in the Americas has ever
been subjected to slavery and centuries of systemic racism (Darity,
1996; Dyson, 1997; Frankberg, 1993; hooks, 1998; Hutchison, 1994;
Levy, 1998; Reed, 1992; Wilkinson, 1987).
A MISSING DIMENSION: HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
Dissecting the minority construction, a lack of understanding
or even acceptance of macro-social forces and power differentials is evident with its use. Certainly, the impressionistic notion
nullifies the effects of a post-slavery culture and the prevailing
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race-based and class hierarchy. Anchored within the matrix of
economic inequality, the minority idea does not allow for the
residual outcomes from race and class-related disparities. Using it
to suggest sex/gender or behavior has an entirely different set of
meanings and outcomes than applying the classification to ethnic
and racial populations.
In most basic texts on race and ethnic relations, a "minority
group" is defined as one that "has restricted power and an inferior
status" or is "any group that has less than its proportionate share
of wealth, power, and/or social status" (Farley, 1995: 7; Marger,
1991: 44-54). Size is usually not considered as the most important
sociological factor. Thus, a minority group is one that
"experiences a pattern of disadvantage or inequality; has a visible
identifying trait, and is a self-conscious social unit. Membership
is usually determined at birth and group members have a strong
tendency to marry within the group" (Healey, 1995: 14).
Introducing the "visible trait or characteristic" that justifies mistreatment by the majority population, the above definition blends
with "blaming the victim" assertions. Presumably, the traits may
be of a variety of types ranging from cultural to physical or
combinations of the two. Depending on the perspective, some
groups are called ethnic minorities, while others are referred to as
racial minorities. "The visibility factor" confirming membership
in a particular racial or ethnic group has been explained as central
to the minority thesis (Wirth, 1945). However, more recent interpretations maintain that minorities are determined not merely
by race or ethnicity but by "sex, physical disability, lifestyle, or
sexual orientation" (Farley, 1995: 7). Despite this, the historical
and contemporary relationships between people of African and
European descent are completely unlike those of any other groups
so categorized.
Concentrating on visibility and embarrassed self-awareness
does not permit grasping the pervasiveness of racial animosities and associated forms of prejudicial treatment. These are entirely separate social processes from the discrimination against
groups because of their behaviors or physical limitations. Thus,
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the perplexing nature of "minority" is revealed in the virtually
opposite groups included in its coverage.
In the final analysis, groups presented as minorities have
faced vastly dissimilar patterns of acceptance and integration as
well as exclusion and residential isolation. Further, intolerance
and segregation have always been more injurious and permanent for African Americans than for any other ethnic Americans, regardless of social position or "visible" traits. Therefore,
highlighting populations by their actual identities situates them
within a narrative frame along with the dilemmas linked to the
ethos of equal opportunity. With respect to the limited choices
facing women of any ethnic or racial heritage, the minority conception calculatedly omits the intersection of class, gender and
race (Wilkinson, 1997).
Probing the content of "minority" permits viewing it as depriving groups of their lived experiences. Its incongruous meanings have been created and reaffirmed by those who have not
been among the economically, politically, and/or racially hindered populations. As pointed out earlier, the concept is devoid of
historical specificity. Neither the aftereffects of American slavery
on self identification nor the influence of the class system on
economic status can be explained through its use. No provisions
are made for interpreting the circumstances surrounding contemporary inequities that are repeated by other groups also classified
as "minorities." Therefore, past and current disparities in opportunities and privileges are discounted through reliance on this
impressionistic label. Since it is embedded in the political culture
of the United States and hence in the social sciences, questions
will be raised when confronting its idiosyncratic and ideological
nature. Significant adjustments will be encountered by attempts
to replace it since "minority" has been retained through custom
and practice. Rationales will proliferate for preserving the concept
in spite of the justifiable quest by groups to reclaim and define
their own identities.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Researchers, clinicians, and teachers must seek ways to incorporate race and ethnicity in all relevant contexts and omit
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entirely the "minority" concept. Since race is such a highly sensitive subject in the United States, a host of avoidance strategies
restrict weighing its impact. On one hand, its influence is pervasiveness throughout American society and culture. On the other,
the "minority" idea negates this reality. Fields that emphasize
research and document identity issues must be among the first to
reappraise the diffuse "minority" constellation.
Insisting on race and ethnic precision and race-consciousness
is fundamental for addressing in a meaningful way economic
and status disparities. The "minority" tag cannot yield solutions
to issues bearing on racial injustices in the United States. Policies cannot be based on obscure ideas or presumed neutrality in
the identification of groups in need. Specificity is imperative in
policy formulation (Allen, Hunt and Gilbert, 1997; Culp, 1994;
Reed, 1992; Rhode, 1997; Snyder, 1990; Wilkinson and King, 1987;
Wright, 1997). With respect to this, in an examination of the
Banneker scholarship program at the University of Maryland,
researchers found that race-specificity remains necessary. This
recommendation was made because of past, present and cumulative discrimination against African Americans (Allen, Hunt, and
Gilbert, 1997). In other words, race-conscious policies in higher
education are sound and necessary.
Scholars who explore language have described words as indicators of power and privilege. Ruling classes and majorities
engage in identity dialogue that continually estranges existing
disenfranchised and disadvantaged populations (Riggs, 1997).
Thus, "minority" is substantively Eurocentric and reinforces erroneous racial assumptions. Along with its negative referents, the
absence of commonalities among those so classified makes the
word political and lacking in theoretical usefulness. Since "minority' is so deeply grounded in the American language system
and psyche, as stated earlier, inevitably any change will become
an arena of controversy.
Particularizing groups in the United States within the context
of their racial and ethnic backgrounds is past due. No systematic
evidence exists indicating that in this country, American Indians,
Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Asian and African Americans
prefer assigning themselves a "minority" image or status. Rather,
their orientation is toward the distinctiveness of their family
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lineage and the racial/ethnic groups to which they belong. In
contrast to the vagueness of "minority group" (Nibert, 1996),
the self-views of these populations have definitive historical and
cultural meaning.
Additionally, the "minority" construction does not lead to
any solutions for the numerous social problems correlated with
economic levels and racial constraints in the United States. Rational policies cannot be designed using generic categories. Unless
words like subordinatedor inferiorizedare used, "minority" has no
plausible substitutes. Specific group recognition is an imperative
in research and in policy formulation. Race and ethnic specificity
and race-consciousness are indispensable for addressing problems and major forms of inequality.
Various contemporary perspectives have suggested that traditional modes of thinking have been devoid of the capacity to
address the needs and self actualization experiences of diverse
populations. This indicates that the different ways that women
and men translate their lives is identity related. "Minority" does
not convey either personal identity nor historical continuity. In
order to accurately incorporate the life stories of women and men
of different ethnic backgrounds, interpretations of their uniqueness must be gender-centered as well as racially and ethnically
grounded. "Minority" serves as an anachronistic political device
that obliterates natural and contingent social distinctions.
The comments presented in this discussion have not been
without forethought. Also, they are not presented for continuous argument but rather for self-reflection, learning and understanding. They should prove helpful to those in the social and
behavioral sciences and to others who have reinforced illogical
constructs. Considering the numerous incongruities in the "minority" concept, scientists and practitioners will have to dissect
all applications and cease using it. As noted earlier, while I have
regrettably used the word in my early writings, I have sought to
discontinue this practice (Wilkinson, 1980a; 1987b; 1980b; 1992).
Currently, the "minority" image is so broad that it includes
groups exposed to a whole range of majority beliefs and norms
of exclusion. Some of the groups are members of the numerically
and politically dominant population. Since science is the study of
difference, classifying on the basis of race, ethnicity and economic
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class should be normative. Continued attempts to connect, at
any level, disabilities, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, economic
position and gender under a vague symbol is prejudicial and
unreasonable. Describing the experiences of African Americans
as characteristic of those encountered by sexual, language or
handicapped "minorities" minimizes the far-reaching impact of
the country's race ideology.
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CONCLUSION
Via the "minority concept, the social sciences are weakened
in theoretical logic. For among the predominant problems of the
modern era and hence in sociology are those relating to class, race,
ethnicity, immigrant status, and gender. While all frame social
placement and self-conceptions, race is the most challenging and
complex. The "minority" idea reduces the scientific challenges
associated with careful and objective study of race and racism
(Dyson, 1997; Hochschild, 1996; Levy, 1998).
In addition to hindering understanding of the effects of past
and present exclusionary processes on identity, the "minority"
classification disregards group attachments and the legitimacy
of difference. By maintaining this ideologically encumbered and
politically correct word, those who embrace it in their teaching impede the imaginations of others. Ironically, the "minority"
concept restricts and simultaneously politicizes the "sociological
imagination."
The unremitting incorporation of "minority" in scholarly
writings and social science language ushers in the need to include
ethnic origins and race in scientific analysis. African Americans
should be called by their racial heritage which they may decide
is "Black", Afro-American, or African American. The purposive
act of dismissing identity through the "minority" lens eliminates
being informed of the ongoing purposive subordination of particular populations on the basis of their race or ethnic status.
Social and behavioral scientists and social workers are products of cultures and distinct populations. They must be able to
deal objectively with race, ethnic group membership and racism.
To do so, requires immediate abandonment of the "minority"
theme. A rational alternative is needed to eliminate it from the

128

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

scientific literature, the print media, and the national conversation. When confirming theoretical principles and attempting to
facilitate understanding of group differences, taking into account
race and ethnic ancestry is mandatory.
Nearing the end of the twentieth century, it is thus imperative
that we begin to alter the language and our mind-sets regarding
the manifest and latent implications of the minority misnomer.
Perhaps, one way to begin is to delineate possible options. The
first involves deleting "minority" from the social and behavioral
sciences because of its intrinsic biases, lessening of the significance
of racialized economic inequality, and elimination of personal
preferences. This step alone could improve the scientific credibility of selected disciplines. Retaining obscure and controversial
language at the outset of the present century poses an especially
compelling paradox for sociology
The accent on minority standing overrides the necessity for
bringing race and racism into research as well as into clinical
therapy and social work practice. Dismissing race, ethnic identity,
class status, and even gender through repeated use of the "minority" label reduces the ability to understand the authenticity of
the life stories of distinct populations. The narratives of those so
named are actually eradicated.
Considering gender, the "visibility" component of "minority"
is offensive and unsuitable in the social sciences and in other
fields. This feature does not contribute toward explaining outcomes bearing on the lives of women of Spanish, Asian, African
and American Indian origin, for example. It is chronically misleading and undermines any appreciation of the personal stories
of these racial/ethnic women. Recognizing the special identities
that they have is much more principled than analyzing them using nebulous symbolism. The internalization of gender roles and
ethnic and racial "being" is a central part of the self-definition process for women (Beale, 1970; Garcia, 1997; Morgan, 1993; St. Jean
and Feagin, 1998; Wilkinson, 1995).
To reiterate, examinations of racial obstacles are clouded via
the use of the term "minority" The word conceals the realities
of particular group circumstances. Comparisons among those so
typed erase the differential economic and political inferiorization
of one population over another. Given this, the most important
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recommendation from this critique is that the concept must be
instantly dismantled and constructive possibilities introduced
that specify individual and collective identities. Ethnic and racial
consciousness is a rational choice.
Overall, racial and ethnic specificity could have several positive outcomes: (1) accepting a population's authentic request
to be defined and related to in terms of ancestry or other preferred status qualities, (2) facilitating sensible communication and
meaningful interaction between the self and others, (3) providing
a sense of in-group solidarity for those now portrayed as minorities, (4) enhancing knowledge of American history and the
country's rich cultural diversity. These possibilities reinforce the
recommendation that the exclusionary motif embodied in the notion of "minority" must be eradicated from social theory, research,
and all policy decisions.
In the United States, race, class and ethnicity have been the
principal molders of group interaction, work roles, power, and
social hierarchy. Historical forces and change have dramatically
shaped family life and occupational outcomes. The "minority"
idea does not grasp these realities. Greater explicitness in setting
priorities can be forthcoming with the deletion of the concept from
the social sciences. Expectedly, any move toward change of this
linguistic symbol will be an area of dispute and rationalization for
its continuation. This is due to the fact that the word is entrenched
in the broader cultural mores. Nevertheless, it must be recognized
that the "minority" idea does not reflect America's racial and
ethnic mixture.
Ultimately, the minority marker is not pertinent for dissecting
the roots of racial inequality in the employment sector nor biases
in the workplace. The term does not account for the stratification
in employment nor contrasting occupational advantages among
persons within the "minority" category some of whom are labeled
on the basis of lifestyles. Several groups in the category have
greater opportunities for upward mobility than others. That is, for
selected populations judged as comparable, systemic differences
in chances for success prevail. Thus, intermingling handicapped
status, health conditions, and behaviors with race and ethnic
heritage is problematic, unwarranted, and unfair to heretofore
disenfranchised racial and ethnic populations.
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"Pretending that U.S. society ... has moved beyond racial and gender biases to meritocracy ignores its long and continuing history of
bias and inequality" (Rhode, 1997).

As interpreted in this critical assessment, "minority" is not an
appropriate formation. Members of particular ethnic populations
do not automatically describe themselves using this figure of
speech. In contrast, those so defined by the dominant sector
seek to have their stories, encounters, and needs included in
analyses of their experiences. Their family and ancestral sagas
are important to them. Removing "minority" from the lexicon
of the social and behavioral sciences means that clarification in
establishing hierarchies of need and sound public policy will be
forthcoming.
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Who Cares about Racial Inequality?
GLENN C. LOURY
Boston University
Institute on Race and Social Division

The issue of Affirmative Action is discussed, identifying some difficulties
with the way that this policy has been pursuedin the past:Racial preferences
can be a poorly targeted method of closing the gap in social status between
Blacks and Whites, and can have negative unintended consequences for
incentives and for the reputations of its beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it

is argued that some form of affirmative action continues to be needed.
The concept of "developmental affirmative action" is introduced. This
form of racially targeted policy focuses primarily on the enhancement
of competitive skills. In so doing, it avoids many of the aforementioned

difficulties.

INTRODUCTION
I have been known over the years as a critic of affirmative
action policies. However, in the wake of a successful ballot initiative banning affirmative action in the state of California, I now
find it necessary to reiterate the old, and in my view still valid,
arguments on behalf of explicit public efforts to reduce racial inequality In doing so, I want to stress that I am not defending racial
quotas, or race-based allocations of public contracts, or racial
double standards in the workplace, or huge disparities in the test
scores of blacks and whites admitted to elite universities. These
practices are deservedly under attack. But, I do defend the U.S.
Army's programs to commission more black officers, the public
funding of efforts to bring blacks into science and engineering,
the attempts by urban law enforcement agencies to recruit black
personnel, and the goal of top universities-public and privateto retain some racial diversity in their student bodies. The mere
Steine Lecture; October 1, 1998; Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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fact that these efforts take race into account, I will argue here,
should not be disqualifying.
My basic position is that the current campaign against "preferences" goes too far by turning what prior to Proposition 209
had been a reform movement to which I was happy to belong
into an abolitionist's crusade that I feel constrained to oppose.'
True enough, the slogan "mend it, don't end it" was a cynical
device, used by a president heavily dependent on black political
support who sought to avoid genuine reform. But, taken seriously, this slogan describes pretty well what our national policy
should be.
The most zealous affirmative action abolitionists hold as their
fundamental principle that knowing the race of the persons burdened or benefited by a public action can never legitimately
influence the desirability of that action. Yet, moral queasiness
about the use of race arises for historically specific reasonsnamely, slavery and Jim Crow segregation. Those reasons centrally involve the caste-like subordination of blacks, a matter that,
in actual historical fact, was not symmetrical as between the races.
As such, to take account of race while trying to mitigate the effects
of this subordination, thought certainly ill advised or unworkable
in specific cases, should not be viewed as morally equivalent to
the acts of discrimination that affected the subjugation of blacks
in the first place.
It is important to distinguish here between legal and ethical
modes of reasoning. Justice Scalia's famous dictum that "the
rule of law requires a law of rules" militates in favor of the
simple prohibition of all racial discrimination by public agents.
But, the moral case is not so straightforward. I stipulate that an
isolated individual's race, as such, is ethically irrelevant. That is,
the weight given to an affected person's welfare when selecting a
course of public action should not depend on race. Nevertheless,
there are circumstances where the ability of a public policy to
advance the general interest of all persons is enhanced by taking
cognizance of the racial identities of particular persons. Under
these circumstances, the steadfast refusal to take into account
how a policy might impact members of different racial groups, in
the name of legal consistency, can turn out to be an act of moral
obtuseness.
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SOCIAL ETHICS
Of course it is a basic principle of political liberalism-sometimes called the "non-discrimination principle"-that personal
characteristics like race, sex, and ethnicity should have no moral
relevance. 2 People are to be valued as individuals, not as the
representatives of groups. In the economic theory of social choice,
for example, this idea is captured by the concept of "anonymity":
the idea that the legitimacy of any given government benefit
depends upon the fact that it is distributed without regard to
the identities, as distinct from the conditions, of those who get
the benefit and those who do not. This is the ideal.
However, ordinary people are not as fastidious as are social
choice theorists. They do care, sometimes passionately, about the
social identities of those who are helped or harmed by their government's policies. As Tip O'Neill once said, all politics is local.
This implies that no politics can be truly anonymous. Government
must be responsive to a public that is often motivated by group
loyalties and antagonisms. At the same time, ideally it should not
distribute benefits or burdens to citizens based on traits that are
morally irrelevant, such as race.
For multicultural America, this poses a permanent, intractable
dilemma. How can we manage it? Some say that all government
policies should be "color-blind." And, given our troubled racial
history, the simplicity and clarity of this color-blind formulation
can, indeed, seem compelling. But, the problem is more complicated than this "simple" position can accommodate. For, by
focusing intensely on how government treats citizens in discrete
encounters, advocates of color-blindness give too little weight
to the purposes government is trying to achieve when it acts. I
maintain that procedural color blindness is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for the attainment of substantive racial
justice. Public policy can be color-blind yet unfairly contrary to
the interests of a racial minority-"benign neglect" being the
most obvious example. Conversely, policies that are intended
to have wide beneficial impact, regardless of race, may require
that cognizance be taken of the reality of racial identity. This
occurs, for example, when a president, to enhance the legitimacy of his government among the nation as a whole, tries to
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ensure that his top appointments are, to some degree, racially
representative.
The distinction between procedural and substantive justice,
between means and ends, is of little interest to the color-blind
purist, however. In fact, these days you often hear conservatives
spuriously likening the defenders of affirmative action to the
southern segregationists. For instance, Todd Gaziano wrote in
the May-June 1998 issue of Policy Review, published by the Heritage Foundation, as follows: "Forty years ago many Americans
felt anger and disgust toward segregationists such as Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus who earned their place in history as leaders of the massive resistance to desegregation. Today's massive
resistance to racial equality is led by another former governor of
Arkansas, Bill Clinton." This is irresponsible hyperbole bordering
on the absurd.
Is it not obvious that the racial sentiments to which Orval
Faubus was responding to were morally illegitimate and undeserving of ratification by government action? And, is it not equally
obvious that not all racial sentiments are of this kind?
Thus, we arrive at the fundament question: Why should we
care about racialinequalityper se? What is wrong with a situation
in which blacks are roughly 12 percent of the U.S. population, but
some 40 percent of welfare recipients, 50 percent of incarcerated
felons, and 3 percent of newly graduating engineers? Why should
we care about the racial composition of the police forces in large
cities, of Presidential appointees to the federal bench, or of the
freshman class at a state university? Why should a large corporation actively seek a qualified black candidate for a position in its
upper management? After all, thinking in the abstract, a growing
welfare population or an increasing number of incarcerated felons
is a problem for society no matter what the color of those citizens.
What matters is that we reduce the total numbers, right?
Actually, I will argue that this is not right, or at least not for
America, not today. A President who appoints hundreds of local
federal judges among whom there are no blacks invites a wholly
unnecessary political firestorm. He would rightly find himself in
trouble. A corporation that neglects to bring along some blacks
into upper management exposes itself needlessly to potential
difficulties with its customers or its lower-level employees. A

137

Inequality

racially diverse big city fielding a nearly all white police force
is asking for big trouble the next time a drunken black motorist
has to be forcibly subdued. A freshman class devoid of blacks
teaches it students some lessons about our society that are not
listed in the course catalog. And to accept with equanimity the
blackening of our prisons or welfare rolls is to be indifferent, I
suggest, to an important aspect of social justice.
REASONS TO CARE
A. Racial Identities Matter
One reason to care about racial inequality is that race forms an
important part of the personal identity of many citizens. Ideally,
these racial identities should be irrelevant to our dealings with
one another. Yet clearly they are not. As a result, all kinds of
circumstances, having nothing to do with "racial preferences,"
require a government to depart from the strictly "color-blind"
treatment of its citizens in order to discharge its legitimate function. A front page story in the October 28,1996 San FranciscoChronicle makes the point nicely. Reporting on an FBI investigation into
excessive fighting among inmates at the Corcoran California state
prison, the story traces the trouble to "an obscure prison edict issued during the 1980s-the integrated yard policyellipsis[which]
required all prison yards to be integrated by race and gang affiliation." This article quotes a veteran prison guard calling that policy
"naive and stupidellipsis[A]nybody that's worked inside a prison
would say that." Yet for a prison warden to allocate exercise time
among inmates as to minimize racial conflict, he would have to
behave in something other than a color-blind manner.
This example is not trivial. In the summer of 1996, the conservative federal judge Richard Posner (in Wittmer v. Peters, Nos.
95-3729, 95-4034 (7 th Cir. July 2, 1996)) upheld the preferential
hiring of a black prison guard in an Illinois boot camp for young
offenders. He argued that, with an inmate population that was
three-quarters black, and given that "aversive training" methods
familiar to marine enlistees were to be employed at the boot
camp, the state might have a compelling and thus constitutionally
justifiable interest in providing for some racial diversity in the
camp's officer corps.
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Faced with such examples, supporters of the "color-blind"
position invariably reply that race here simply serves as a proxy
for some non-racial trait-like the ability to win the trust of
black inmates. But this response is insufficient, for the crux of the
matter is not the state's use of race as a proxy for some desirable
characteristic in an employee, but rather some citizens' tendency
to view the world through a racially tinted lens. In the boot camp,
a young inmate is bullied mercilessly by guards who either have
his best interests at heart or do not. When black youths refuse
to believe that this bullying is for some useful purpose when
none of the guards are black, then the success of the training
technique requires racial diversity on the staff. And this is true
no matter how sophisticated the prison personnel office may be
at discovering, without using race, whether an applicant "truly
cares" about his prospective charges.
B. Race Conveys Information
Another reason to care about racial inequality is that race is
an important source of information in many situations. Race is
an easily observable trait that, as an empirical matter, is correlated with some hard-to-observe traits about which employers,
lenders, police officers and others are concerned. 3 Direct evidence
from employer interviews indicates that both black and white
employers are reluctant to hire black, urban young males who
exhibit lower-class behavioral styles. Racial identity is also used
as information in a variety of ways by police. Some evidence
indicates that it shapes their law enforcement decisions. Indeed,
the dramatic disparity between the races in the rates of arrest and
incarceration for criminal offenses must be taken into account
when discussing racial differences in the labor market experiences of males, thought the direction of causality is difficult to
untangle.
Racial-statistical discrimination can be quite damaging to
both the efficiency of market allocations and to equity This is due
to the very real possibility that the empirically valid statistical
generalizations lying at the heart of such discrimination can be
self-fulfilling prophecies. There is an informational externality
present whenever decision takers take actions based on group
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inferences. It is not difficult to give straightforward economic
accounts of how this process might work in a variety of contexts.
Suppose only a few taxi drivers will pick up young black men
after a certain hour. Given that behavior by taxi drivers as a class, it
is plausible through a process of adverse selection that the "types"
of young black men who will attempt to hail taxis during those
hours contain an especially large fraction of potential robbers.
This makes it rational to avoid them. But if most drivers willingly
picked up young black men, then this behavior might induce
a less threatening set of black males to select taxi transportation
after dark, confirming the rationality of the drivers' more tolerant
behavior.
Or, suppose employers have an a-priori belief that blacks are
more likely to be low effort trainees than are whites. Then, they
will set a lower threshold for blacks on the number of mistakes
needed to trigger dismissal, since they will be quicker to infer
that black workers have not tried hard enough to learn the job.
But knowing that they are more likely to be fired for making a few
mistakes, more black employees may elect not to exert high effort
during the training period in the first place, thus confirming the
employers' initial beliefs.
Or, if car dealers believe that black buyers have higher reservation prices than whites, then dealers will be tougher when
bargaining with blacks than with whites. Given this experience of
tough bargaining, a black buyer anticipates less favorable alternative opportunities and higher search costs than a white buyer, and
so may rationally agree to a higher price. This behavior confirms
the dealers' initial presumption that "color" predicts bargaining
power.
Such stories are not difficult to produce, and at least to my ear,
they have a certain ring of truth about them. The key to all of these
examples is their self-reinforcing nature: they begin with racial
beliefs that then bring about their own statistical confirmation.
These examples are not unrelated to the historical problems of
race, as they have developed in our society. Race is an easily
discernable characteristic that has salience in our culture, making
it operate powerfully in many venues because it is common
knowledge that people are taking it into account.
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C. Social Networks
Yet another reason to care about racial inequality is that race
influences the social networks that are open to individuals, and
these networks in turn have a major effect upon individuals'
opportunities.4 Here are two observations that illustrate the key to
my argument: First, all societies exhibit significant social segmentation. People make choices about whom to befriend, whom to
marry, where to live, to which schools to send their children and
so on. Factors like race, ethnicity, social class, and religious affiliation influence these choices of association. Second, the processes
through which individuals develop their productive capacities
are shaped by custom, convention, and social norms, and are
not fully responsive to market forces, or reflective of the innate
abilities of persons. Networks of social affiliation are not usually
the result of calculated economic decisions. They nevertheless
help determine how resources important to the development of
the productive capacities of human beings are made available to
individuals.
One can say that an adult worker with a given degree of
personal efficacy has been "produced" from the "inputs" of education, parenting skills, acculturation, nutrition, and socialization
to which he was exposed in his formative years. While some of
these "inputs" can be bought and sold, some of the most crucial
"factors of production" are only available as by-products from
activities of social affiliation. Parenting services are not to be
had for purchase on the market, but accrue as the consequence
of the social relations between the custodial parents and the
child. The allocation of parenting services among a prospective
generation of adults is thus the indirect consequence of social
activities undertaken by members of the preceding generation.
An adolescent's peer group is similarly a derivative consequence
of processes of social networking.
I concede that this is an artificial way of thinking about human
development, but the artifice is quite useful. For it calls attention
to the critical role played by social and cultural resources in the
production and reproduction of economic inequality. The relevance of such factors, as an empirical matter, is beyond doubt.
The importance of networks, contacts, social background, family
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connections, and informal associations of all kinds has been amply documented by students of social stratification.
I can put this somewhat less abstractly. There is one view of
society in which we are atomistic individuals, all of us pursuing
our own paths to the best of our ability, given the opportunities
available in the marketplace. Some of us work harder, some are
luckier, some are more talented than others, and so the outcomes
are not equal. That is one view, but it is a false, or at least an
incomplete, view of the way in which our society actually works.
For the fact is that each and every one of us is embedded in a
complex web of associations, networks, and contacts. We live
in families, we belong in communities, and we are members of
collectivities of one kind or another. We are influenced by these
associations from the very first day that we draw breath. Our
development-what and who we are become-is nourished by
these associations.
It is a severe disadvantage to be born to parents who are not
interested in your development. It is a great impediment for a
talented youngster to be embedded in a social network of peers
whose values do not affirm the activities the youngster must
undertake to develop his talent. Children do not freely choose
their peers. To a significant degree they inherit these associations
as a consequence of where they live, what their parents believe,
what social group they belong to, and so on. In American society,
given our history, racial identity is one important component of
that complex of social characteristics that define the networks
in which we live. Opportunity travels along the synapses of
these networks. We learn about what we can do with our talents
from the conversation taking place over dinner, from the family
friend who says "Why doesn't your kid do this or that?," from
the business owner who offers a summer job. These kinds of
opportunity-enhancing associations are not just out there in the
marketplace to be purchased by the highest bidder. Nor are they
allocated randomly so as to create some kind of level playing
field.
RACIAL JUSTICE
Now as someone who values liberty it is my view that we
cannot and should not seek to equalize for all persons access to
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such networks of social affiliation. They are to a large degree the
inheritance of history, and we must take them as they come. But
we do not have to accept the inegalitarian consequences of these
structures without reflection, nor must we impute naturalness or
an inevitability to those unequal consequences.
We do not, in other words, have to take one seventeen-yearold who has grown up in a suburban, affluent, two-parent family
with wholesome neighbors and peers, attending schools that
work, and compare him with another seventeen-year-old who
has grown up under less felicitous circumstances, and then stamp
on the forehead of the former the big "M" for merit and say of the
latter, "He has not earned the right to further develop his talents."
When it comes time to allocate state-funded opportunities for
the intellectual development of the two youngsters, we need
not pretend that the playing field has been level all the time
and that, by favoring the first kid, we are merely giving scarce
opportunities to the most deserving recipient.
I am arguing that inalienable non-marketed social and cultural resources play a critical role in the production and reproduction of economic inequality. In this context, it is crucial to
realize that even the values, attitudes and beliefs held by an
individual-of central import for the attainment of success in
life-are shaped by the cultural milieu in which that person develops. Whom one knows affects what one comes to believe, and in
that way influences what one can do with one's God-given talents.
Do we collectively, as a society, have any responsibility for the
debilitating, even pathological cultural milieus that exist in our
midst? This is an important component of the racial inequality of
our day. Are these subcultures of despair just facts of nature about
"those people," toward whom the rest of us have no obligations
whatsoever? Or are they products of a history in which we are
implicated?
My claim here is that the "social pathology' to be observed in
some quarters for our society did not come out of thin air, but to
some extent is a consequence of historical practices, including, in
the case of blacks, the practice of racial oppression' Moreover, the
ongoing racial segmentation of our society-most clearly visible
in the social isolation of today's urban black poor-is an important social inequity that helps to perpetuate the consequences of
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our troubled racial history. I believe this analysis has an important
ethical implication: Because the creation of a skilled workforce is a
social process, the meritocratic ideal-thatin a free society individuals
should be allowed to rise to the level of their competence-should be
tempered with an understandingthat no one travels that road alone. We
should not embrace the notion that individuals have "merit" that
must be rewarded without some awareness of the processes by
which that merit is produced. Theses are social processes, with
a racial dimension. It should be evident that, notwithstanding
the establishment of a legal regime or equal opportunity, historically engendered economic differences between racial groups
could well persist into the indefinite future, and not as some
have argued, perniciously, because of the genetic inferiority of
blacks. Thus, the pronounced racial disparities to be observed
in American cities are, at least, in part, the product of an unjust
history, propagated across the generations by segmented social
structures of our race conscious society. This is what I mean by
the problem of racial injustice.
For this reason I would argue that, as a matter of social ethics
and social science, there should be collective public effort to mitigate the economic marginality of those who are languishing in
the ghettos of America. Prevailing social affiliations, including
the extent of racial segregation in our society, influence the development of the intellectual and personal skills of the young.
As a result, the, patterns of inequality-among individuals and
between groups-must embody, to some degree, social and economic disparities that have existed in the past. To the extent that
past disparities reflect overt racial exclusion, the propriety of the
contemporary order is called into question.
I stress that this is not a reparations argument. I am not saying
that some individuals are due something because of what was
done to their ancestors. Neither is this a group entitlement argument, in which racial collectivities are seen as having "rights" that
take precedence over those of individuals. Indeed, my argument
here is entirely consistent with individualism as a core philosophical premise. I am simply acknowledging the additional fact that
in society, people are not atoms. They are, rather situated within
systems of mutual affiliation. And in our society, these systems
are defined, in part, by race.
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Taking note of this situatedness and understanding its historical roots leads me to some recognition of race as a legitimate
factor in consideration of social justice. When the developmental
prospects of individuals depend on the circumstances of those
with whom they are socially affiliated, and when social affiliation
reflects a tendency toward racial segregation, even a minimal
commitment to equality of opportunity for individuals can require, I am arguing, a willingness to take racial identity into
account. In our divided society, given our tragic past, this implies
that public efforts to counter the effects of historical disadvantage among blacks are not only consistent with, but indeed are
required by widely embraced, individualistic, democratic ideals.
COLOR BLIND EXTREMISTS
This argument leads naturally to the question of whether
affirmative-action policies are necessary and justified. To emphasize that racial group disparities can be transmitted across
generations through subtle and complex social processes is not
necessarily to endorse employment or educational preferences
based on race. But recognizing the importance of social segmentation does cause one to doubt the ethical viability, and indeed
the logical coherence, of "color-blind absolutism"-the notion
that the Constitution requires government agents to ignore the
racial identity of citizens. Ironically, recent claims by some conservatives 6 to this effect bear an eerie resemblance, in form and in
substance, to the similarly absolute claims of some card-carrying
civil libertarians on behalf of a "wall of separation" between
church and state.
Consider that, as a practical matter, the government cannot
enforce laws against employment discrimination without taking
note of a gross demographic imbalance in an employer's work
force. Yet, the government's requiring that employment data be
reported by race is already a departure from pure color-blind
behavior. So too is the practice, nearly universal in the public and
private sectors, of targeted outreach efforts designed to increase
the representation of blacks in the pool of persons considered for
an employment opportunity Accordingly, the more intellectually
consistent of the color-blind absolutists now recommend, as logic
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would require, that we repeal the civil-rights laws and abandon
even those efforts to achieve racial diversity which do not involve
preferential treatment. But is that stance consistent with fairness?
Coming up with cases that challenge the absolutist claim is not
difficult. How can a college educator convey to students the lesson
that "not all blacks think alike," with too few blacks on campus
for this truth to be evident? Can the police consider race when
making undercover assignments? Can a black public employee
use health insurance benefits to choose a black therapist with
whom to discuss race-related anxieties? Can units in a public
housing project be let with an eye to sustaining a racially integrated environment? What about a National Science Foundation
that encourages gifted blacks to pursue careers in the fields where
few now study? Clearly, there is no general rule that can resolve
all of these case reasonably.
COSTS OF RACIAL PREFERENCES
I want to be clear. This criticism of color-blind absolutism is
not an unqualified defense of the affirmative action status quo.
There are many reasons to suspect that in particular contexts
7
the costs of using racial preferences will outweigh the benefits.
One such reason for questioning the wisdom of affirmative action
in certain contexts is that the widespread use of preference can
logically be expected to erode the perception of black competence.
This point is often misunderstood, so it is worth spelling out
in some detail. The argument is not a speculation about the
feelings of persons who may or may not be the beneficiaries
of affirmative action. Rather, it turns on the rational, statistical
inferences that neutral observers are entitled to make about the
unknown qualifications of persons who may have been preferred,
or rejected, in a selection process.
The main insight is not difficult to grasp. Let some employer
use a lower threshold of assessed productivity for the hiring of
blacks than whites. The preferential hiring policy defines three
categories of individuals within each of the two racial groups
which I will call "marginals," "successes," and "failures." Marginals are those whose hiring status is altered by the policyeither whites not hired who otherwise would have been, or blacks
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hired who otherwise would not have been. Successes are those
who would be hired with or without the policy, and failures are
those who would be passed over with or without the preferential
policy. Let us consider how an outsider who can observe the hiring decision, but not the employer's productivity assessment, would
estimate the productivity of those subject to this hiring process.
Notice that a lower hiring threshold for blacks causes the
outside market to reduce its estimate of the productivity of black
successes, since, on average, less is required to achieve that status.
In addition, black failures, seen to have been passed over despite
a lower hiring threshold, are thereby revealed as especially unproductive. On the other hand, a hiring process favoring blacks
must enhance the reputations of white failures, as seen by outsiders, since they may have been artificially held back. And white
successes, who are hired despite being disfavored in selection,
have thereby been shown to be especially productive.
We have thus reached the result that, among blacks, only
marginals gain from the establishment of a preferential hiring
program-they do so because the outside observer lumps them
together with black successes. They thus gain a job and a better reputation than they objectively deserve. Moreover, among
whites, only marginals are harmed by the program, for only
they lose the chance of securing a job and only they see their
reputations harmed by virtue of being placed in the same category
as white failures. In practical terms, since marginals are typically
a minority of all workers, the outside reputations of most blacks
will be lowered, and that of most whites enhanced, by preferential
hiring. The inferential logic that leads to this arresting conclusion
is particularly insidious, in that it can serve to legitimate otherwise
indefensible negative stereotypes about blacks.
Another reason for being skeptical about the practice of affirmative action is that it can undercut the incentives for blacks
to develop their competitive abilities. For instance, preferential
treatment can lead to the patronization of black workers and
students. By "patronization," I mean the setting of lower standards of expected accomplishment for blacks than for whites
because of the belief that blacks are not as capable of meeting
a higher, common standard. In the 1993 article "Will Affirmative
Action eliminate Negative Stereotypes?" 8 , Stephen Coate and I
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show how behavior of this kind can be based on a self-fulfilling
prophesy That is, observed performance among blacks may be
lower precisely because blacks are being patronized, a policy that
is undertaken because of the need for an employer or admissions
officer to meet affirmative-action guidelines.
Consider a workplace in which a supervisor operating under
some affirmative-action guidelines must recommend subordinate workers for promotion. Suppose further that he is keen to
promote blacks where possible, and that he monitors his subordinates' performance and bases his recommendations on these
observations. Pressure to promote blacks might lead him to deemphasize deficiencies in the performance of black subordinates,
recommending them for promotion when he would not have
done so for whites. But his behavior could undermine the ability
of black workers to identify and correct their deficiencies. They
are denied honest feedback from their supervisor on their performance and are encouraged to think that one can get ahead
without attaining the same degree of proficiency as whites.
Alternatively, consider a population of students applying to
professional schools for admissions. The schools, due to affirmative action concerns, are eager to admit a certain percentage of
blacks. They believe that to do so they must accept black applicants with test scores and grades below those of some whites
whom they reject. If most schools follow this policy, the message
sent out to black students is that the level of performance needed
to gain admission is lower than that which white students know
they must attain. If black and white students are, at least to some
extent, responsive to these differing expectations, they might, as a
result, achieve grades and test scores reflective of the expectation
gap. In this way, the schools' belief that different admissions
standards are necessary becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy
DEVELOPMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The common theme in these two examples is that the desire
to see greater black representation is pursued by using different
criteria for the promotion or admission of black and white candidates. But the use of different criteria reduces the incentives that
blacks have for developing needed skills. This argument does not
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presume that blacks are less capable than whites; it is based on
the fact that an individual's need to make use of his abilities is
undermined when that individual is patronized by the employer
or the admissions committee.
This problem could be avoided if, instead of using different
criteria of selection, the employers and schools in question sought
to meet their desired level of black participation through a concerted effort to enhance performance, while maintaining common
standards of evaluation. Call it "developmental," as opposed to
"preferential," affirmative action. Such a targeted effort as performance enhancement among black employees or students is
definitely not color-blind behavior. It presumes a direct concern
about racial inequality and involves allocating benefits on the
basis of race. What distinguishes it from preferential hiring or
admissions, though, is that it takes seriously the fact of differential
performance and seeks to reverse it directly, rather than trying to
hide from that fact by setting a different threshold of expectations
for the performance of blacks.
For example, given that black students are far scarcer than
white and Asian students in the fields of math and science, encouraging their entry into these areas without lowering standards
-through summer workshops, support for curriculum development at historically black colleges, or the financing of research
assistantships for promising graduate students-would be
consistent with my distinction between "preferential" and "developmental" affirmative action. Also consistent would be the
provision of management assistance to new black-owned businesses, which would then be expected to bid competitively for
government contracts, or the provisional admission of black students to the state university, conditional on their raising their
academic scores to competitive levels after a year or two of study
at a local community college. The key is that the racially targeted
assistance be short-lived and preparatory to the entry of its recipients into an arena of competition where they would be assessed
in the same way as everyone else.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am arguing that if our interest is achieving a
just society, then there is nothing in the sorry history of affirmative
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action abuses that requires us to tie our hands with a colorblind formalism. Consider the common sense observation that, in
this country, an army where blacks are one-third of the enlisted
personnel but only three percent of the officer corps is likely to
function poorly. The U.S. Army cares about the number of black
captains because it needs to sustain effective cooperation among
its personnel across racial lines. That the racial identities of captains and corporals sometimes matters to the smooth functioning
of a military institution is a deep fact about our society, one that
cannot be wished away.' Now, monitoring the number of blacks
promoted to the rank of captain, and formulating policies to
increase that number, are activities that inherently involve taking
account of some individual's race. Yet, depending on how they
are undertaken, such activities need not entail the promulgation
of racial double standards, nor need they seem to declare, as a
matter of official policy, that racial identity is a determinant of
an individual's moral worth. As the military sociologist Charles
Moskos is fond of pointing out, the Army is the only place in
American society where large numbers of whites routinely take
orders from blacks. Ironically, the irrelevance of race to a person's moral worth may be more evident to the members of this
institution than elsewhere in our society precisely because the
government has taken account of race in the conduct of its military
personnel policies.
The color-blind principle, while consistent as a self-contained
legal rule, is in my opinion neither morally nor politically coherent. It requires that we not care about racial inequality, per se,
when, as I have argued above, there are many compelling reasons to reject that position. For instance, the color-blind principle
would seem to imply that we should discontinue all racial classifications associated with the collection of government statistics.
To what proper use could the agencies possibly put the racial
information-on crime, housing, employment, welfare receipt,
test scores-which they collect? Yet, monitoring the racial dimension of social and economic trends is an obviously vital public
function. Why? For one reason, consider that these data are the
sole source of our knowledge that discrimination has declined
over the years, a key aspect of the case for reforming the practice
of affirmative action. Moreover, without these data, the vast over
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representation of blacks among imprisoned felons in this country
could not be rationalized in such a way as to refute the charge of
systematic racism in the administration of criminal justice. These
examples illustrate how, despite the moral irrelevance of race at
the individual level, there remains an operational need to attend
to racial disparity in the conduct of our public affairs.
Moreover, as I have suggested, racially targeted recruitment
and racially defined anti-discrimination enforcement mechanisms inevitably entail a form of mild "reverse discrimination,"
because they guarantee a labor market environment in which
the targeted group receives more favorable treatment. Colorblind employment policy, if faithfully and uniformly pursued,
must mean the abolition of racial representation as a goal. (See,
eg., the recent Silberman decision for DC Circuit in Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communications Commission,
No. 97-1116 (D.C. Cir. September 15, 1998), where a federal judge
seems prepared to go this far.)
All of this shows the confusion of those color-blind advocates
who offer the criminalization of employment discrimination as
a quid pro quo for the abolition of affirmative action. Jailing
employers for not finding enough black workers would only
lead to a dramatic increase in the amount of covert, reverse
discrimination against white job-seekers. Indeed, since all antidiscrimination enforcement requires classifying, monitoring, and
counting employees by race, the only fully consistent color-blind
position is to advocate the repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I respect the intellectual consistency, but doubt the moral probity
of those like Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law
School, who so advocate.
NOTES
1. This point is developed more fully in Loury (March 1998).
2. The discussion in this section draws on Loury (August 1998).
3. For a more complete discussion, see Loury (Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Spring 1998).
4. These ideas are developed more fully in Loury (1997).
5. For a more complete argument in this vein, see Loury, Brookings Review, Spring
1998.
6. For example, America in Black and White (1997) by Abigail and Stephan
Thernstrom.
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7. See Loury (Spring 1997).
8. See Coate and Loury (1993).
9. See All that We Can Be (1997), by Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, for
an informative discussion of affirmative action in the U.S. Army.

REFERENCES
Butler, J. S. (Contributor) & Moskos, C. (September, 1997). All That We Can Be:
Black Leadershipand Racial Integration the Army Way. Basic Books.
Coate, S. & Loury, G. (1993). Will Affirmative Action policies eliminate negative
stereotypes. American Economic Review, 1220-40.
Epstein, R. A. (1992). ForbiddenGrounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws. Harvard University Press.
Gaziano, T. (1998). The new 'Massive Resistance'. Policy Review, 89.
Holding, R. (1996, October 28). Officials accused of trying To block FBI investigation. San Francisco Chronicle, p. 1.
Loury, G. (1997). How to mend Affirmative Action. The Public Interest, No. 127,
33-43.
Loury, G. (1998, March). Is Affirmative Action on the way out? Should it be?
Commentary, 38-40.
Loury, G. (1998, Spring). An American tragedy: The legacy of slavery lingers in
our cities' ghettos. The Brookings Review, 36-40.
Loury G. (1998, Spring). Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights era: Beyond
market interactions. Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Loury, G., (1998, August 17). The hard questions: Color-Blinded. The New Republic, 12-13.
Thernstrom, S. & Thernstrom, A. M. (1997, September). America in Black and
White: One Nation, Indivisible. Simon & Schuster.

Affirmative Action at the Crossroads:
A Social Justice Perspective
MARGARET GIBELMAN

Yeshiva University
Wurzweiler School of Social Work

This article reviews the basis for the policy of affirmative action within
the context of changing social values. Both the aims and unanticipated
consequences of affirmative action are explored, the latter of which have
resulted in substantialbacklash and the real possibilityof policy overturn.
Within this context, the position of the social welfare community toward
and involvement in affirmative action is traced. An agendafor social work
in current and future debates about affirmative action is offered which
takes into account the original social problem-discrimination-within
redefined societal values and political realities. Alternative remedies to
affirmative action, it is argued, can be congruent with the mission and
values of the social welfare community in its quest to achieve socialjustice.
Such options include targeting specific professions that interface with
the inner city African-American underclass; reframing the purpose of
affirmative action from that of correctinginjustice for the victims of racial
discrimination to social engineering;and targetingspecific geographical
areas which are characterizedby economic deprivation.

INTRODUCTION
The debate about the future of affirmative action occupies
center stage on our national agenda. Incremental changes have
already been implemented in the direction of diluting the scope
and impact of affirmative action and the current socio-political
environment suggests continued "chipping away" at the foundation of this public policy It is essential that the social welfare
community be an active participant in the debate about the future
of anti-discrimination efforts and that it offer viable alternatives to
preserve and extend efforts to fight discrimination in this country.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 1
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This article has a three-fold focus. First, the basis for the policy
of affirmative action is reviewed within the context of changing
social values. Both the aims and unanticipated consequences of
affirmative action are explored, the latter of which have resulted
in substantial backlash and the real possibility of policy overturn
through sustained reductions in the scope of judicial or legislative
policy. Second, the position of social work, as the practicing social
welfare profession, toward and involvement in affirmative action
is traced. Third, an agenda for social work in current and future
debates about affirmative action is offered which takes into account the original social problem-discrimination-within redefined societal values and political realities. Alternative remedies
to affirmative action, it is argued, can be similarly congruent with
the mission and values of the social welfare community in its
quest to achieve social justice.
In the past few years, there has been a plethora of books
on race and representation, with particular focus on affirmative
action. As the debate about the future of affirmative action has
gathered momentum, the quantity of books and popular magazine articles has risen exponentially (see for example, Curry, 1996;
Post & Rogin, 1998; Skrentny, 1998). In general, this accumulation
of literature is descriptive-seeking to explore the debate, detailing why we do or do not need affirmative action-but with few
prescriptions for constructive alternatives.
Social work has not been an active contributor to the debate
when compared to the disciplines of sociology, political science,
and law, and even descriptive information is sparse within the
social work literature that would help to clarify this complex
issue. A commitment on the part of the social work profession
to affirmative action, in principle and in policy, can be assumed
from the procedures and practices of social welfare agencies, from
the standards of accrediting bodies for social service agencies,
from position statements of the National Association of Social
Workers, and from the NASW Code of Ethic (NASW, 1996a; NASW,
1996b; COA, 1997). However, discussion within the social welfare community has centered largely on support for affirmative
action, without full recognition of the breadth and intensity of
society's opposition to its continuation. This view is short-sighted.
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Affirmative action concerns not only public policy and social
justice priorities and commitments, but also the well-being of
the clients represented in social work practice. Human service
professions have much to contribute to the dialogue about viable
alternatives, but must do so within the context of prevailing sociopolitical realities and in concert with other groups which seek to
ensure that combating discrimination in any form continues to
be a high and demonstrated public priority. The credibility of
the profession's contributions to this dialogue must be rooted in
a solid knowledge of what affirmative action is and why it has
come to occupy center stage as detractors seek to dismantle it.
Although affirmative action addresses discrimination against
women, the physically disabled, and other designated groups,
the focus of this discussion is primarily on racial minorities, particularly African-Americans. This is because much of the current
debate centers on racial discrimination and recent Supreme Court
decisions (e.g., Adarand Constructorsv. Pena) focus on establishing
tougher standards to justify policies designed to benefit racial
minorities (Biskupic, 1995). Similarly, an analysis of the full intricacies and ramifications of affirmative action is beyond the scope
of this discussion. Rather, the focus is on viewing affirmative
action-past, present, and future directions-from a social justice
perspective.
For purposes of this discussion, social justice refers to conditions in which "all members of society have the same basic
rights, protections, opportunities, obligations, and social benefits" (Barker, 1995, p. 354). Social injustices, as referenced in the
NASW Code of Ethics, refer to such conditions as poverty, unemployment, and discrimination (NASW, 1996a, p. 5). Although
there are different perspectives on what constitutes social justice
and how it can be achieved, Van Soest (1994) found that justifications for an investment in human services and rebuilding the
nation's economy were apparent in the diverse views of libertarians, utilitarians, and egalitarians. Based on Rawl's conception
of social justice, Figueira-McDonough (1993) argues that equality
in the distribution of social goods, such as education and work,
is the means to achieve equal opportunity. Equal opportunity, in
turn, is the pre-condition for the exercise of freedom.
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FROM DISCRIMINATION TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
Within the context of changing values, of increased concern
about social justice for all, and of grass roots mobilization for
change, this nation slowly but steadily over the past 100 years
moved toward identifying discrimination as a social problem. The
term "social problem" suggests that society has recognized the
existence of a social condition which is deemed, by the majority,
to be unacceptable in some form or way and which requires
the intervention of government, through judicial or legislative
remedy, to rectify (DiNitto, 1991; Gilbert, Specht, & Terrell, 1993;
Chambers, 1993). The fact of discrimination came to be seen as
the problem of discrimination against racial minorities, particularly African-Americans who had been subjected to decades of
enslavement.
Affirmative Action Antecedents
Various legislative, judicial, and executive branch efforts were
initiated to correct discriminatory practices, the earlier initiatives
of which focused on prohibitions against discrimination. The Fifteenth Amendment, which took effect in March, 1870, guaranteed
that the right of citizens to vote should not be denied because of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude (Pritchett, 1968).
Laws which were intended to prevent blacks from exercising
their voting rights were declared unconstitutional. The momentum had begun, however slowly. President Truman took steps to
desegregate the military in 1946. In Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court ruled that separate educational
facilities were inherently unequal (Day, 1997).
In 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925
which created the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity whose charge it was to recommend "affirmative
steps" that executive branch departments and agencies could take
to more fully integrate the federal work force. The Order went
further in prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating
on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin by federal
contractors. In fulfilling their contracts, these contractors were
ordered to take affirmative steps to hire African-American and
other racial minorities (Wells & Idelson, 1995).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 attempted to ensure that
the Constitutional guarantees afforded to all citizens were applied equally. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was created to enforce civil rights (Day, 1997). Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expanded equal opportunity to
cover private employers by making it unlawful to discriminate
against potential or actual employees on the basis of race, gender,
color, religion, or national origin. The law provides for redress
of discriminatory actions: courts have the authority to order employers to take affirmative steps such as reinstating, hiring, or
paying retroactive wages to employees (Wells & Idelson, 1995).
The provisions of the 1964 Act made all discrimination illegal; this
prohibition did not in any way imply that positive or aggressive
efforts need be made. And, in fact, they were not.
The slow but steady progress (albeit with some instances of
backward movement) in the affirmation of civil rights for AfricanAmerican and other minorities is consistent with an incremental
model of social change, a model embraced by American society
and congruent with its conservative leanings (Chambers, 1993).
However, even these changes which form the backdrop for affirmative action did not occur without significant resistance. There
are members of our society who do not see the unequal division
of resources by race as a function of centuries of social policy, but
rather as a function of reward for inherent worth or lack of worth,
as the case may be (Kraft, 1996).
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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS POLICY
The policy of affirmative action is, in itself, unusually brief
and straightforward. In 1965, President Johnson, through Executive Order 11246, expanded President Kennedy's earlier order
by requiring contractors to take affirmative steps in all business
operations, not just in fulfilling federal contracts (Pecora, 1995).
Companies were required to submit the "numerical goals and
timetables" used in carrying out their affirmative action plan
(Wells & Idelson, 1995). The Order did not require specific timetables or "quotas" (numerical imperatives in absolute or proportionate terms), although, in time, individual businesses, bolstered
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by the courts, have instituted such. This far-reaching Executive
Order and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which preceded it were executed at a time of widespread interest in and support for the civil
rights movement. Liberal Democrats controlled the presidency
and both branches of Congress, making opposition to affirmative
action politically impractical. The backdrop of the growing civil
unrest of the 1960s was also a motivating factor for government
action (Day, 1997; DiNitto, 1991).
Building on the groundwork laid by the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Act was amended in 1991, through Title VI, to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in
any program or activity that receives federal government financial assistance (Wells & Idelson, 1995). Included in this category
are programs that receive loans, tax breaks, or grants and contracts from the government. Few are exempt. However, the 1991
amendments also inserted language to clarify that employers
are not required to meet statistical quotas. In 1992, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act was passed by Congress, which
amended Title VII to increase the EEOC's powers to bring civil
suits against employers for discriminatory practices. These suits
must be brought by the U.S. Justice Department. Heretofore, the
EEOC had relied on dialogue and conciliation efforts, with the
potential threat of withdrawal of government funds.
Affirmative action rejects the notion that policies are insufficient if they simply do not discriminate against individuals on
the basis of gender, race or ethnic background. The word "affirmative" suggests that positive steps must be taken to achieve
equality in admissions to institutions of higher education, in hiring and promotion in employment settings, and in other arenas
(Kraft, 1995). Inequities must be reduced and eliminated through
active intervention (DiNitto, 1991; Pecora, 1995).
The broad goal of these policies was to correct the discriminatory practices of the past and to create a balance in the work force
and in higher education that was reflective of the balance between
the races and genders in American society. Specific objectives
were to increase the numbers of under-represented women and
minorities in all businesses and programs benefitting from federal
support in proportion to their numbers in the general population.
Have these goals been achieved? Progress has been made (see, for
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example, Burstein, 1994; Taylor, 1995; Wolfe, 1996; AAD Project,
1998). Has discrimination been eliminated? No.
IMPLEMENTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Value Issues
There are a number of value conflicts and different assumptions about the nature of people which have affected the successful implementation of affirmative action as a social policy.
Although equality is a widely held value, it is a value for some
that is based on worth. The assumption that all people are not
equally worthy and that there are differences in worth based
on racial group identity is one that many Americans hold; such
attitudes have been used to justify social, political, and economic
discrimination and exploitation for decades. The view that race
and class differences are the result of genetic factors and therefore
not subject to social intervention received widespread attention
with the publication of The Bell Curve (Hernstein & Murray, 1994).
To the extent that people believe that inequities are a function
of inherent worth, then inequality becomes a descriptive reality
rather than a social problem (Kraft, 1996).
Even among those who agree that inequality is a function
of centuries of social injustice, there are some who believe that
once the law made discrimination illegal, it is up to individuals to
overcome whatever obstacles confront them in acquiring their fair
share of resources or achieving personal aspirations. Adherents
of this laissez-faire position would argue that a policy of affirmative action infantilizes the population it seeks to help, thereby
exacerbating the consequences of years of discrimination (Kraft,
1996). Even those who agree that inequity is a function of unequal
treatment and that affirmative action is part of a useful remedy
might still object on the grounds that you can't address one evil
(inequality) with another (quotas or preferential treatment). These
disparities in viewpoints signify a conflict in values and create
serious obstacles to the successful implementation of the policy
of affirmative action. It is therefore not surprising that, thirty
years after affirmative action was implemented, the policy itself
has come to be defined as creating unacceptable conditions for
mainstream America.
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There were several unique aspects to the development and
implementation of affirmative action. Here, the executive, rather
than the legislative branch of government set forth the goals,
private institutions created methods for implementation, and the
administrative departments, with legislative assistance, worked
on enforcement. The implementation of affirmative action was
left to employing organizations, most of which have developed
affirmative action divisions or departments to create and monitor institutional policy. Thus, the policy was implemented in
thousands of businesses, agencies, and educational institutions
through their own structures and with varying levels of commitment and effectiveness. The government bureaucracy maintains
the power to sanction and the wielding of that power has apparently been sufficient to generate significant compliance. The
EEOC continues to investigate and adjudicate complaints, often
with substantial back log to its heavy load. Most states have
passed similar legislation and have created parallel agencies to
further ensure that affirmative action is carried out.
UnanticipatedConsequences
Executive Order 11246 did not single out specific sub-sections
of the population nor were financial resources set aside to implement the order. Instead, it simply authorized the EEOC to use
its good offices to monitor and assist institutions in developing
methods to achieve the general goal of the policy-to achieve
more equitable racial balances. The EEOC and the various state
commissions perform more of a judicial than legislative function,
monitoring the impact of the policy through the processing of
complaints. However, unlike the courts, the decision of one administrative body is not binding on the decisions of other bodies
adjudicating similar matters. Therefore, a body of "case law" does
not exist and comparable data are not available to contrast the
different ways in which the policy has been applied (Kraft, 1995).
As a policy, affirmative action attempts to enforce equal opportunity by monitoring the outcomes of the hiring and promotion processes of businesses. It is the responsibility of businesses
to demonstrate that they are in compliance with equal opportunity laws. In general, this internal process includes analyzing
employee utilization patterns in regard to women and minorities
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and submitting a plan to correct any identified under-utilization
(Lundberg, 1994). In implementation, under-utilization has been
applied to those situations in which a job category contains fewer
women or minorities than might be found based on their presence
in the available qualified labor pool. Corrective plans, which
"good faith" effort must address, are generally based on numerical goals and schedules.
Thirty-one years after employment discrimination was prohibited under the Civil Rights Act, the definition and manifestations of and remedies for discrimination remain elusive. The
nature of our policies and programs to combat discrimination
may be as responsible for this continuation as the entrenched
attitudes of the American public. Are we clear, as a society, about
what constitutes discrimination? And are there always remedies
available? What denotes a pool of "qualified" candidates?
Title VII of that Act simply fails to define discrimination. It
prohibits some specific practices, such as failing to hire because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but adds that it is an
"unlawful employment practice. . . otherwise to discriminate"
(42 U.S.C. 2000e, sec. 702(a)), without providing insight into the
meaning of this clause. In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company, expanded the definition of discrimination
to include not only intentional disparate treatment, but also unintentional practices which have an adverse impact on minorities
or women, such as requiring all applicants for particular jobs
to meet specified educational credentials (Burstein, 1994). Critics
have charged that this revised legal definition creates a situation
in which any negative labor market outcome can be interpreted to
be the result of discrimination. The result, it is argued, is reverse
racism, quotas, and an over concern with group representation
rather than individual justice (Burstein, 1994).
The Supreme Court has an inconsistent record in regard to
affirmative action although clarification of the policy is frequently
sought through this Court. For example, the charge of "reverse
discrimination" was clearly enunciated in the decision of Regents
of University of Californiav. Bakke (1978). Here, the Court ruled that
Alan Bakke was unfairly denied admission to the University of
California-Davis Medical School because his qualifications were
stronger than many minority candidates admitted to the school
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(Day, 1997). Court challenges continue through today, with interpretation subject to the vicissitudes of prevailing socio-political
values. In the 1997-98 session of the Supreme Court, the modernday counterpart of reverse discrimination claims was scheduled
to be heard, but an unprecedented out of court settlement caused
the case to be withdrawn. This case concerned a white school
teacher in Piscataway, New Jersey who was laid off as part of
personnel retrenchment in favor of a black teacher with the same
qualifications. Civil rights groups had anticipated an adverse
ruling by the Supreme Court and court experts believed that the
settlement only temporarily forestalled decisions which would
set affirmative action back (Holmes, 1997). Although the 1998-99
Supreme Court calendar does not include any major cases involving affirmative action, several cases are now being heard in state
courts which raise issues similar to those in the Piscataway case.
To date, the major impediments to the implementation of
affirmative action have been sociological, but political barriers are
surfacing which affect the ultimate outcome and future direction
of the policy, itself. The 1990s have seen a shift of politics to the
right. Republicans, who now control both houses of Congress,
are calling for an end to affirmative action. The courts, too, are
showing a willingness to chip away at the foundations of affirmative action. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the Supreme
Court ruled, in 1995, that federal programs or policies based
on race or ethnicity must meet a legal test of "strict scrutiny"
(Jaschik, 1995). This decision affects dozens of federal affirmative action programs which have benefitted minority students
or faculty members. California's ban on the use of racial and
gender preferences in hiring, contracting, and education, went
into effect in August, 1997(Schmidt & Lederman, 1997), despite
unsuccessful challenges through the courts (Schmidt, 1997). The
impact has already been felt in California. Minority admissions on
three campuses of the University of California were reported to
have dropped sharply for the freshman class of 1998, the first class
to be admitted since the ban on the use of racial preferences took
effect (Staff, 1998). In the four states in which affirmative action
can no longer be used in higher-education admissions (California, Louisana, Mississippi, and Texas) enrollment of members of
minority groups has dropped 17 percent (Campbell, 1997).
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The rhetoric focuses on instrumental values, e.g., you can't
fight discrimination with another form of discrimination. However, the debate fuels old prejudices and stereotypes, with claims
that it has stigmatized those whom it seeks to help (PeeblesWilkins, 1996). The arguments suggest the cyclical nature of societal values and the weight of conservatism now characteristic of
our citizens and their elected representatives. The shift in values
is evident in the following views:
° Race-conscious policies lead to preferential treatment and unfair advantages for some at the expense of others;
" Justice should entail equal opportunity for individuals, not
statistical parity for groups identified by government;
• Affirmative action gives some people in society benefits they
have not earned and do not deserve;
" The practice of filling "slots" designated for people of color sets
up for failure those hired into these positions;
" Practices that limit or deny opportunities to others lead to
heightened racial tensions;
" Minorities who are intended to profit from affirmative action
are hurt by the reinforcement of stereotypes; and
* Affirmative action excludes [white] individuals on the basis of
race, and hence constitutes reverse discrimination (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1994; Kraft, 1996; Peebles-Wilkins, 1996).
Such arguments lead logically to a repudiation of the compensatory features of affirmative action based on the legacy of past
discrimination and the goal of redressing resulting inequalities.
These views set the framework for the current and future debate
on affirmative action. Some want to end equal opportunity programs entirely; others want to bring about change, but disagree
about what constitutes equality of opportunity and how it can
best be achieved.
Many of these prevailing perceptions about affirmative action can be challenged on the basis of hard data. For example,
complaints of "reverse discrimination" by white males represent
less than two percent of all complaints made to human rights
commissions (Kinsley, 1995). There is no significant evidence to
indicate that individuals or groups are suffering as a consequence
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of these programs (Merida, 1995) or that economic productivity
and efficiency have declined. To the contrary, a study focused
the racial make-up of Chicago's largest corporations (including
Amoco, Beatrice, MacDonald's, Sears, and Quaker Oats) found,
in comparing productivity and efficiency of the participating
companies with percentage of minority workers, no significant
differences (McMillen, 1995). Unfortunately, "facts" do not necessarily alter perceptions, particularly with an emotional-laden
issue. The extent of emotionalism is evident in the pervasive
misconceptions about affirmative action-that it is a single policy
with one purpose, that it concerns racial issues only, and that
preferential treatment of some groups over others is the only
(unacceptable) option (Skrenty, 1998).
The weight of public opinion and recent supportive judicial
and legislative actions supporting an end to affirmative action as
we know it are suggestive of a building momentum for change.
The social welfare community needs to acknowledge this political reality, rooted as it is in prevailing values. With recognition
that affirmative action has not fully resolved inequities among
the races, we need to promote the examination of alternatives
within a social justice framework. Anti-discrimination needs to
be defined in terms of the larger public good (that which is in
the interest of all segments of society), rather than as competition
between individual or group interests. The problem needs to be
reframed in a way that better addresses the educational, social and
economic conditions which continue to challenge the concepts of
a society that espouses equality and equity for all.
WHERE DOES THE SOCIAL
WELFARE COMMUNITY STAND?
The social welfare community has, not surprisingly, asserted a
position in favor of affirmative action, but without noticeable dialogue about the broader mandate for change or possible directions
of such change. The NASW Code of Ethics (1996a, p. 27) is explicit
in regard to a proactive professional position on discrimination:
Social workers should promote ... policies that safeguard the
rights of and confirm equity and social justice for all people. But
what does this mean? What policies should be promoted? How?
By whom?
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In August 1996, the NASW Delegate Assembly endorsed a
policy statement affirming NASW's support of affirmative action
as a tool to prevent and eliminate discrimination. Included among
the principles set forth in this statement is that "social workers
should join others to denounce attempts to end affirmative action
initiatives" (1996b, p. 3). Such principles suggest that social work
efforts should be directed to maintaining current policy, surely an
unrealistic and perhaps counterproductive professional stance.
Simply stated, ongoing verbalizations of our support for affirmative action as currently stipulated in public policy point to a
level of political naivete. To assert "keep things as they are" in a
socio-political environment in which the reverse (radical change
or total demolishing) is being forcefully pursued implies our own
brand of inflexibility
More in line with a proactive position which recognizes
the mandate for change are two other principles contained in
the NASW statement: "Changes in affirmative action should
strengthen practice and policy aimed at ending discrimination
and its impact" (1996b, p. 4), and "Social workers should work
with others to develop more effective and cogent policies and
strategies to guide society and communities to strengthen affirmative action". Even here, such broad mandates lack the level of
specificity and direction needed to serve as a guide to professional
behavior.
Social workers need to be able to actively apply social plannew
ning knowledge and policy development skills to identify
the
to
expertise
its
lend
solutions. Further, social work must
collection and analysis of empirical data on the outcomes of
The
past, present, and future approaches to end discrimination.
may
credibility of the profession in the affirmative action debate
practice,
our
through
well depend on being able to document,
the continued negative impact of discrimination and, conversely,
the positive outcomes of anti-discrimination strategies. The proto an
fession must also be clear about its potential contributions
interdisciplinary dialogue.
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attributed to the fact that alternatives are not only difficult to
identify, but are also far more complex than affirmative action in
terms of value issues, policy content, and program interventions.
Intra and inter-disciplinary arenas for discussion include:
targeting specific professions that interface with the inner city
African-American underclass; reframing the purpose of affirmative action from that of correcting injustice for the victims of
racial discrimination to social engineering, and targeting specific
geographical areas which are characterized by economic deprivation. These arenas do not purport to be solutions, per se, but
rather broad categories of potential intervention in which specific
options may be considered.
THE FUTURE: OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
Some possible directions for change that maintain the integrity and intent of the original policy can be gleaned from a
sociological perspective. Discrimination goes beyond the decision making of individual employers; it is rooted in institutional
racism that has denied minorities not only access to jobs, but to
education and training, as well (Burstein, 1994). Although there is
a growing African-American middle class and blacks have made
educational and economic inroads, there is a growing underclass.
African-Americans are disproportionately under-represented
in the labor market at all levels and in higher education. Social workers know this intuitively and anecdotally, since the
consequences of under- and unemployed are seen in the lives
of the clients we serve. A recent study demonstrated that although blacks are closing the gap in educational disparity visa-vis whites, they are losing ground with jobs (Rich, 1995). Data
also show that where African-Americans do hold jobs, there is
a disparity in pay for the same work between black and white
Americans. College educated black men earn, on average, 76 percent of what their white counterparts earn (Walsh, 1995). A study
conducted by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management found that
African-American federal employees were two and a half times
more likely to be fired than white employees, even when variables
such as age, education, and years of experience were controlled
(Barr, 1995). The highest levels of management remain almost
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all white and male (Kilborn, 1995). African-Americans comprise
10 percent of the work force, but only 4 percent of physicians, 3
percent of lawyers and architects, and 2 percent of airline pilots
(Cohn & Vobejda, 1993). African-Americans remain largely absent
from the most prestigious private sector jobs.
These troubling statistics suggest that the problem is more farreaching than opportunity disparity. These data negate a compensatory approach to address past discrimination and suggest that
a socio-economic model may be more viable. The consequences
of large numbers of minorities who are in poverty and who do
not contribute to the economy or the culture affect all of us. We all
suffer from the drain on our productivity, the reality that many
do not share the tax burdens of society, and the manifestations
of poverty-including rising crime rates and drug abuse (Kraft,
1996). These consequences of discrimination suggest the enormity of the social justice issues still to be addressed. Dialogue
that acknowledges these socio-economic disparities reframe the
repetoire of alternative remedies by focusing on assistance to the
most victimized, with program eligibility criteria grounded in
economic need rather than gender or racial category.
Reframing the Purpose
The current debate about affirmative action revolves around
our responsibility to correct the injustices of the past and promote
social justice for the future. The left argues that society is to blame
for centuries of slavery and generations of discrimination. The
right argues that there are no excuses for individuals' failure to
take responsibility for their lives and the lives of their families.
This focus is counter-productive, as it promotes blame rather than
change.
What is undeniable is that a growing black underclass hurts
all Americans and any policy that changes this condition will
serve all of us. The key to this approach is to generate a respect
for different points of view and approaches and a willingness
to subject such approaches to empirical testing. If the left wants
the right to agree to strategies which emphasize the provision
of help and resources, then the left must be willing to attempt
programs which are strict and include enforceable sanctions. A
potential path for success is to start with an acknowledgment that
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there is a serious problem affecting the whole of society, that we
do not now know what the solutions are, but that solutions are
identifiable if we are willing to explore and experiment (Kraft,
1996). Social work needs to enter this dialogue with coalitions of
other professions and politicians. Social engineering to achieve
change in norms, mores and social institutions (Barker, 1995)
needs to be approached purposefully, with societal manipulation
a positive rather than negative goal. Social work has much to
contribute in terms of anecdotal successes and a burgeoning
empirical research base pertaining to social justice issues. Further,
the skills of social workers in mediation and negotiation can
assist those whose views are at polar ends to identify and build
consensus around areas in which there is agreement.
Targeting GeographicalAreas
New social programs aimed at increasing opportunities ought
to be piloted in those areas which are creating the highest social
cost. These areas tend to be urban, largely minority in composition, with high crime and poverty ratios. The number of arrests,
number of people receiving social service benefits, and number
of school drop-outs are easy to quantify and serve as benchmarks
for assessing the success or failure of programs. The application
of appropriate research methods can provide a relatively low-cost
indicator of the potential of new programs for success, with equal
attention to measuring the outcomes of interventions.
A concurrent strategy in targeted neighborhoods is to actuate
the principles of community organizing and change, principles
widely heralded within social work yet largely downplayed in an
overwhelmingly clinical profession. Empowering communities
to create their own affirmative circumstances through self-help
networks, community economic development, and the use of
political power warrant renewed experimentation, also subject
to empirical testing. Such tenets fit with a socio-economic base
for the development of new initiatives to achieve equality.
The remaining question is: who is going to accomplish these
social experiments? It is becoming increasingly clear that government cannot continue to be relied upon as the source of ideas
or the funder of programs. Partnerships between the not-forprofit sector and business have been highly successful in other

Affirmative Action

169

ventures, but have not been adequately explored in the area of
social engineering. Such partnerships are worthy of pursuit.
Targeting Specific Professions
If one of the major sociological problems inherent in racial
issues concerns the motivation of the oppressed and disadvantaged, as some have alleged in the most recent welfare
reform debate, certainly their exposure to people who look
like them and who occupy the jobs and social positions with
which they most frequently interface would have an important
impact.
Social work can and should be a model for other professions.
The ability of the profession to relate to the communities it serves
suggests the imperative of a more diverse human services labor
force. The composition of the profession must be brought more
in line with the proportion of clients served by social workers who are racial minorities. The current profile of AfricanAmericans in the social work profession (at least in regard to
the NASW membership) reflects less than one-half of the 11.8
percent that this group comprises of the U.S. population (Gibelman & Schervish, 1997). These numbers are unacceptable for a
profession that would like to see itself in the vanguard of progressive social change. Strategies to recruit ethnic minorities into
the profession deserve greater attention and resources. Schools
of social work have an essential role to play in recruiting ethnic
minorities through outreach and scholarships. This means reaching potential students earlier (perhaps in high school) and more
effectively "Marketing" social work as a career has never been
more important. More concentrated efforts to promote diversity
within social work will be a signal to others of our commitment
in action as well as in words.
Similarly, the teaching profession is crucial in terms of its
interface with African-Americans. A large percentage of AfricanAmericans teaching African-Americans would have a significant
impact on creating hope and motivation. Other important professional groups to target include police, attorneys, and correctional
officers. Targeting efforts ought to go well beyond scholarships
and slots, and extend to early identification of potential candidates for these professions and the provision of information
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and incentives that would encourage youth at the time they are
forming opinions about the course of their future.
The social welfare community needs to increase its expertise
in using the media to promote the visibility of these professions
and the opportunities they afford for African-Americans. During 1997, an NBC public service announcement series, featuring African-American and other actors of some fame, promoted
teaching as a profession. Other professions need this type of
visibility and promotion.
Intra-ProfessionalChange
The consequences of discrimination are widely known to
the social welfare community. The problems of under and unemployed, of poor education and skill deficits, poverty, substance
abuse, inadequate housing, family breakdown, and lives of despair play out in various ways in the presenting problems of
the people with whom social workers work. Despite the overwhelming evidence that major stress factors are related to socioenvironmental problems, of which discrimination is a notable
example, the major emphasis in social work practice continues
to be on the nurturing services, such as mental health counseling,
that reflect a focus on "fixing the individual" rather than on
sustaining services which view problems and interventions as
grounded in societal causes and societal solutions. The "person
in environment" perspective, which holds claim as the theoretical
base of social work practice, falls short in implementation, with
the person too often the sole center of attention, while the effects
of the environment are ignored. As noted by Greene (1991, p. 9),
"the clear integration of a seemingly dual perspective on both the
theoretical and action levels sometimes seem to have eluded the
profession". Haynes (1998) clarifies that the it is not a question
of social reform or individual treatment; the two foci need not be
mutually exclusive and divisive.
Thus, there is a substantial and long-standing discrepancy
between the content of policy statements issued by professional
associations representing social workers and the actions and interventions of professionals who work with the disenfranchised.
This lament is not new and the predominance of a clinical focus within the profession seems to grow continuously stronger
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(Gibelman & Schervish, 1997). Specht and Courtney (1994) devoted an entire book to chastising the profession for its abandonment of a systems-change perspective. Haynes and Mickelson
(1997) continue to echo the belief that the profession has adopted
a "dispassionate, objective, and apolitical stance" (p. xiii). They
urge, in a spirit similar to Specht and Courtney, that "advocacy
become the central mission of our professional association, a
mandated standard for all social work practice, and a daily part
of every social worker's experience" (p. xiv).
The obligation of professional associations, schools of social
work, and practice agencies to teach, encourage, and allow political practice must go beyond lip service. The predominant interest
of social workers in clinical practice, the realities of limited time
and funds for advocacy activity, and the pressures upon human
service organizations to focus on only reimbursable activities
highlight some of the reasons why there is a substantial gap
between wLat the social work professes and what it does. The
credibility of the social welfare community to be legitimate players in shaping the anti-discrimination policies and programs of
the future depends on the extent to which the dual perspective can
be realigned to emphasize both the person and the environment.
CONCLUSION
The examples of possible avenues of intervention discussed
above place the social welfare community in a position to contribute, from a social justice perspective, to deliberations about the
future course of anti-discrimination efforts. The ongoing dismantling of affirmative action raises fundamental questions about
the future of this society. Policy practice, much heralded as an
essential component of social work practice, provides the basis
for a more active leadership role in the debate. Inherent in such
practice is the mandate to inform politicians about the effects of
discrimination, as garnered through the day-to-day work of social
workers with disenfranchised groups. Collecting and aggregating such data is both realistic and necessary and can provide an
important counter-argument to those who urge dismantling of
affirmative action without first identifying how its aims can be
achieved through other means.
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The conditions which led to the need for affirmative action
have been unrelenting in their persistence. The situation for many,
if not most African-Americans and other minorities has improved
only marginally and sometimes not at all (Day, 1997). The opinion
of Justice Thurgood Marshall in Regents of University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) included this testimonial to the continuous need to pursue a course of equal opportunity, no matter
what its form:
"If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one
in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the
opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing to take
steps to open those doors. (as cited in Ezorsky, 1991, p. 133)"
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Book Reviews
Barry D. Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Andre Krouwel
(Eds.), The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics:National
Imprints of a Worldwide Movement. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press, 1999. $59.95 hardcover, $22.95 papercover.
Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel wanted to provide an overview of both existing lesbian and gay social-political movements
and to place these movements into an historical context. They
acknowledge that little work has been done in this field, and, in
an effort to explore the phenomenon of gay and lesbian politics
form a worldwide perspective, the editors provided what they
call "portraits" of fourteen countries. To ensure a global perspective, countries from each of the five continents are included. The
attempt to present a global perspective related to lesbian and gay
political and social movements is an ambitious one and the editors
have done a laudable job of exploring content that has been largely
overlooked by other scholars.
The 318 page, indexed text includes introductory and summary chapters authored by the editors and 12 chapters that include content from the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina,
Britain, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Romania, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, South Africa, Japan, and Australia. A total of 17
different authors contributed to this effort, and while there is some
unevenness in chapter length and scholarship, the book is fascinating if one has an interest in gay and lesbian political, historical,
or social movements. There are several recurring themes woven
throughout chapters that focus on specific countries. Specifically
related to the country being analyzed, themes include: legal issues, an historical overview of the lesbian and gay movements,
AIDS and its impact, political realities, and differences between
lesbian and gay men's views and approaches.
Most of the authors try and link their essays to existing theoretical or conceptual frameworks thereby demonstrating how
lesbian and gay sociopolitical activities fit into existing constructs.
And the overarching theme has to be viewed as one of empowerment. Across the globe political activism in gay and lesbian
175
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communities has evolved from small groups meeting in household kitchens to national demonstrations and parades. Once denied legal rights, lesbians and gay men on every continent are
demanding personal freedom. Continuing hate crimes, lingering
discrimination, and ongoing homophobia shadow these positive
outcomes. But the themes of resiliency and determination are
clearly evident.
The book has many strengths. Each chapter has been well
researched and includes notes and references. It is generally well
written and easily read. The reader must be prepared to move
through it slowly only because there is a vast amount of content included. The final summative chapter does a fine job of
synthesizing, comparing, and contrasting earlier materials which
helps the reader integrate content. There are some weaknesses
too. There is a tendency for some authors to rely heavily on
secondary references when exploring history and some of the
chapters were written four years before the book ever reached
the press. Therefore, one must trust that the data from the original sources has been accurately portrayed and then correctly
interpreted by the current authors (sometimes a quantum leap).
Further, one must be aware that some of the materials are dated
and perhaps do not reflect current ideology (or even country
structure). Some chapters are hard to read simply because of the
extensive use of acronyms. For those who are monolingual, when
the acronym's letters do not fit the actual title, it may become
confusing.
In a world of diversity, this book should find a home first
in the libraries of queer scholars and then in the offices of sociologists, political scientists, and historians. Its worldwide perspective should make The Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics
of interest beyond the United States as its major themes have
importance for wherever lesbians and gay men are struggling
for legal and human rights, and its historical analysis provides
tips for emerging gay and lesbian sociopolitical organizations and
movements.
Carol T. Tully
Tulane University
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Roger Goodman, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon (Eds.), The
East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalismand the State. New
York: Routledge, 1998. $90.00 hardcover, $29.99 papercover.
This collection of papers examines five Asian countries
(namely Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea;
China is included as contrast) and attempts to answer the question
whether there is an East Asian welfare model. There are two other
research questions: First, how does one explain the structure and
dynamics of East Asian welfare systems and second, is the East
Asian welfare experience worthy of emulation in other countries
facing the challenge of welfare reform? In its attempt to answer
these questions, the book is divided into three parts: an overview
on Welfare Orientalism, a review of East Asian welfare systems,
and country case studies.
The book reveals that the Eat Asian countries constitute a
distinct welfare experience with some common elements but they
are far from homogeneous. They find that:"with regard to its
relevance to Western societies, and Britain in particular, we are
comparing chalk and cheese." (p. 20) Cultural explanation for
welfare development in terms of Confucianism is dismissed as
unhelpful and ideological. Welfare programs are often introduced
by those in power with political motives. Welfare spending is
considered wasteful by the governments and funded systems are
set up to get financial resources for investment in industry and
infrastructure.
The relevance of this collection should be placed in the current
ideological context. Under the challenge from neo-liberalism, the
welfare state in the advanced industrialized countries has been in
disarray. This has driven policy-makers and researchers to seek
policy alternatives. With very spectacular economic development
since 1970's, the East Asian countries have impressed the world.
Not surprisingly, their successful welfare system is brought up
by the both the Conservative Party and Labour Party in Britain
as possible model for emulation.
For a long time, comparative policy analysts who theorize rigorously on the basis of research findings from the advanced western countries have completely neglected East Asian countries,
either treating them as developing societies which fall outside
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their scope of analysis or contending that these countries will
sooner or later be like the industrialized countries in all respects.
There is thus a lamentable void in comparative social policy
analysis. Seen in this perspective, this book is most timely. As
it stands, it is an invitation to the emerging field of social welfare
in Asia and a pioneering guide to this relatively unknown terrain.
This book has a number of strengths. The two introductory
chapters are particularly interesting. The first by Goodman and
White set the stage by thoroughly and perceptively reviewing
their idea of Welfare Orientalism. The cultural explanation of
welfare development is extensively reviewed. They find that it
only imbues certain basic societal features with a sense of timelessness and serves to marginalize other forms of explanations.
The importance of the state cannot be overemphasized: "Most
notable is the strategic role of states in directing a process of
economic development with distributive as well as growth objectives, resulting in a relatively egalitarian pattern of income
distribution compared with other industrializing regions such as
Latin America." (p. 13) The second chapter by Huck-ju Kwon is
a comparative analysis of their welfare development. Rejecting
the relevance of public expenditure approach, this paper rightly
focuses on the role of the state and the political dynamics of the
evolution of the individual welfare systems.
The main criticism of this volume is one that can be directed
at many edited books: its struggle to integrate the chapters under
a central theme. This is particularly true for the six country case
studies. Although Kwon promises that: "The directions in which
they are likely to go-and implicitly whether they are likely to
go along similar paths-is the subject of the individual country case-studies" (p. 67), most chapters (except Tremewan's and
Goodman's chapters) only look at one particular welfare policy.
Christopher Tremewan in Chapter 3 gives an analysis of social
welfare development in Singapore, emphasizing the manipulation of welfare by an authoritarian regime. Chapter 4, written
by Huck-ju Kwon, shows the South Korean pension program as
a means of legitimation and the impending financial problems.
Yeun-wen Ku examines Taiwan's National Health Insurance in
Chapter 5 and attributes its development to democratization, a
decline of Kuomingtang (the party in power) authority and social
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movement. Roger Goodman in Chapter 6 looks at minseiiin system
in Japan which represents a compromise between professional
and voluntary institutions. Next, Nelson Chow examines Hong
Kong's social security and surmises that a provident fund will be
introduced by the new government. Finally, Gordon White looks
at China's pension reform and concludes that China seems to converge toward the East Asian welfare system which emphasizes
self-sufficiency, personal savings and hard work.
Moreover, while some contributors blend comparative literature with their country studies, other supplies no more than an
insider's cursory look at his own social welfare development.
Overall, labor welfare, a key element which carries much political connotations in Asia, is not sufficiently explored. Despite
these shortcomings, there are two chapters which are thoughtprovoking. White breaks new ground in his discussion of China's
social security reform by linking this issue up with the social
development perspective. Tremewan's analysis of Singapore is
a fine example of how critical thinking is applied to examine
welfare development of an Asian city-state.
Overall, this is an important addition to the field of comparative social policy. It is the best one on East Asia that is available. A
theoretical introduction to comparative social policy analysis and
discussion of the various models of social welfare would make it
more readable. A spate of comparative reports on Asian welfare is
on the horizon. The quality of this volume will ensure that it will
be an essential reader for many years to come. As the leading text,
it will provide insights to researchers who examine the nature and
development of East Asian welfare.
Kwong-leung Tang
University of Northern British Columbia

Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise (Eds.), Social Security and
Retirement Around the World. Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1999. $62.00 hardcover. [June 1, 1999].
The relationship between social security programs and labor
participation rates of older persons has been a subject of considerable attention in cross-national research for the past several
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decades. The literature has lent credibility to a number of plausible causal relationships between labor force activity and social
security benefit provisions. However, none has been conclusive.
There continues to be debate and dialogue on exactly how much
of a role benefit provisions in social security systems, particularly
old-age pensions, play in an individual's decision to stop or reduce their work activity when they become eligible for benefits.
The debate often centers around a number factors that seem
to influence decisions and, consequently, labor force participation
rates: the level of the benefit amount; health care coverage; early
retirement options based on age or disability; monetary penalties
assessed against the pension for continuing work; job satisfaction
in the place of employment; health conditions of the individual
or family members; working conditions; auxiliary sources of income that enhance the value of a public pension; and a range
of quality of life issues (more time with family, care of a family
member, hobbies, etc.). Determining which of these factors or mix
of multiple factors has the most influence is a daunting task. The
challenge is made all the more formidable by the difficulty of
developing an analytical framework that does more than merely
describe predominant trends and patterns on a case by case basis
in selected countries.
There is no general agreement on suitable analytical comparative models that tend to reflect the biases of professional
disciplines and government policy analysts with backgrounds in
economics, sociology, or public policy. Nevertheless, almost any
empirical evidence of how individual decisions are influenced
by particular program provisions is welcomed by policy makers
who seek to make informed decisions that are likely to impact
retirement decisions. Such information is particularly timely in
today's political and economic environment given the pressures
of government in all industrialized countries to explore measure to reduce expenditures for old-age pension programs (and
health benefits) in the face of unfavorable demographic shifts
that have been accompanied by early entitlement provisions for
benefits.
This text approaches the challenge by relating the documented
decline in labor force participation rates to social security provisions in eleven industrial nations. Each country study provides an
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overview of historical trends and a description of the institutional
aspects of the social security old-age pension. The analytical
framework used to provide a comparative context to the study
is a detailed examination of the inherent social security program
incentives that appear to influence retirement behavior. The analysis for each country is partially based on a simulation model
using economic variables to calculate social security wealth in
the country. In general, social security wealth is a reference to
benefit accrual minus taxes or payroll contributions paid in partial
retirement.
The discussion in each chapter provides an abundance of very
valuable descriptive and explanatory information in a historical
context. Graphs and charts are used to illustrate trends and patterns related to specific public and private program provisions.
The data clearly show that options for early retirement and a
generous benefit package have influenced choices about working
and receiving old-age benefits over the past several decades,
contributing to a significant decline in labor force participation
rates among older men.
The comparative analysis framework has an economic orientation giving heavy weight to economic determinants in decisions
about work and full or partial withdrawal from the labor force.
Some consideration is given to the influence of related social and
health factors that may impact decisions, but there is sparse attention to a large body of literature that suggests health and quality of
life issues have a major impact on retirement decisions. Another
limitation in the study to understanding overall retirement trends
is that there is insufficient comparative analysis of data on women
labor force participation rates and retirement patterns. Most of the
cross-country data and analyses are based on the experiences of
men due to logistical difficulties in interpretation for similar data
on women in the labor force.
Despite these shortcomings, the book is highly recommended
for the serious student of retirement age trends and social security
old-age pension policies of industrial nations in a cross-national
context.
Martin B. Tracy
Southern Illinois University
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David Stoesz, Charles Guzzetta and Mark Lusk, International
Development. Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999. $56.67 hardcover.
The challenge of identifying and implementing development
strategies which promote economic progress while successfully
addressing problems of mass poverty and social deprivation has
spurned a vast literature over the past four decades. Reductionist
modernization and Marxist meta-theories with their blueprint
solutions have given way to a multi-institutional third way' which
combines the attributes of State and civil society as well as a range
of international institutions. The present volume represents a
useful, if at times frustrating, addition to this debate by searching
for elements of what the authors term an integrative model of
development', which incorporates broad-based economic and
social development goals with environmental sustainability.
The first four chapters provide an overview of the colonial
history, post-War development experience and current development tasks facing Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern
Europe. Necessarily concise, they are however extremely useful
summaries for non-specialists, although the treatment of Latin
America is the thinnest and merits more space. These accounts
underline the extent to which rapacious colonial greed on the
part of European powers, combined with dictatorship, corruption
and genocide (especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the socalled fourth world') has led to patterns of distorted development
whose problems now seem so intractable. In one sense, they
belie the claim made in the book's introduction that the authors
present a reasoned optimism about the prospect of international
development' (p. xi).
However, the prospects for international development appear
brighter in the following sections, which consider a number of
strategies and case studies showing exactly what can be achieved
through creative thought and action. Chapter 5 provides a fascinating account of the work of Catholic and Protestant missionaries in their ambiguous historical roles, colonizing the minds
of indigenous peoples while promoting economic development.
Some mention is made of their progressive development work
since the 1970s but this aspect is greatly underplayed and deserves far more attention from the author in this section, given its
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importance in relation to the application of Liberation Theology
in Latin America and close associations with the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Chapter 7 contains a wideranging treatment of community development in both the North
and South but much of it is abstract and there is too little analysis
of actual program experiences in the developing world. Although
the importance of NGOs in this context is acknowledged there is,
surprisingly, little discussion of how traditional, State-directed
community development has given way to radical grassroots
movements for social and environmental action in defense of
people's livelihoods. A link could also have been made here with
the subsequent chapter on sustainable development', a process
in which community-based movements and NGOs have in many
instances become partners and an essential linchpin in the quest
for equitable, non-destructive and non-polluting strategies.
Further chapters examine a series of creative attempts to overcome the obstacles to development generated by prejudice, discrimination and bureaucracy. The pioneering work undertaken
by Rebecca Adamson with the First Nations Development Institute on behalf of Native Americans and other indigenous groups,
described in Chapter 10, should inspire young practitioners and
activists everywhere. Likewise, the success of the Grameen Bank
micro-credit program in Bangladesh and several other countries,
as well as of the Habitat for Humanity low-cost housing scheme,
illustrate what can be achieved through sheer perseverance and
dogged determination by committed individuals in the face of
all the odds. Although not without their critics, of course, these
ventures have yielded highly positive economic and social returns for deprived communities, something which many of the
multi-million dollar schemes funded by mainstream official development agencies have often failed to achieve.
The volume has some quirks. Sections dealing with development theories and with the measurement of economic and
social advancement-or lack of it-(6 and 13 respectively) should
have been grouped together. An introductory chapter (rather than
just a brief foreword) setting out the central theme and synthesizing the central arguments would have been helpful. Despite
the book's valid and well-documented criticisms of Capitalism
and Communism, there is no discussion of post-modernism, the
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power of agency or stucturation theory. Some coverage of these
newer theoretical frameworks would have helped to provide a
conceptual basis for analysis of the changing roles of the State,
community, the church and NGOs in the development process.
The volume refers continually to Malthusian notions of demographic pressure as a source of poverty and environmental degradation. Yet relatively little weight seems to be given to other,
arguably more critical factors such as structural obstacles at both
domestic and international levels as well as severe policy bias in
all economic and social sectors which marginalizes the poor.
The final chapter, entitled An Integrative Model of Development', promises much but delivers little. It is something of an
anti-climax, since the reader is really not much wiser about what
actually constitutes the stated ideal of integrative' (or integrated')
development. Indeed, although meant to underpin the volume,
it is defined only in very general terms and is mentioned just
briefly in the foreword and merits barely two pages in the final section. Integrative' development seems to equate with the
UNDP's notion of Human Development', which is quoted in support. Yet integrative development' remains an elusive conceptfine practice but difficult in theory! It is to be hoped that any
subsequent volume from the authors would develop this concept
more centrally and comprehensively. However, in spite of the
above-mentioned shortcomings, the book contains much valuable material to inform and provoke development policy-makers
and practitioners into working for a better world.
Anthony Hall
London School of Economics and Political Science

Jane Waldfogel, The Future of Child Protection. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998. $39.95 hardcover.
The field of child protective services (CPS), and scholarly
examination of it, invokes deep passions and fears, involving as
it does the safety of children as well as abiding suspicions of the
poor. "Child protection" has come to mean protection of children
from their parents, and in practice, CPS interventions have predominantly been directed toward impoverished families.
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For many years now, amongst those who have been engaged
in CPS and/or study it, there has been widespread agreement
and concern that CPS dominates the child welfare system in the
United States, and that there is a continuing crisis in that system's abilities (or inabilities) to protect children, and to preserve
families or otherwise provide children with permanent living
arrangements.
Much has been written about these issues, and individuals
and committees have made various recommendations to "reform" the system in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Jane Waldfogel, in writing her book, draws partly on the
deliberations of one of these groups, of which she was a member,
the so-called Executive Session on CPS at Harvard's Kennedy
School of Government, funded by the Annie E. Casey and Edna
McConnell Clark Foundations. In the process, she exhibits a very
competent personal grasp of the recent literature pertaining to
many aspects of the crisis, and presents a good summarization of
recent facts and controversies, particularly those concerning the
"front end" of the system.
Waldfogel gives us a carefully drawn and statistically detailed
overview of recent trends in the annual volume of reports of
alleged child abuse and neglect received by CPS agencies, the
sources of such reports, the demographics of the children involved, and percentages (that constitute a descending order) of
reports that are screened in, "substantiated," prompt the opening
of cases, and involve child removal. Moreover, while focusing
on the United States, she provides a comparative analysis with
Canada, Britain, and Australia on all or most of these variables,
although noteworthy here is how surprisingly minor are the differences revealed. CPS systems in these countries and ours seem
to be far more alike than different.
Waldfogel accurately and fairly analyzes recent and current
debates (and their implications) concerning overreporting, underreporting, subsequent underinclusion and overinclusion of
families in the system, and the crisis of system overcapacity. She
considers "front end" alternatives for change, such as narrowing
the gateway to CPS intervention at the point of reporting, screening, and/or investigation, and perhaps coupling this with the
building of an alternative service delivery system. Waldfogel opts
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for a "differential response" paradigm that she claims would include these elements, in addition to "a community-based system,
in which CPS continues to play the lead role"; modifications of the
processes through which case-specific assessments and service
plans are developed; and a more active role for "informal and
natural helpers" in prevention of child maltreatment "in partnership with CPS." She is not unfair in her brief portrayals of recent
alternative proposals, and demonstrates considerable awareness
of the weaknesses of the proposal that she puts forth here.
However, although Waldfogel is fully aware that operating
definitions of abuse and neglect vary greatly even from worker
to worker, throughout the book she refers to and compares statistics concerning children who were "abused and neglected," in
tacit acceptance of some presumed common meaning. Similarly,
credence is given to statistics concerning "substantiated" reports
although, in practice, the "substantiation" process is highly variable and arbitrary. There is little discussion here of the process
itself or of what "substantiation" means. Likewise, there is little
discussion of the foster care system and adoption, of why very sizable proportions of all impoverished children are removed from
their homes and placed in foster care, or of the costs involved.
Currently, the CPS system is forced to institute "differential
responses," that is, it is obliged to turn away many cases, simply
because of the overwhelming volume of reports that it has generated for itself. This in itself is not reform. Moreover, although
Waldfogel contends that her paradigm differs sharply from the
current CPS approach, it merely extends it. While CPS would keep
for its own caseload only "high risk" cases, it would maintain
oversight over everything, and families would be "reassessed"
on an ongoing basis. "Community partner agencies" and "family
and community members" would be enlisted as coercive social
control agents for "protective oversight" and "shared responsibility." The CPS gateway to "services" would straddle child welfare
even more extensively than it does today, with the possibility of
net-widening in terms of the CPS caseload itself. This will appeal
to those who believe that if we don't keep a vigilant and menacing
eye over the poor, who knows what horrible things they'll do.
Her suggestions for change confuse social work with coercion
(which she politely terms "the use of authority"). Waldfogel is
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partial to collaborations, collaborative processes, and "partnerships," even with the very families that the system coerces. But
to speak of "partnerships" between the coercively powerful CPS
and the powerless impoverished families reported to it is to raise
further questions of meaning. In addition, there is the problem of
the further diffusion of responsibility and diminishment of any
agency's accountability that "sharing" CPS responsibility with
other agencies entails.
Finally, although many of the examples of collaborative procedures that Waldfogel favorably describes in Britain, New Zealand,
and some states have been in place for some time now, we are
given only anecdotal evidence of what participants (workers,
police, and others) say about their cross-training, team-working,
collaborating, and partnering. There is little discussion of actual
outcomes in terms of impact on children and families. One starts
to wonder if "collaboration" is an end in itself. Nonetheless, there
are some suggestions here that any commissioner of child welfare
would be wise to take under consideration.
It is time to reexamine the deeper issues that CPS terminology
and statistics tend to obscure. The level of explicit discussion must
shift to that of underlying values, political philosophy, attitudes
toward the poor, the political meaning of "authority," the nature
of social justice, and what we mean by social services and social
work. If it does not, the future of child protection is dim, indeed.
This book does not confront these matters but, if read along with
work from other sides of the debate, might help us to see the need
to move forward to this level of discussion.
Leroy H. Pelton
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
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Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Recasting Egalitarianism:New
Rules for Communities, States and Markets. New York: Verso,
1999. $13.00 papercover.
The ideal of equality is central to the agenda of those on the left
of the political spectrum. Liberals, social democrats and Marxists
have all argued that social well-being and human contentment
can only be achieved if inequalities in society are significantly reduced. In the past, various policy instruments have been adopted
to promote greater equality. Employment generation, job security,
wage bargaining, progressive taxation and the provision of publicly funded social services have all helped to reduce disparities
in income and wealth. However, in recent times, the quest for
greater equality has been stalled by the claim that these and other
egalitarian measures stifle economic growth. Their arguments
have been persuasive. Today, political leaders and electorates
believe that the need for economic development is greater than
the drive for equality. As a result of changes to the tax system, the
weakening of labor unions and retrenchments in the social services, the degree of inequality in American society has increased
substantially during the last two decades.
In this important book, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
propose a new strategy for promoting equality. This strategy
is based on the recognition that income redistribution policies
are unlikely to secure political support. Instead, they argue that
a strategy based on asset redistribution has a good chance of
success. Four components of an asset redistribution strategy are
outlined. They include the creation of worker-owned firms, the
promotion of home ownership, the provision of educational
vouchers and the adoption of policies that give children access
to parental property.
In addition to outlining their proposals, Bowles and Gintis
invited 16 social scientists and philosophers to comment on their
ideas. Unfortunately for egalitarians, these commentaries suggest
that however ingenious Bowles and Gintis's proposals may be,
they suffer from numerous difficulties and are unlikely to result
189
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in a significant reversal in current thinking about economic development and equality. Nevertheless, Bowles and Gintis may
have initiated a debate that could have far reaching repercussions.
Their clear explication of how a grossly unequal society harms the
well-being of ordinary people may be persuasive in fostering an
egalitarian agenda that is electorally palatable.
Myra Marx Ferree, Judith Lorber and Beth B. Hess (Eds.), Revisioning Gender. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999.
$72.00 hardcover, $34.95 papercover.
Feminist scholarship in sociology has expanded rapidly over
the last twenty or so years. This expansion has moved steadily
along a trajectory of shifting gender analysis from the margins
of sociological interest to its very center. Today feminist scholars
insist that gender be viewed as a central element in all sociological
research. Since gender is a central element of social life, the gender
lens must be applied to all sociological questions.
As the editors of this book point out, sociology has not yet
reached the stage where gender is central to its concerns. While
gender inquiry is today given much more prominence than before, it is still viewed as a specialized field within the discipline. To
attain centrality, they urge feminists scholars to continue to stress
the importance of gender in all sociological and indeed, social science research. Irrespective of whether social science investigation
is concerned with issues closely associated with gender, such as
the family or employment, or with less obviously relevant issues
such as economic development, social policy or law, gender must
be fully integrated into the research agenda.
To promote this goal, this book offers a broad overview of
the current state of feminist scholarship. Based on a summer
conference funded by the American Sociological Association, it
provides an commendably comprehensive account of the field. Its
sixteen chapters cover a wide range of topics. These are grouped
into five major categories dealing with the conceptualization of
gender; gender and social policy; science and gender; gender and
sexuality; bodies, gender and sport; gender and culture and so
on. The list is impressive.
Equally impressive is the way most of the authors summarize
their topics in a readable and engaging way, and successfully
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avoid obfuscating the narrative with jargon. For this reason, the
book should appeal not only to academics but to all those who
are interested in contemporary social questions. For example,
the chapters on gender and globalization, and gender and the
welfare state do not focus exclusively on the gender dimension,
but succeed in summarizing the field in its entirety successfully
demonstrating that gender issues cannot be relegated to the margins of social policy discourse. The authors also show that their
subject is exceedingly complex and that it contains few simple
and universally agreed upon generalizations. Their ability to
combine sophistication of presentation with a readable and easily
understood exposition of the field is impressive.
This book will be an essential resource for students, faculty
and researchers in the social sciences. As suggested earlier, it
should also appeal to those with a wider interest in contemporary
social issues. It deserves to be the standard resource book on the
subject.
Christine Cousins, Society, Work and Welfare in Europe. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1999. $55.00 hardcover.
It is only in relatively recent times that social policy scholars
have again focused on the role of employment in the promotion
of social welfare. Although full employment was a fundamental
component of both the New Deal and Beveridge proposals, mainstream social policy paid little attention to labor market issues
and focused instead on the social services, and on issues of social
service delivery. Today, employment is once again an important
element in social policy The requirement that needy people be
required to work is central to so-called welfare reform in the
United States and Britain. In Europe, where unemployment rates
are comparatively high, labor market flexibility is a perennial
theme in social policy discourse.
In this interesting and ambitious book, Christine Cousins
examines diverse aspects of employment policy in Europe and its
relationship with social policy. The book traces developments in
four European nations-Britain, Germany, Spain and Swedenand examines the way changing employment patterns over the
last fifty years have affected social policy thinking. The four
countries chosen offer examples of both policy divergence and
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convergence. All four have been described as 'welfare states' and
all four have adopted policies that link employment to social
welfare. On the other hand, there are siginifcant differences in the
way these policies operate and the way they address fundamental
social needs.
The book covers an enormous field and at times, appears
to lack coherence. However, this is largely due to its ambitious
sweep over a wide range of topics. These include discussions of
Fordism and flexible specialization in industrial production, the
growth of 'non-standard' employment, the increasing role and
significance of women in the labor market, regional differences
in labor markets and industrial production, gender inequality and
discrimination in employment, and the merits of social exclusion
as an alternative concept to that of poverty. The book also provides
an excellent summary of employment trends in the four European
nations since the Second World War.
Although Cousin's does not attempt to compare European
trends with those in the United States, her book contains much
information that will be of interest to American readers. The
problem of persistently high unemployment; the idea of social
exclusion as a uniquely European approach to conceptualizing
social ilfare; and the idea that active labor market policies are
a major responsibility of government deserves the attention of
readers in the United States and indeed, other countries as well.
This book should be widely read. Hopefully, it will encourage social policy scholars to pay more attention to issues of employment
and social policy.
Stephen P. Wernet, Managed Care in Human Services, Chicago, IL:
Lyceum Books, 1999. $32.95 papercover.
The term 'managed care' is widely used today but there is
still much confusion about its meaning and implications. In the
popular media, it is used primarily to criticize HMOs for failing to provide adequate medical services to people with serious
health conditions. In psychotherapy, it gloomily foretells the imminent end of private practice. In the social services it is more
broadly used to refer to the contracting out of services to nongovernmental organizations. Frequently, it connotes the involvement of for-profit groups in the provision of these services.
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As these examples show, there is a need to clarify these different meanings and to provide a comprehensive account of developments in the field. This helpful book, edited by Stephen Wernet
goes a long way towards meeting this goal. It contains a number
of interesting contributions on different aspects of managed care.
Wernet's opening chapter sets out to describe managed care and
to define the complex jargon which is used by those working
in managed care programs. Several chapters discuss managed
care in the context of child welfare, mental health and children's
behavioral health. One chapter deals with the way managed care
is impacting psychotherapeutic practice and the book concludes
with a brief assessment of some of the issues and debates surrounding the topic.
While the book makes a useful contribution to the literature,
it does not fully meet the need for a comprehensive account of
managed care. The role of managed care in corrections is only
mentioned fleetingly, and the implications of managed care for
mainstream medical social work are not discussed. Some of the
chapters tend to repeat material presented by other contributors.
These deficiencies stem largely from the fact that the book is an
edited collection and not a systematic, single authored explication
of the subject. Nevertheless, it contains much useful information
and should be widely consulted by social workers and human
services personnel.
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